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Abstract

This thesis examines the policy perspectives related to technology transfer and the
resulting implications on scientific research. The study seeks to answer whether domestic
and international laws and policies support a developmental perspective towards scientific
research and technology transfer. The study finds that while university policies,
government policies as well as international treaties aim to achieve the adoption o f a
“developmental” model for technology transfer, the commercialization o f resources or
research through interaction with multinational companies does not necessarily lead to
better access, products, revenue or increased innovation. On the contrary, it is argued that
the “developmental” model makes room for an exploitative one, giving rise to problems
in a variety o f research situations from academic patenting to biopiracy. This thesis
supports an open access model to attain the policy objectives o f greater use o f research, as
well as furthering the goal o f “knowledge-sharing.”

Keywords:
Academic Patent, Biopiracy, Knowledge sharing, Materials Transfer Agreement,
Research, Technology, Technology Transfer

m

Dedication

To my parents, Dr. N.N Tripathy and Mrs. Radha Tripathy, for reminding me that
research is a skill that requires not only planning and patience, also courage and closure.
Mummy Papa, this thesis is a reality because o f you!

IV

Acknowledgement

This thesis saw the light o f day due to the support, love and inspiration of some
wonderful individuals that I came across at the University o f Western Ontario, Canada.

I extend my deep gratitude to Prof. Mark Perry, my thesis supervisor for his incessant
patience and guid ance. Sir, your encouragement, insightful suggestions and generous
financial assistance kept me motivated while writing the thesis. My heart-felt thanks to
Dr. Priti Krishna for her warmth and culinary treats. Thank you Dr. Krishna for letting me
know that being unconventional may be a blessing after all.

I am grateful to Prof. Thomas Telfer for the valuable remarks and feedback, which helped
infuse clarity to the structure o f the final version of the thesis. A special thanks to Prof.
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Prof. Margaret Martin and Prof. Richard Bronaugh, my LLM
course instructors at Western Law. The engaging discussions during class were helpful in
guiding my thought-process in the formative stages o f developing the thesis idea.

Thank you Dr. Thomas Margoni, Dr. Ramesh Karky and Deepshika Dutt for exchanging
thoughts about my thesis. I am grateful to John Sadler, Bruce Fyfe and the supporting
staff o f the John and Bitsova Family Law Library and D.B Weldon Library for helping
me find the necessary resources for my research. A very special thanks to Veronica
D ’Souza for helping me settle in and tide through the inclement winter at London.
It was always very inspirational to be around you all!

V

Table of Contents
CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION.............................................................................. ii
Abstract..................................................................................................................................... iii
Dedication..................................................................................................................................iv
Acknowledgement.....................................................................................................................v
Table of Contents..................................................................................................................... vi
List of Abbreviations.................................................................................................................x
List of Tables.......................................................................................................................... xiii
List of Figures......................................................................................................................... xiv
Chapter 1................................................................................................................................... 01
1. Introduction........................................................................................................................ 01
1.1 Historical Account o f Technology T ransfer........................

04

1.2 The Present Study: Aims, Scope and Structure..............................................................07
1.2.1 Aims o f the Study.......................................................................................................... 07
1.2.2 Limitation o f the S tu d y .................................................................................................09
1.2.3 Structure o f the Study

09

11

Chapter 2

2. Conceptual Nuances o f Technology Transfer..................................................................11
2.1 Technology Transfer: Definitional Concerns.................................................................11
2.2 What is Technology?........................................................................................................11
2.3 What is Technology transfer?.......................................................................................... 16
2.4 Commercialization o f publicly funded R&D : A multidimensional process..............19
2.5 Summary............................................................................................................................ 21
Chapter 3 ...................................................................................................................................22
3. Technology Transfer: A Domestic Outlook..................................................................... 22
3.1 Technology Transfer as a Mission of Research Institutes............................................ 24
3.2 Knowledge sharing : Preserving the ethos of science...................................................27
3.3 Technology Transfer : The Laws and Policies............................................................ 32
3.3.1 The US Bayh Dole Act, 1980 : A Full Commercialization Approach....................33
3.3.2 The Canadian approach to commercialization of publicly funded research.............36
3.3.3 Academic Capitalism: An Evil Paradox......................................................................52
3.3.3.1 The Experimental Use Exception : A Peculiar Exemption...................................57
3.4 Summary............................................................................................................................ 69

vii

Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................................. 72
4. Technology Transfer: An International Viewpoint.......................................................... 72
4.1 Technology Transfer : A Developmental Approach......................................................76
4.2 TRIPS and Technology T ransfer.....................................................................................79
4.3 Challenges to the Developmental Approach: Barriers to Access and Transfer.......... 84
4.4 CBD and TRIPS: Identifying the relationship..............................................................87
4.5 TRIPS and CBD: Is there a conflict?.............................................................................. 94
4.5.1 Private rights versus Community rights................................................................... 102
4.5.2 Modem technology and Traditional know ledge......................................................106
4.5.3 Access and Benefit-Sharing Arrangements............................................................. 108
4.6 Can CBD and TRIPS be reconciled?............................................................................ 112
4.7 Summary..........................................................................................................................114
Chapter 5...................................................................................... ..........................................117
5. Conclusion........................................................................................................................ 117
5.1 Recommendations and Alternative approaches........................................................... 121
5.2 Future R esearch............................................................................................................. 130
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................131

vm

160

Appendix

A. Ontario Research and Commercialization Projects.......................................................160
B. Revenue Canada Provisions............................................................................................168
C. Federal SR&ED Program o f C anada............................................................................171
D. Federal and Provincial SR&ED Tax Incentives in C anada........................................ 172
E. 192 Member States o f the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992................ 174
F. Member states o f the Group of 7 7 ................................................................................. 176
Curriculum V itae................................................................................................................... 178

IX

List of Abbreviation

ABS

: Access and Benefit Sharing

AIDS

: Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome

ARV

: Antiretroviral

AUTM

: Association o f University Technology Managers

CBD

: United Nation’s Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992

CGIAR

: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

CITES

: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora

CRA

: Canada Revenue Agency

CUDOS

: Communalism, Universalism, Disinterestedness, Organised Scepticism

EPO

: European Patent Office

FDI

: Foreign Direct Investment

GATT

: General Agreement on Tariff and Trade

IARCs

: International Agricultural Research Centres

IBRD

: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IPR

: Intellectual Property Rights

ITPGRFA

: United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organisation’s International
Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 2001

LDCs

: Least Developed Countries

MAT

: Mutually Agreed Terms

MIT

: Massachusetts Institute o f Technology

MNCs

: Multi National Corporations

MRI

: Ministry o f Research and Innovation

MTAs

: Material Transfer Agreements

NGO

: Non Governmental Organisations

NIEO

: New International Economic Order

OMAFRA

: Ontario Ministry o f Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs

ORCP

: Ontario Research and Commercialization Program

PGRs

: Plant Genetic Resources

PIC

: Prior Informed Consent

PSIA

: Public Servants Inventions Act

R&D

: Research and Development

RTLA

: Reach Through License Agreement

XI

SMTA

: Standard Material Transfer Agreement

SR&ED

: Scientific Research and Experimental Development

TLOs

: Technology Liaison Officers

TRIPS

: The World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Trade Related aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, 1995

TTOs

: Technology Transfer Offices

UN

: United Nation Organisation

UNCTAD

: United Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development

US

: United States of America

USPTO

: United States Patent and Trademark Office

VCLT

: Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties

WIPO

: World Intellectual Property Organisation

xn

List of Tables
Table 1: Revenue Sharing Policy o f Mount Sinai Hospital, Ontario, Canada................... 21
Table 2: Income Received from Intellectual Property - 2008.............................................46
Table 3: Expenditure on Intellectual Property Management - 2008..................................47
Table 4: Income Cost & Surplus - 2008.............................................................................. 48
Table 5: Allocation o f Net Income in Canadian Universities............................................ 49

xiii

List of Figures
Figure 1: Attributes o f Technology.......................................................................................16
Figure 2: The Multidimensional Process of Technology Transfer................................... 20
Figure 3: Commercialization of Academic Research.........................................................26
Figure 4: Types o f uses contemplated by MTAs................................................................ 31
Figure 5: Model for Economic & Sustainable Development............................................. 85
Figure 6: The Conflicting Relationship between CBD & TRIPS....................................100
Figure 7: Flowchart o f Arguments......................................................................................129

XIV

1

Chapter 1

1.

Introduction
[E]ach generation has been benefitting by the trials and failures o f the
preceding generation... Step by step the science o f mathematics has
advanced immensely since the time o f Newton. Our modem steam
engines and locomotives far surpass those o f Watt and Robert
Stephenson and so it is with every item which goes to form that which
we term our civilization. We have risen, step by step, on the ladders and
scaffolds erected by our predecessors.1
- Alfred Russel Wallace
This essay by Alfred Russel Wallace reflects the success o f human endeavour and

its ensuing progress. If mankind were credited for all that has been achieved, there would
be much reason for celebration. While that may be a joyful thought, the endeavour that
has contributed to the greatness of mankind has undergone an immense transformation.
This endeavour is known as “knowledge sharing” which has been a primary factor in
human progress. An affirmation of this transformed endeavour is the tale of the San
tribe.2*The San are known to traditionally eat parts o f the hoodia plant as an appetite
suppressant on their long hunting trips in areas o f the Kalahari Desert in Southern Africa.
The tribe has lived off the land in a region that includes Botswana, Namibia, South Africa
and Angola for several years. With a population o f over a hundred thousand people, the

'See, A. R. Wallace, Human Progress: Past and Future 1892 (Boston: Arena, 1892) online:
<http://people.wku.edu/charles.smith/wallace/S445.htm > (last accessed on December 11, 2010).
2 For similar examples see, D. F. Robinson, Confronting Biopiracy - Challenges, Cases and International
Debates (UK: Earthscan, 2010) at 56. [“Robinson”]; See also, J. Kuanpoth, “Closing in on Biopiracy; Legal
Dilemmas and Opportunities” in R. Melendez-Ortiz and V. Sanchez eds., Trading in Genes: Development
Perspectives on Biotechnology, Trade and Sustainability (London: Earthscan, 2005) at 139, 152; See J.
Chen, “There is N o Such Thing as Biopiracy...And it’s a Good Thing Too” (2006) 37 McGeorge L. Rev 32
for counter-examples.
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San tribe is ranked as one of the most impoverished communities in Africa.3 During the
1990s, scientists o f the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(SACSIR) approached the San members to informally discuss the hoodia with them. In
1995, SACSIR filed a patent in South Africa for use o f the active components o f the
hoodia plant, responsible for suppressing appetite. The SACSIR signed an exclusive
licensing agreement with a British company, Phytopharm, and also filed for additional
patents in other countries, earning lucrative royalty payments and license fees.4 The
SACSIR did not consult the San tribe to obtain their informed consent prior to
developing, patenting and commercialising hoodia. No attempt to establish any sort of
benefit-sharing arrangement was made. The publicity o f the returns generated due to the
patents on the hoodia plant led other herbal supplement companies to start collecting the
plant excessively. By 2006, trade in the hoodia-related products had escalated
exponentially - in many cases illegally - from just a few tonnes to more than 600 tonnes
of wet, harvested material per year, sold as ground powder for incorporation into non
patented dietary supplements. Wynberg notes:
[I]n North America in particular, dozens of hoodia products were sold as
diet bars, pills, drinks and juice, traded by a myriad o f companies ‘free
riding’ on the publicity and clinical trials of Phytopharm.5
Threatened by the unregulated harvest from its natural environment, in 2004
hoodia was included in the Appendix of the Convention on International Trade in

3 See, K. Bavikatte, H. Jonas and J. Von Braun, “Shifting Sands o f ABS Best Practice: Hoodia from the
Community Perspective,” in UNU-IAS Traditional Knowledge Initiative: Guest Articles (Japan: UNU-IAS,
2009) at 87. [“Bavikatte et a!'].

4 See, R. Wynberg, “A ccess and Benefit-Sharing Agreements in the Commercial Development o f Hoodia”
in S. Laird and R. Wynberg eds., Access and Benefit-sharing in Practice: Trends in Partnerships Across
Sectors (Montreal: Technical Series N o 38, CBD Secretariat, 2008a) at 33. [“Wynberg”] for similar
discussion.
5 Supra note 4 at 83.
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Endangered Species o f Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in order to restrict the international
trade in hoodia to licensed companies.

Examples of similar unauthorised access to a resource and related know-how from
a country o f origin, patenting o f the resulting technology, and refusal to acknowledge or
share the accrued benefits constitute an abuse of the enterprise of “knowledge sharing.”

Without a doubt, mankind has been able to develop because of its ability to
reason. From time immemorial, ingenuity and ideas emanating from the human mind
have been shaping the future o f the human race.6 This rapid development o f mankind
would have been unattainable had it not been for sharing knowledge around the globe.
Many civilizations in human history have necessarily passed on new ideas, culture and
technology. From the horse cart to jet planes, it is this growth in science and
technological innovation that is an indicator of human progress. With scientific progress,
the speed at which technology evolved into more sophisticated and useful forms
accelerated the need o f bringing the technology from the creator to the market where the
consumer could use it, giving rise to a formal system o f technology transfer. Thus began
the commercialization o f science and technology.

Legal devices such as intellectual property rights grant inventors a limited
monopoly right to exclusively use and commercialize technology. Since the invention is
not in the public domain, the permission o f the inventor must be sought by means of
licensing, contracts and the like. Private ownership o f technology led to technology

6 See for example, L. Fredholm, “The Discovery o f the Molecular Structure o f D N A - The Double Helix”
online: http://nobelprize.org/educational games/medicine/dna double helix/readmore.html (last accessed
on February 11, 2011) for discussion regarding the discovery o f the double helix structure o f the deoxyribose nucleic acid by James Watson and Francis Crick in 1953.
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transfer becoming a multibillion dollar industry.7 With technological innovation
becoming a property, the need for regulating its commercialization and transfer surfaced
and new regulatory measures and policies at the domestic and international level
emerged.
1.1 Historical Account of Technology Transfer
G.K Manning explains:
[F]ew expressions represent so many different meanings to so many
different people as the often-used phrase ‘technology transfer.’8
A further review o f the literature pertaining to these diverse perspectives is
presented to establish that there is an absence o f a model aimed at extracting basic
resources for research and transferring technology. While presenting two parallel strands
o f observation from the literature, it is found that the main participants engaged in
technology transfer activities, and the definition o f that activity, have evolved over time.
Well-known examples such as the Venetian attempts to acquire the secret o f Greek fire
from the Byzantine navy during the late Middle Ages,9 the spread o f the printing press
across Europe after Gutenberg,10 or the British struggle to prevent the export of their
steam engines and textile machinery, which were core technologies o f the industrial

7 See generally, L. Ritchie de Larena, “The Price o f Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost” (2007)
43 Houston L. Rev., Part V opening paragraph at 24. [“Ritchie de Larena”]
8 See, G. K Manning, Technology Transfer: Successes and Failures (San Francisco: San Francisco Press,
1974) at 54.
9 See, A. Roland, “Secrecy, Technology and War: Greek Fire and the Defense o f Byzantium” in Technology
and Culture (Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992) 655, 679.
10 See, E.L Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent o f Change: Communications and Cultural
Transformations in Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980) at 44.
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revolution,11 testify that technology transfer is not a modem concept. The specific
historical circumstances which brought increased attention to technology transfer
activities were World War II and its aftermath, the end o f European colonialism, the Cold
War, the dawning of the Space Age and the various technological ages that marked the
last half o f the twentieth century, and the re-emergence o f global economic competition.
These circumstances created the context within which technology transfer practitioners
have operated and imparted a dynamic dimension to the definition o f technology
transfer.12 Human activities such as invention, trade, selling, buying, spying, copying,
empire building and military conquest involved the transfer o f technology. Academics
who have studied technological diffusion have adjusted and extended the concepts of
what it takes for nations, firms and organizations to innovate, adopt and adapt
technologies developed elsewhere.

The end o f World War II left millions devastated, prompting American leaders to
propose and initiate aid programs. This resulted in the Marshall Plan, which is described
as the most massive technology transfer in history.13 The success of the Marshall Plan
influenced the major historical instance o f organized technology transfer, namely the
international aid programs for the less-developed countries (LDCs).14 Western leaders

11 See, J.R. Harris, Essays in Industry and Technology in the Eighteenth Century; England and France
(Brookfield, V.T: Ashgate, 1992) at 56.
12 See, B. Seely, “Historical Patterns in the Scholarship o f Technology Transfer” in Comparative
Technology Transfer and Society (New York: The Colorado Institute for Technology Transfer and
Implementation, 2003) at 34 [“Seely”].
13 S e e , A. Ahmad and A.S Wilkie, “Technology Transfer in the N ew International Economic Order:
Options, Obstacles and Dilemmas” in D.S Papp and J. McIntyre eds., The Political Economy o f
International Technology Transfer (New York: Quorum, 1979) at 79. [“Ahmad and Wilkie”]
14 See, [“Seely”] supra note 12 at 9, wherein it was noted that “pressure to end European colonial rule in
Africa and A sia had grown for decades, but the prostrate condition o f European nations encouraged
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assumed that the creation o f modem economies might be achieved by replicating the
Western development patterns, especially its technology.15 Baark, Elzinga and
Bortgstrom have noted that “common to all Western explanations o f different patterns of
development was the assumption that modernization is essentially European phenomenon
and that Asian development must be analyzed with reference to this European
experience.” 16 Scholars mention that it was during this time that “the vocabulary of
modernization theory incorporated pejorative terms such as underdeveloped before labels
such as more or less developed, Third World and North-South came into vogue.”17
International Organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and private foundations such
as the Rockefeller Foundations played key roles in transferring Western technology. The
UN for instance, initiated the UN Expanded Program o f Technical Assistance in 1950 to
send experts to over 150 countries and train students. The UN also helped in creating the
International Finance Corporation in 1956 having earlier joined with the World Bank to

nationalist leaders. Britain bowed to the inevitable, granting India and Pakistan independence in 1947 and
creating a Dominion that included many new nations in Africa and Asia. When the French, Dutch and
especially the Portuguese hesitated, bloody wars o f national determination erupted in Algeria, the Congo,
Vietnam and elsew here...but new nations founded with much hope faced daunting economic challenges”;
See also, [“Ahmad and Wilkie”] supra note 13 at 79, wherein it was noted that “these nations soon began to
realize that political freedom could not be construed as an end in itself and that achieving it did not
automatically ensure the social and economic well-being o f their people”; See also, J.D Hargreaves,
Decolonization in Africa (N ew York: Longman, 1988) at 23; See also, M. Zinkin and T. Zinkin, Britain and
India : Requiem fo r Empire (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964) at 44 wherein it was
noted that “new nations [like India] founded with much hope faced daunting econom ic challenges”.
15 See [“Seely”] supra note 12 at 9.
16 See, A. Elzinga, B. Bortgstrom and E. Baark, Technological Change and Cultural Impact on Asia and
E u ro p e-A Critical Review o f the Western Theoretical Heritage (Lund, Sweden: Research Policy Institute,
University o f Lund, 1980) at 1.
17 See for instance [“Ahmad and Wilkie”] supra note 13 at 79.
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establish the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). In 1960 the
1o

two agencies partnered to create the International Development Agency.

It is noteworthy that the common feature of assistance from Foundations, the UN
and the World Bank was the assumption that economic development required the transfer
o f advanced Western technology. Technology transfer emerged as an essential tool for
furthering innovation, foreign aid and economic development by means of capacity
building. Having reiterated that scholarly interest with the concept o f technology transfer
is uncommon, the ensuing section discusses the outline o f this thesis.

1.2 The Present Study: Aims, Scope and Structure

1.2.1 Aims of the Study
This study aims to identify the emerging models o f scientific research and
technology transfer, the conflicts and synergies between profit-making and conservation
o f basic resources, and to arrive at an understanding of the approaches and consequences
o f commercialization and patenting of basic science and technology at the domestic and
international levels.

The legislative purpose o f domestic laws and policies in developed countries such
as United States of America (US) and Canada, as well as the international regulatory
framework relating to technology transfer, favours better access, products, revenue or18
18 See, W .A Brown Jr and R Opie, American Foreign Assistance (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1953) 399,406; See also, P.G Hoffman, World Without Want (New York: Harper & Row, 1962)
114,115; See also, G. Rosen, Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents o f Change in South Asia,
1950-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) at 45; See also, United Nations
Technical Assistance Board, 15 Years and 150,000 Skills : An Anniversary Review o f the United Nations
Expanded Programme o f Technical Assistance (New York: United Nations Economic and Social Council,
1965).
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increased innovation. This perspective is labelled as the “developmental” model.
However, in order to implement the domestic laws, policies and international regulations,
increased interaction with private industry is required, making way for a new perspective.
The perspective o f the private industry is labelled as the “corporate” model. The central
claim of the study is that, inherent in the “developmental” model for scientific
research and technology transfer is the “corporate” model which gives rise to
problems in a variety of research situations from academic patenting at the micro
level to biopiracy at the macro level of policy making.

Generally, this study aims to provide an answer to the main question: whether
laws and policies pertaining to technology transfer at the domestic and international level
support a “developmental” perspective towards scientific research and technology
transfer? Furthermore, this study also aims to provide answers for the following
questions: First, what are the implications o f excessive commercialization of science and
technology on the traditional enterprise o f “knowledge sharing”? And second, does the
“corporate” model transform the traditional enterprise o f “knowledge sharing” into an
exploitative one at the domestic as well as the international level?

The analysis begins with a discussion o f the theoretical model o f optimum
scientific production and leads to examination o f laws and regulations related to the
commercialization o f science and technology at the micro and macro level of policy
making. The conflicts pertaining to the goals o f commercialization of scientific research
and technology transfer in the World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Trade Related
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1995 (TRIPS) and the conservation of resources
essential for scientific research and technological development hailed in the United

9

Nation’s Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 (CBD) are examined. The TRIPS
Agreement is the framework treaty determinative o f international policy making
regarding commercialization of scientific research and technology transfer. Hence, the
interpretative analysis o f the provisions pertaining to technology transfer in TRIPS will
prove the presence o f a “developmental” model at the international level in principle. The
study will further analyze the technology transfer provisions in CBD in relation to TRIPS
to argue that the “developmental” model in essence is a “corporate” model making room
for exploitation in research scenarios.

1.2.2 Limitation of the Study
The scope o f the study is limited to the policy approaches pertaining to technology
transfer in the developed countries o f US and Canada at the domestic level and the TRIPS
and CBD at the international treaty framework. Regional approaches such as North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and arrangements within private international
law are not discussed in this study.

1.2.3 Structure of the Study
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the subject matter
and the historical account o f the phenomenon o f technology transfer. The chapter also
describes the aims, scope and the structure o f this study. Chapter 2 discusses various
definitions, concepts and processes pertaining to technology transfer available in the
literature. Chapter 3 describes the theories o f optimal scientific production to highlight
the norm o f “communalism” and the prevalent policy models for commercialization of
scientific research and development in the developed countries o f US and Canada so as to
comprehend the domestic approach to technology transfer. Chapter 4 examines the

10
provisions pertaining to technology transfer in TRIPS and the CBD to note the presence
o f a “corporate” model within the “developmental” model in the international regulatory
framework. Chapter 5 is the conclusion describing the findings in terms of the issues and
existing conflicts between the parties at the domestic and international level. Suggestions
to adopt an “open access” model instead of total privatization o f scientific research are
made. The newly adopted multilateral system under the United Nation’s Food and
Agriculture Organisation’s International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture, 2001 (ITPGRFA) is cited as an example o f a positive start at the
international level to further the public interest in terms o f conservation of resources for
future scientific research and the goal of “knowledge sharing.”
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Chapter 2

2.

Conceptual Nuances of Technology Transfer
[Technology discloses the active relation of man towards nature, as well
as the direct process o f production of his very life, and thereby the
processes o f production o f his basic societal relations, o f his own
mentality, and his images o f society, too.19
- Karl Marx
Marx’s definition of technology signifies the social relevance o f its relation with

man’s development. This chapter explains the concepts and meanings o f the essential
terms related to the process o f transferring technology.

2.1 Technology transfer: Definitional concerns
The term technology transfer has been used to denote a very wide range of
activities. Part o f the ambiguity associated with it stems from the term “technology.”
Therefore, before delving into the conceptual nuances of technology transfer, it is
imperative to define what is meant by “technology.”

2.2 What is technology?

Eminent scholars have grappled with the difficulty o f defining the term
“technology.”20 The traditional perception o f technology which originated with Aristotle
and is still held by many philosophers is the view that “technology is a human
arrangement o f techniques - tools, machines, instruments, materials, sciences and

19 K. Marx, “Machinery and Big Industry” in Das Kapital (New York: Regnery Publishing Inc, 1967) at 35.
20 See, G. A Klein, and B. Crandall, “Finding and Using Technology-Specific Expertise” (1991) 16 JTT at
23; See also, J. Rogers, and B. Bozeman, “Basic Research and Technology Transfer in Federal
Laboratories” (1997) 22 JTT at 37.
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personnel - to make possible and serve the attainment o f human ends.”2123Barry Bozeman
laments that unlike circumstances in which definitional difficulties can be quickly
resolved by simply relying on the dictionary, the term technology poses a unique
problem.

The definitions o f technology provided by the Webster Dictionary,

do not

offer respite in setting the definitional difficulties to rest. According to the dictionary,
technology is defined as “the science or study o f the practical industrial arts,” “the terms
used in a science, technical terminology,” “applied science,” “a method, process, et cetera
for handling a specific technical problem,” and “the system by which a society provides
its members with those things needed or desired.”24 While this definition may serve as a
starting point, study o f technology requires a fundamental meaning. For instance
technology also includes “the skills, knowledge and procedures for making, using and
doing useful things,”25 or “the means and capacity to perform a particular activity.”26 In
its commercial context, technology is taken to embrace the “knowledge of how to make

21 See, C. Singer, “L.T Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture N o. 21,” in Technology and History (London:
Oxford University Press, 1952) at 19, noting that “...the essence o f history is no politics but technology...”
[“Charles Singer”]; See also, J.W Cohen, “Technology and Philosophy” (1955) 3 Colarado Quarterly at 4.
22 See, B. Bozeman, “Technology Transfer and Public Policy: A R eview o f Research and Theory” (2000)
29 Research Policy 627. [“Barry Bozeman”].
23 See, D. Guralnik ed, Webster’s New World Dictionary, 2ed., (Toronto, Canada: Nelson, Foster and Scott
Ltd, 1970) at 1460. [“Webster”].
24 See, [“Webster”] supra note 23 at 1460; see also, P. Speser, “The Game o f Technology Transfer” in Art
and Science o f Technology Transfer (Canada : John W iley & Sons, 2006) at 10, for discussion regarding
application o f technology transfer in a day to day scenario such as having cereal for breakfast.
25 See, R. S Merril, “The Study o f Technology,” in D.L. Sills, ed., Encyclopaedia o f Social Sciences
(1968), quoted in UNITAR Res Report, no. 14 (1971) 3.
26 See, W.H Gruber and D.G. Marquis, “Research on the Human Mind” in Factors in the Transfer of
Technology (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1969) at 255.
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use of factors o f production to produce goods or services for which there is an economic
demand.”27
Bozeman mentions “works on technology transfer generally focus on technology
as an entity or a tool, not a study and certainly not any specific applied science.”28
Notable theorist Devendra Sahal presents an alternative to the dictionary meaning of
technology and the confusion owing to poorly specified concepts, by observing “these
products, processes and configurations are not useful without knowledge of their
applications.”29 Sahal’s notion o f technology supports the view that without that
knowledge base the physical entity cannot be put to use. The knowledge base is inherent,
not ancillary to technology.30 Thus, the definitions o f technology do no more than to
describe one or more o f the combinations of skills or rights embodied within the notion.
Reference is made to whether it is embodied in a tangible form such as in plant,
machinery, or skilled labour; whether it is intangible such as managerial knowledge and
technical skills; or to whether it is enshrined in legal documents such as patent licenses,
know-how agreements or registered designs. The quantum o f knowledge, he explains,

27 See, A. Brown, “Impact o f Patents and Licenses on the Transfer o f Technology” in S. Gee, ed.,
Technology Transfer in Industries Countries (New York: John W iley & Sons Inc, 1979) at 311.
28 See, [“Barry Bozeman”] supra note 22 at 628; See also, J. K. Fiebleman, “Pure Science, Applied Science,
Technology, Engineering: An Attempt at Definitions” (1961) 2 Technology and Culture 305, noting that
“...[B ]y pure science or basic research is meant a method o f investigating nature by the experimental
method in an attempt to satisfy the need to know. By applied science is meant the use o f pure science for
some practical human purpose. Thus science serves two human purposes: to know and to do...”
29 See, D. Sahal, “Alternative conceptions o f technology” (1981) 10 Research Policy at 2. [“Devendrá
Sahal”].
30 See [“Charles Singer”] supra note 21 at 629; See also, E.W Hayden, Technology Transfer to East
Europe: US Corporate Experience (New York: Praeger, 1976) at 23 for another example.
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“comprises

two

parts:

the

engineering

documentation

and

the

manufacturing

techniques.”3132

In the international realm, the working definition o f technology is that employed
in the Licensing Guide for Developing Countries, produced by the World Intellectual
Property Organisation (“WIPO”):
Technology is the systematic knowledge for product manufacture and
service provision in industry, farming and commercial fields. Knowledge
is reflected in inventions, utility models, designs, and in data forms.
Knowledge is also shown in industrial plants, design, installation,
operation, and equipment maintenance, management o f industrial &
commercial corporations, the technical skill and experience of experts for
those activities. 2
In this definition, it must be noted that technology is knowledge. However, not all
knowledge is included. That is, knowledge must be transferable and it must be systematic
so as to satisfy needs and problems that arise in special fields o f human activity including
industry, farming and commerce. So, there are three standards in the definition of
technology as per the WIPO. First, knowledge must be systematic. This means that it
must be organized in terms o f providing solutions to problems. Second, knowledge must
exist in certain places like in someone’s head or in documents, and must be able to be
presented, so no matter what it means it must be able to be transferred from one person to
another. Third, it must be oriented towards purpose, so that it can be utilized in industry,
farming and commercial fields. This definition highlights the importance o f technology to
all stages of a commercial or industrial endeavour. Thus technology has a role to play in
the definition o f a need, the evaluation o f relevant technical solutions, design work and

31 Ibid.
32 See, WIPO, Licensing Guide fo r Developing Countries (Geneva: WIPO, 1977) at 28.
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the installation, operation and maintenance of the appropriate technical solution essential
for the need which has been defined. This study refers to the term technology as the
application o f scientific knowledge or research. That is to say, technology is the use of
scientific knowledge by a given society at a given moment to resolve concrete problems
facing its development. It would be, thus erroneous to limit the description of technology
to only the device33 or process or configuration34 or just the knowledge of the construct’s
applications, while adopting a study on transfer of technology especially since today
technology transfer is not limited to the local boundaries but has become an international
phenomenon. The problem with limiting the description o f technology to such strict
applications leads to several assumptions. For instance, it is often assumed that if a
machine or a technique o f production works perfectly well in the country and
circumstances in which it was created and nurtured, it ought to do just fine in any other
locale when transferred.35 This is however not true in all circumstances as it depends on
the recipient country’s capacity to absorb the technology.

Figure 1 describes the attributes o f technology. Technology emanates from
scientific knowledge or research that is then applied and fixed in a material form such as a
document or device. It is for the purpose o f problem solving and is afforded legal
protection from misappropriation. Technology most importantly must be transferable and
accessible to the user. The transfer o f technology may be facilitated by direct or indirect

33 See [“Charles Singer”] supra note 21 at 5, noting that “...[A] high tech example o f technology is a cancer
detection probe, comprised o f sensing devices that detect responses in tissues to specific wavelengths o f
light and electrical impulses, and o f a computer system that transfers and interprets the signals, and relates
them to tissue types.”
34 See [“Devendrá Sahal”] supra note 29 at 4.
35 See, A. I. Akubue, “Technological Capabilities and Industrialization” (1990) 2 JTS 15.
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means. Direct technology transfer refers to specific technologies being transferred by
means of visible channels such as contract or cooperative research projects. Indirect
technology transfer concerns knowledge exchanged through informal meetings, seminars,
publications or workshops.

Scientific
Knowledge

Applied in a
material form

Technology

Purpose
Oriented

Legally
Protectable

Transferable

Figure 1: Attributes o f Technology

2.3 What is technology transfer?

Technology transfer is defined in many different ways, sometimes according to
the discipline o f the research, and also according to the purpose o f the research. For
instance, economists tend to define technology transfer on the basis of “the properties of

17
i/r

generic knowledge,”

m

focusing particularly on “variables that relate to production and

design.”3637 H. Brooks38 has presented a generalised economic perspective o f the term
technology transfer by describing it as:
[T]he process by which science and technology are diffused throughout
human activity. Wherever systematic rational knowledge developed by
one group or institution is embodied in a way o f doing things by other
institutions or groups, we have technology transfer. This can be either
transfer from more basic scientific knowledge into technology or
adaptation of an existing technology to a new use.39 [emphasis added\
Sociologists tend to associate technology transfer with innovation and view
technology, including social technology, as a design for instrumental action that reduces
the uncertainty of cause and effect relationships involved in achieving a desired
outcome.40 Anthropologists tend to view technology transfer broadly within the context of
cultural change and the ways in which technology affects change,41 while management
scholars tend to focus on stages o f technology transfer, particularly relating design and
36 See, K. Arrow, “Classificatory notes on the Production and Transmission o f Technological Knowledge,”
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings o f the Eighty-first Annual Meeting o f the American
Economic Association (Washington, D.C: American Economic Association, 1969) at 32. [“Arrow”]; See
also, H. Johnson, “The Efficiency and Welfare Implications o f the International Corporation” in C.
Kindleger, ed., International Corporations (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970) at 24 [“Johnson”];
See also, G. D osi, “The Nature o f the Innovation Process,” in G. D osi, et al. eds., Technical Change and
Economic Theory (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988) at 22 [“D osi”].
37 See also, C. Freeman and L. Soete, The Economics o f Industrial Innovation, 3rd ed (London: Washington
Printer, 1997) at 15.
38 See, H. Brooks, “National Science Policy and Technology Transfer,” Proceedings o f a Conference on
Technology Transfer and Innovation, National Science Foundation Publication No. NSF (Washington D.C:
National Science Foundation, 1966).
391bid.
40 See, E.M. Rogers, Diffusion o f Innovations (New York: The Free Press o f Glencoe, 1962); See also, E.M.
Rogers, F. F. Shoemaker, Communication o f Innovations: A Cross Cultural Approach (New York: Free
Press, 1971).
41 See, G.M. Foster, Traditional Cultures and the Impact o f Technological Change (New York: Harper
Publishing, 1962) at 20; See also, R. Merrill, “The Role o f Technology in Cultural Evolution” in Social
Biology (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1972) at 246.
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production stages, as well as sales, to transfer.42 J. D. Roessner,43 an eminent policy
maker, defines the concept as “the movement o f know-how, technical knowledge, or
technology from one organizational setting to another.” He notes:
The term has been used to describe and analyze an astonishingly wide
range o f organizational and institutional interactions involving some
form o f technology-related exchange. ‘Sources’ of technology have
included private firms, government agencies, government laboratories,
universities, non-profit research organizations, and even entire nations;
‘users’ have included schools, police and fire departments, small
businesses, legislatures, cities, states and nations. Within single
organizations such as large, research-intensive private firms, technology
transfer has been used to describe the processes by which ideas, proofs-of
concept, and prototypes move from research-related to production-related
phases o f product development.44
It is clear that the existing literature on technology transfer describes the
movement of applied scientific knowledge between various institutions. Transferring the
technology created in the laboratory to someone who may be able to use and build on it is
typically referred to as technology transfer. Technology transfer is necessary because any
idea, no matter how innovative or merely conceived and maintained in the brain, will
have no value until the idea is transferred to a user. Some literature refers to the same
process as ‘knowledge transfer.’45 Scholars also note that innovation may be thought of as

42 See, D. Teece, “Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost o f Transferring
Technological Know-How” (1977) The Economic Journal 242 at 245; See also, A. Lake, “Technology
Creation and Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms” in Research in International Business and
Finance (Greenwich: Jai Press, 1979) at 137.
43 See, J.D. Roessner, “Technology Transfer” in press, C. Hill,.ed.,in Science and Technology Policy in the
US, A Time o f Change, (London: Longman, 1993) [“Roessner”]; See also, H. Norman Abramson, et al,
Technology Transfer Systems in the United States and the Germany, Lessons and Perspectives (Washington
: National Academy Press, 1997) for a comprehensive definition o f technology transfer processes in the
United States and Germany.
44 See [“Roessner”] supra note 43 at 1.
45 See, L. Argote and P. Ingram, “Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive Advantage in Firm” in
Organization Behaviour and Human Decision Processes (London: Artech House Inc, 2000) at 150.
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the whole process from idea to finished product while technology transfer is the means of
achieving innovation.46 According to Lazar Sama:
Technology transfer is merely part of the commercialization process and
refers to the process of transferring intellectual property whether or not it
is fully developed or subject to protection from the inventor to a
commercial agent, or any other party on the road to commercialization47
Therefore technology transfer has involved the commercialization of scientific
knowledge for transferring technology from the originator to the consumer for income
generation.

2.4 Commercialization of publicly funded R&D: A multidimensional process
The process o f technology transfer is a multi-dimensional process, involving
science, business and law. Figure 2 from a university hospital model in Canada is an
illustration explaining the interrelationship in that environment. The process of
technology transfer begins from the time of the disclosure o f the invention at the time of
filing for a patent. While the patenting procedure is underway, evaluation o f the
invention’s market potential begins in order to ascertain if it is marketable and at what
scale. Research organizations may not be able to carry out such an evaluation, and
without aid they then try to license the invention to a business corporation or start a
spinoff company. A patent, if the invention passes the examination process, will give the
owner full control over the invention. After the patent approval, if the invention is
licensed, the owner receives the royalties from the licensee. If, on the other hand, a spin-

46 See, I. Cooke and P. Mayes, Introduction to Innovation and Technology Transfer (London: Artech House
Inc, 1996) at 27.
47 See, L. Sama, Commercializing Research and Development: A Guide to Legal and Business Practice
(Canada: LexisN exis Butterworths, 2006) at 5.
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off company is established, then a business plan is developed to market that invention and
the owner may get the revenue from the sale of that invention.
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Figure 2: The Multidimensional Process o f Technology Transfer48
Percentage o f the royalties and the revenue are usually reinvested in research and
further innovation and development. For instance, the net revenue generated in Mount
Sinai, that is, the revenues received less the expenses incurred in seeking protection,
further development and commercialization o f the invention, is shared in the ratio
represented in Table 1.

48 The copyright o f the table vests with Mount Sinai Hospital, Ontario Canada, available on file with the
author, with thanks to Deepshikha Dutt, LLM, University o f Western Ontario.
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Table 1: Revenue Sharing Policy of Mount Sinai Hospital, Ontario, Canada49
Partv

Percentaee o f Revenue

Inventor(s)

40%

Institution

40%

Research

Fund

20%

administered by
Director o f Research

2.5 Summary
The various definitions of the term technology transfer and concepts interlinking
commercialisation of technology and the process o f technology transfer have been
presented in this chapter. The historical evolution o f the processes involve difficulties in
defining what constitutes ‘technology’ and how does technology transfer take place. In
order to simplify the concepts, a diagrammatic representation o f the attributes of
technology is presented in Figure 1. This study defines technology as the result of
application of scientific knowledge and research fixed in a medium, which is capable of
problem solving and should be legally protectable and accessible to the end-user. Figure 2
from a University Hospital model illustrates the multidimensional process of technology
transfer. Having clarified the concepts related to technology transfer, the following
chapters discuss particular implications of commercialising basic science and research.49

49 Email correspondence dated July 04, 2011 with Terry Donaghue, Director, Technology Transfer and
Industry Liaison, Mount Sinai Hospital Foundation, Ontario, Canada.
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Chapter 3

3.

Technology Transfer: A Domestic Outlook

[F]or years a battle has been raging in the courts over expanding versus
constricting patent protection. Universities have generally entered the list
with entrepreneurial firms in advocating broader protection, and hence
greater value for their own [intellectual property]. When money is on the
table, it seems, universities take a narrow view o f the public interest.
Most universities define the mission o f technology transfer in language
that highlights benefits to society. However, social benefits or the public
good can be slippery terms, subject to many interpretations.50
- R. Geiger and C. Sa
The 1970s to 1990s witnessed significant growth in patenting, licensing and start up
company formation by public sector institutions in the US.51 Several survey studies by
Statistics Canada in the year 2003 showed a similar trend in Canada albeit on a smaller
scale.52 Historically, knowledge generated within universities was transferred to the
outside, including to industry.53 Informal knowledge transfers are reportedly the outputs
from universities most highly valued by industry.54 Studies further account that scientists

50 See, R. Geiger and C. Sa, Tapping the Riches o f Science: Universities and the Promise o f Economic
Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008) at 146 (the authors opine that “traditionally,
much o f the knowledge left the university environment with the graduation o f students, in publications and
in conference presentations o f faculty.”) [“Geiger and C. Sa”]
51 See for instance, D.C Mowery et al., “The Growth o f Patenting and Licensing by US Universities : An
Assessment o f the Effects o f the Bayh-Dole Act o f 1980” (2001) 30 Research Policy 99 [“Mowery”]; See
also, Annual Licensing surveys which document this trend, Association o f University Technology
Managers, Surveys, online : <AUTM http://www.autm.net/surveys/> (last accessed January 22,2011).
52 See, Statistics Canada, Survey o f Intellectual Property Commercialization in the Higher Education Sector,
Statistics
Canada
(2003
edition),
online:
http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/88F0006XIE/88F0006XIE2005018.Ddf (last accessed on January

22, 2011).
53 See, M. Herder and J. Johnston, “A ccess Concerns and Business Models in Public-Sector Technology
Transfer o f Genetic Inventions” in E.R Gold and B.M Knoppers eds. Biotechnology IP & Ethics (Ontario:
LexisNexis, 2009) at 165. [“Herder & Johnston”]
54 See, W.M. Cohen, R. N elson and J. Walsh, “Links and Impacts: The Influence o f Public Research on
Industrial R&D” (2002) 48 Management Science 1 at 16; See also, C. Weiner, “Patenting and Academic
Research: Historical Case Studies” (1987) 12 Science, Technology & Human Values 50.
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and researchers are mostly interested in their freedom to

research and not

commercialization.55 Formalized technology transfer has been embraced by Canadian
academic institutions since 1985 due to increased public research funding.56 This chapter
examines the laws and policies supportive o f commercialisation o f scientific research in
US and Canada to ascertain the presence of a “developmental” model. Furthermore, this
chapter discusses the issues connected to the start of the academia-industry partnership
and its impact on the traditional enterprise of “knowledge sharing.” The aim is to address
possible conflicts that arise as a consequence of commercialisation of academic and
scientific research. The potential effects of capitalistic measures on innovation and
scientific endeavours are further summarised.
There are four sections in this chapter, section 3.1 introduces technology transfer as a
mission o f universities and research institutes; section 3.2 explains the theoretical models
o f optimum scientific production to emphasize upon the need for disclosure o f scientific
research results and knowledge sharing; section 3.3 discusses government approaches to
commercialisation o f university generated intellectual property and technology transfer,
namely the US Bayh Dole Act 1980, and specific laws and policies supporting
commercialisation o f research in Canada. Brief discussion o f the issues of patenting on
innovation and scientific progress is undertaken by explaining the relevance of the

55 For one sample study o f European scientists and researchers, see, S. Breschi and V. Tartari, “Set Them
Free: Scientist's Perceptions o f Benefits and Costs o f University- Industry Research Collaboration” in
Papers Presented at the Summer Conference 2009 (Denmark: Copenhagen Business School, 2009).

56
See
also,
J.
Garcia,
“Tech
Transfer
Practices
Canada
Vs
USA”
online:
http://garcantechnologies.eom/archives/l 13 (last accessed September 12, 2011) where the author opines
that the lack o f a country-wide policy governing the practice o f commercialising university research in
Canada makes for a significantly different approach from that o f the US.
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statutory exemption for experimental use o f research material. Lastly, section 3.4
summarises this chapter.

3.1 Technology Transfer as a Mission of Research Institutes
University research has traditionally been “predicated on the free flow and open
sharing o f knowledge.”5758 The norm of open science is widely restated in several
university mission statements and declarations. For instance the mission statement of the
Massachusetts Institute o f Technology (MIT) states:
[T]he Institute is committed to generating, disseminating and preserving
knowledge and to working with others to bring this knowledge to bear on
SR
the world’s great challenges.
International declarations such as the UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the
Status o f Higher-Education Teaching Personnel (November 11, 1997) also reiterate this
sentiment:
[...] Higher education teaching personnel should be free to publish the
results o f research and scholarship in books, journals and databases of
their own choice [.. .]59
Higher education teaching personnel have a right to carry out research
work without any interference, or any suppression, in accordance with
their professional responsibility.60

57 See, B. W. Jones, “Knowledge Commons or Economic Engine - What’s A University For?” (2005) 31 J.
Med Ethics 249 at 249.
58 See fo r example, MIT M ission Statement online : http://web.mit.edu web.mit.edu/mission.html (last
accessed on January 12, 2011); See also, York University, “The M ission o f York University is the pursuit,
preservation and dissemination o f knowledge” online : http//www.yorku.ca/web/about_yorku/mission/ (last
accessed on January 12, 2011); See also, Y. Joly, “Wind o f Change : In Re Fisher and the Evolution o f the
American Biotechnology Patent Law” (2006) 24:1 Law in Context 67 at 68 for a similar reiteration in the
context o f American universities.
59 See, UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status o f Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, Art 12.
60 See, UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status o f Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, Art 29.
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Scientific publications and research papers have all the attributes of technology,
that is they are characterised o f scientific knowledge fixed in a medium, which is capable
o f problem solving, is legally protectable as copyright and transferable to the reader as
publication. Therefore, publishing an experimental result or even a scientific discovery
would constitute ‘indirect’ technology transfer. The primary reason research institutes
engage in ‘direct’ technology transfer is to enhance the likelihood that new discoveries
and innovations, new uses o f physical materials, and new applications o f science to solve
industrial and medical problems, will lead to useful products, processes and services
throughout

the

world

economies.

Technology

transfer

propels

new

research

collaborations, exchanges o f materials, information and personnel with industry, adding
new dimensions to university research programs and, at the same time, presents unique
research opportunities for faculty and students. The resulting income stream from
royalties is shared with inventors, which may assist in retaining faculty who might
otherwise leave the research institute to pursue more lucrative careers in the for-profit
sector. The income benefits the research institute, as it is reinvested in new research and
teaching programs and provides financial support for research.61
Figure 3 illustrates a situation where a faculty scientist who has a grant to conduct
research from a federal fund carries out research with her staff and students and develops
a technology. The next step towards commercialization is the market evaluation of the
newly developed technology. If the market assessment indicates that there is potential
value for the technology, intellectual property protection is sought for the same, for
instance by means o f filing for patents. This stage is followed by negotiations with

61 See, Table 1: Revenue Sharing Policy o f Mount Sinai Hospital, Ontario, Canada at 21, wherein 20% o f
the revenue is diverted back to the research fund administered by Director o f Research.
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interested parties for the technology. Such negotiations are usually carried out by the
Technology Liaison Officers (TLOs). Depending on the nature o f technology and the
progress with the negotiations, either the new technology is licensed to a company,
royalty-free licenses for not-for-profit organizations may be arranged, an industry
sponsored agreement may be entered into or a new start up may be formed for the
purpose of commercializing the technology.

Figure 3: Commercialization o f Academic Research
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3.2 Knowledge sharing: Preserving the ethos of science
Vannevar Bush is credited with conceiving a model known as the ‘public good’
model for the American universities and research institutes in 1945. The ‘public good’
model proposed:
Researchers are to focus on basic science and are entitled to the freedom
to pursue scientific research wherever it leads, whether potentially
profitable or not, and that there is to be a separation o f the university and
the private sector.62
This model presupposes the separation of the university and the for-profit sector.
A similar assumption gained popularity owing to the scholarly contribution of Robert
Merton. The CUDOS model o f science pioneered by Merton is traditionally considered as
the “pillars o f university science.”63 Merton proposed four norms or institutional
imperatives as a set o f ideals that scientists should strive to attain. These norms are
communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and organized scepticism.64 Universalism
refers to the impersonal nature of science,65 that is to say that the “claims of science are
not constrained by social and national markers.”66 Disinterestedness refers to not having

62 See generally, R. Welsh and L. Glenna “Considering the role o f the University in conducting research on
agri-biotechnologies” in Social Studies o f Science (London: Sage Publications, 2006) 929, 942.
63 See, D. Lotter, “The Genetic Engineering o f Food and the Failure o f Science - Part 2: Academic
Capitalism and the Loss o f Scientific Integrity” (2008) 16 Inti J o f Soc o f Agri and Food 50, 68 [“Lotter”];
See also, J.A Schuster, The Scientific Revolution: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy o f Science
(Wollongong: University o f Wollongong, 1995).
64 In later writings Merton discussed two additional norms, namely originality and humility. Originality
refers to the value o f priority o f discovery which is reward-worthy. Humility is thought o f as an extended
version o f disinterestedness, wherein the scientist submits his idea for peer review and accepts the refutation
o f a cherished idea as positive criticism; See, R. K Merton, The Sociology o f Science : Theoretical and
Empirical Investigations (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1973) at 297,302. [“Merton - 1973”]

65 See [“Merton - 1973”], supra note 64 at 270. Merton mentions that “because there is no such thing as
American, French or German science, the claims o f science are not accepted or rejected because o f “the
personal or social attributes o f their protagonist; ...race, nationality, religion, class and personal qualities
are as such irrelevant.”
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any vested interest and willingly subjecting the research results for correction, review and
retraction at the hands o f peers,666768w hile organized scepticism is an institutional norm
characterized by “hypothesis testing and experimental control.’
“Knowledge sharing” is encompassed by Merton’s norm o f “communalism.” The
theoretical strength o f the norm which calls for the open and full communication of
scientific findings and denounces secrecy has been challenged by increased pressure to
immediately patent research results by the technology transfer offices (TTOs).
Communalism refers to the sharing o f scientific information among scientists and for the
good o f the scientific enterprise. According to Merton, the scientific goods being common
property, scientists are expected to adhere to the public character of knowledge. The
norms were reflective o f the cooperative nature of scientific research. Communalism
ensures

that

“secrecy

was

condemned,

while

timely,

open

publication

was

rewarded.”69According to Merton:

The substantive findings of science [...] constitute a common heritage in
which the equity of the individual producer is severely limited. An
eponymous law or theory does not enter into the exclusive possession of
66 See, D. K ellogg, “Towards a Post-Academic Science Policy: Scientific Communication and the Collapse
o f the Mertonian Norms” (2006) Inti J o f Communication Law and Policy 4 [“K ellogg”] wherein Kellogg
mentions, “Universalism for Merton does not mean that the claims o f science are universally applicable or
universally true; his point is that limits on scientific claims are determined by the rules o f science rather
than by the prejudices o f society.”
67 See also [“Lotter”] supra note 63 at 2, wherein Lotter mentions that Merton held the view that “scientists
must remain detached from their research, and that results must always be subject to healthy skepticism”;
See also, [“K ellogg”], supra note 66 at 4, wherein K ellogg mentions, “[b]y referring to science as
disinterested, Merton does not mean that scientists possess no internal motivation. Scientists are surely
guided in their work by passions and commitments; however, in submitting their work to peer review and
testing by the scientific community, Merton pointed out, scientists subordinate their own interests to the
wider protocols o f the institution.”
68 See [“K ellogg”], supra note 66 at 5.
69 See [“Merton - 1957”], supra note 64 at 45:557.
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the discoverer and his heirs, nor do the mores bestow upon them special
rights of use and disposition. Property rights in science are whittled
down to a bare minimum by the rationale o f the scientific ethic.70
[emphasis added]
Merton seemed to have referred to patents as a tool whose rights of use and non
use lead to the suppression or withholding of knowledge, as opposed to the rationale of
scientific production and diffusion.71 In the main, Mertonian communalism advocated the
notion that, “secrecy is the antithesis o f this norm”72 and that “scientists may not hoard
the information they develop or the conclusions they draw, but they must freely share
their results, methods and materials.”73

[C]ommunalism is the norm of open science by which scientific
knowledge belongs to the community and should be “assigned to the
community” rather than the scientist [.. .]74
The rationale behind this notion is that disclosure o f scientific information may
lead to further innovation or even improved research results, thereby facilitating progress
and development. Therefore, the Mertonian model, and especially the norms of
disinterestedness and communalism reject the possibility for commercializing research
and advocate knowledge sharing. Recent legal scholarship reiterates the justification for
the communal approach as a role o f the University:

70 See [“Merton - 1957”] supra note 64 at 45:557.
71 Ibid at 46: 558.
72 See [“Merton - 1973”] supra note 64 at 273.
73 See [“K ellogg”] supra note 66 at 4.
74 See especially, J. Thursby and M. Thursby, “Knowledge Creation and Diffusion o f Public Science with
Intellectual Property Rights” (2008) 2 Frontiers o f Economics and Globalisation at 202. [“Thursby and
Thursby”]
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[T]he non-profit nature o f universities charges them with different roles
and responsibilities in society than private actors motivated by different
aims and goals.75
While industry has a responsibility to investors and shareholders whose
motivation is only financial gain, academia in contrast, owes a duty to human kind
generally, is motivated by “the quest for knowledge for the sake o f knowledge”76 and is
focused on “the disinterested pursuit o f truth.”77 Scientific researchers bear a
responsibility to propel knowledge into application while keeping the basic science or
research tool intact for communal use. In this light, the example o f Banting and Best is
praiseworthy.78 They patented the method for producing synthetic insulin so as to monitor
its safe production, while making the process available free o f charge and entering into
several cooperative agreements to produce and distribute the new drug. This study
endorses the communal approach advocated by Merton as it is indicative of an open
method for achieving accuracy in scientific research and innovation.
One fundamental aspect o f scientific research is ‘access’ to basic science.
Traditionally, public research institutions such as universities engaging in scientific
research provided access to resource base or basic science to other scientists freely.
Nowadays by contrast universities enter into material transfer agreements (MTAs) with
75 See, B. Robinson, “Pin-Stripes, Test Tubes and Patents: Is the Commercialisation o f University Research
Consistent with the Fundamental Tenets o f the Patent Act?” (2006) 3:2UOLTJ 385.
76 See, J. Henderson and J. Smith, Academia, Industry and the Bayh-Dole Act: An Implied Duty to
Commercialize (Boston: Association o f University Technology Managers, 2002) at 6; See also, P. Vallance,
“Biotechnology and N ew Companies Arising from Academia” (2001) 358 Lancet 1804 at 1805.
77 See [“Lotter”] supra note 63 at 2 where the author mentions that universities and scientific journals are
often viewed as the guardians o f integrity in scientific research, endorsing the quality and honesty o f the
same.
78 See, G. Matkin,“University Intellectual Property Management in the 20th Century : How Did We Get
Here and Where Are We Going?,” A Presentation fo r the Conference on Research and Development and
Economic Growth in the 20lh Century (Berkeley : University o f California, 1999) [“Gary Matkin”]; see also
supra note 53 at 166 [“Herder & Johnston”].
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parties interested in accessing the resource. The increased use o f MTAs in addition to
patents is a result of the entrepreneurial role o f the university. MTAs are essentially
contracts between the donor and the recipient o f material that the donor is providing to
the recipient. Therefore an MTA may forbid the recipient from analyzing the material or
even seeking intellectual property rights in anything resulting from use of the material
and publication of the results of experiments using the material. Figure 4 is an illustration
of a study portraying the various permitted and prohibited uses o f MTAs in bio-based
technology transfer in Canada:

Figure 4: Types of uses contemplated by MTAs79
Scholars have opined:
[S]ome MTAs go so far as to provide that the intellectual property rights
resulting from the recipient use of the material shall belong to the donor.79
79 See, M. Perry and P. Krishna, “U se o f Material Transfer Agreements in Biotechnology in Canada” Poster
presentation at Canadian Society o f Plant Physiologists Eastern Regional Meeting, November 2007.
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MTAs are becoming more and more widespread, and they are imposing
increasingly complex and onerous terms. They typically forbid
researchers receiving material to share that material with other
institutions and may require pre-publication review o f research results.
As they are contractual agreements (e.g. between a university and
company or between different universities), MTAs are not
geographically or temporarily limited. In this respect they differ from
patents and can have even more far-reaching effects.80
Having discussed the practice of technology transfer generally, the following
section discusses the US Bayh Dole Act of 1980 as an example o f the Government
measure for promoting technology transfer by means o f full commercialisation of
intellectual property generated by universities in the US.

3.3 Technology Transfer: The Laws and Policies
Recent studies suggest that more patents, non disclosure agreements, and the use
o f MTAs in academia as a result of commercialization have interfered with access to
research results and materials.81 O f the factors that have contributed to the growth in
university-owned and managed intellectual property, government action in the form of
legislative enactments enabling commercialization o f university research is prominent.
This section analyses the laws and policies adopted to push for commercialization of
research in US and Canada.

80 See, W. Streitz and A. Bennett, “Material Transfer Agreements: A University Perspective” (2003) Plant
Physiology at 23; See also, R. Pool, “Material Transfer Agreements” in Finding The Path: Issues o f Access
to Research Resources (Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 2000).
81 See for example, D. Blumenthal et al., “Data Witholding in Genetics and the Other Life Sciences:
Prevalence and Predictors” (2006) 81:2 Academic Medicine 137; See also, Y. Joly et al., “Impact o f the
Commercialization o f Biotechnology Research on the Communication o f Research Results: North
American Perspective” (2007) 8:1 Harv. Health Poly Rev.71.
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The US Bayh Dole Act, 1980 is one element of the strong intellectual property
rights policy regime prevalent in the US since 1980s. The legislation is emulated across
several countries, including Denmark, Germany, Austria and Norway.

3.3.1 The US Bayh Dole Act, 1980: A Full Commercialization Approach
The US Government introduced a change in the policy pertaining to
commercialization o f public funded research after World War II. Government supported
research and development had proven successful in two core research areas: Firstly, the
development of weapons that aided winning the war; and second, the development of
medical capabilities that greatly reduced casualties both from wounds and infectious
diseases compared with earlier wartime experiences. This drew extensive public attention
while the US Government debated the governance o f publicly funded research. It was
O '!

then that Vannevar Bush in Science, the Endless Frontier

argued for a self governing

scientific community but with national priorities, such as health and national security,
playing a role in setting broad research directions. Thus, mission oriented agencies
became government supporters of basic research. For example, the Department of
Defense funded basic work in computers, material science and electrical engineering. The
Atomic Energy Commission had the responsibility for funding high energy physics while
the National Institutes o f Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation became the
funders o f university science and biomedical sciences.823

82 See for an elaborate discussion, N. Baldini, “Negative Effects o f University Patenting: Myths and
Grounded Evidence” (2008) 75:2 Scientometrics 7.
83 See, V. Bush, Science, The Endless Frontier (Washington D.C: National Science Foundation, 1945).
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In 1980, the US Congress enacted a new law to create a uniform patent policy
among the Federal agencies funding research. The Bayh Dole Act, 198084 allowed
universities and other federal research fund recipients to elect title to resulting inventions,
rather than the Government.85 O f the Government owned thirty thousand patents only 5%
led to new or improved products.86 Many patents were not exploited as the Government
did not have the resources.87 The Bayh Dole Act, 1980 gave universities the right to seek
intellectual property rights in inventions resulting from publicly funded research, and this
resulted in exclusive licensing. Industry obtained an incentive to contribute to university
research because o f the potential of reaping exclusive benefits through licensing and
commercialization agreements.

The Act has been described in the literature as a broad transformation illustrating
the law o f “unintended consequences.”88 Section 200 o f the US Bayh Dole Act, 1980
describes the legislative purpose of the Act:

84 P.L. 96-517 ( Patent and Trademark Act Amendments o f 1980).
85 See also, T. Silverstein, Y. Joly, E. Harmsen and B.M. Knoppers, “The Commercialization o f Genomic
Academic Research : Conflicting Interests” in R. Gold and B.M Knoppers eds. Biotechnology IP and Ethics
(Canada: LexisNexis, 2009) at 131 [“T. Silverstein et al - Commercialisation & Conflicting Interests”]
noting that, “the 1980s witnessed the landmark ruling o f Diamond v Chakrborthy (447 U.S.303 (1980)
which along with the subsequent enactment o f the Bayh Dole Act in the US had the effect o f encouraging
the commercialisation o f inventions developed under federal funding by public institutions and small
businesses. The creation o f the Court o f Appeals for the Federal Circuit also helped pave the way for
sometime o f intense commercialisation o f fruits o f biotechnology research in the U S.”
86 Ibid, See also, D. Mowery, R. Nelson, B. Sampat and A. Zeidonis, “The Effects o f the Bayh-Dole Act on
U.S. University Research and Technology Transfer: An Analysis o f Data from Columbia University, the
University o f California, and Stanford University” (2001) Research Policy 1 online :
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download7doN 10.1.1.23.7017&rep=repl&type=pdf.nast accessed on
January 12,2011). [“N elson et al."]
87 See [“N elson et al.”] supra note 86.
88 See generally, L. Ritchie de Larena, “The Price o f Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost” (2007)
43 Houston Law R eview , Part V opening paragraph at 24. [“Ritchie de Larena”] at 1374.
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It is the policy and objective o f the Congress to use the patent system to
promote the utilization o f inventions arising from federally supported
research or development; [...] to promote collaboration between
commercial concerns and non-profit organizations, including
universities; to ensure that inventions made by non-profit organizations
and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future
research and discovery; [...] to ensure that the Government obtains
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of
the Government and protect the public against non-use or unreasonable
use o f inventions; and to minimize the costs o f administering policies in
this area.89 [emphasis added]
According to the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) by
2006 the US work force in the technology transfer offices (TTOs) had grown to over
1800 and this work force has reviewed over 15908 patent applications within a span of
eighteen months.90 Studies conducted by Mowery, Nelson, Sampat and Ziedonis91 have
found that though the Bayh Dole Act resulted in an increase in academic patenting, the
increase was accompanied by harm to the public domain of science. No exceptional gain
in terms o f income by way o f licensing revenue or royalty was noted.92 With these
outcomes, it can be concluded that the full commercialization approach through
intellectual property portfolios and licensing adopted by the US may have not achieved
the goals o f public interest.

89 See, U.S.C. Title 35, Part 2, Chapter 18, § 200.
90 Association o f University Technology Managers, FY US Licensing Activity Survey, 2007, online :
Association
of
University
Technology
Managers
http://www.autm.net/events/file/
AUTM _06_US% 20LSS_FNL.pdf (last accessed on January 12, 2011).
91 See, D. Mowery, R. N elson, B. Sampat and A. Zeidonis, “The growth o f patenting and licensing by U.S.
universities: an assessment o f the effects o f the Bayh-D ole Act o f 1980” (2001) 30 Research Policy 99.
[“Mowery et al.”].
92 See [“Mowery et al.”] supra note 91 at 106.
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Canada has no law similar to that o f the US Bayh Dole Act, the ‘not-so-fullcommercialization approach’ to research in the Canadian context is analysed in the
following sections.

3.3.2 The Canadian approach to commercialization of public funded research
Several efforts have been made by the Canadian Government to regulate the
commercialization o f public funded research. Canada has relied less on legislation and
more on government statements, policies and aims in the field. A chronological account
o f the measures is presented herein below:
The Public Servants Inventions Act (PSIA) and Regulations o f 197393 - The Act
laid down the rule that any invention made by the public servant would be held by the
Crown and the public servant could not transfer or use that invention without the due
permission o f the Crown. It also made provisions for the payment of an award to the
public servant if the Crown deemed it to be appropriate.
Title to Intellectual Property arising under the Crown Contract [1991] (revised in
2000)9394 - The government policy had been to assign contractors the right over the
intellectual property that was created during their research with the government. The
policy was revised in 2000, the purpose of the policy was stated as “commercialization of
intellectual property,” and the Crown could reserve ownership over the intellectual
property rights in the invention on certain conditions and on payment o f a sum to the
contractor.
93 Public Servants Inventions Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3,10.
94 See, Canada, Contract Policy Notice 2000-2: Revised Policy on Ownership o f Intellectual Property
Arising Under Crown Procurement Contracts by the Treasury Board o f Canada (Canada: Treasury Board,

2000).
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Retention o f Royalties and Fees from the Licensing o f Crown-owned Intellectual
Property [1993].95 The Treasury Board approved a submission from the Minister of
Industry, Science and Technology and the Minister for Science which authorized the
departments and agencies to receive, through supplementary estimates, an annual
appropriation equal to all revenues arising from the licensing o f Crown-owned
intellectual property which the department or agency remitted to the Consolidated
Revenue Fund in the previous fiscal year.
Award Plan fo r Inventors and Innovators [1993] 9697- It is a government policy to
allow employees responsible for scientific and technological inventions to share in the
financial benefits accruing from the commercialization o f inventions, and to recognize
government use of the inventions of its employees during their lifetime.
Science and Technology fo r the New Century97 - On March 11, 1996 the federal
government released a statement paper. The statement paper provided leading action
plans for science based departments. This was a bulky document which contained the
history o f technology development policies in Canada, and laid down how the various
government departments, university, small research institutes need to work together for
the growth o f science and technology.

95 See, Canada, Policies issued by the Treasury Board in 1993fo r Retention o f Royalties and Fees from the
Licensing
of
Crownowned
IP
(Canada:
Treasury
Board,
2000)
online:
http://www.tbssct.gc.ca/pubs pol/dcgpubs/ContPolNotices/ip retention rovalties-eng.asn (last accessed on
June 11,2011).
96 See, Canada, “P olicy Issued by the Treasury Board Award, 1993” in Plan fo r Inventors and Innovators
Policy - Chapter 1-11 (Canada: Treasury Board, 1993).
97 D. Brassard, Science and Technology fo r the New Century (Canada: The Parliament Library, April 1996)
at 21.
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Guiding Principles fo r Management o f Intellectual Property issues [Draft 1998] The draft was prepared by Federal Partners in Technology Transfer, which is an initiative
o f all Canadian science departments and agencies. The demand, supply and need for
intellectual property in Canada were analysed. Sixteen guiding principles o f technology
transfer which gave guidelines for transferring intellectual property between private and
government institutes were adopted.
Title to Intellectual Property Arising Under Crown Procurement Contracts
[October 2000] (Replaced the 1991 policy) - This initiative made allowance for the
payment o f royalty rewards to public servant inventors and key contributors from
revenues received from license to other fees by the government, the payment of up to
$5000 for internal use o f an invention by the Crown, the assignment o f ownership of
intellectual property to contractors, the retention o f revenue from the licensing of
intellectual property by government departments to offset their awards program and their
intellectual property management costs and a consistent approach to management of
intellectual property if the management guidelines are voluntarily adopted.

Though Canada has no law similar to that o f the US Bayh Dole Act, research
intensive Canadian universities committed themselves to triple their commercialization
outcomes by 2010 by way o f the 2002 Framework on Federally Funded Research.98 The
latest survey report, “Scientific and Technological Activities o f Provincial Governments
and Provincial Research Organizations,” from Statistics Canada also indicate that the

98 See [“T. Silverstein et al - Commercialization & Conflicting Interests”] supra note 57 at 134, where the
authors mention about “the commercialised focus o f universities can also be gauged in the formation o f
significant and long lasting research sponsorship agreements with major corporations.”
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Provincial Governments are spending millions on research and development (R&D).99
The actual direct return from the huge investments comes only when the research is
commercialized. For instance, the Province of Ontario leads research and development in
Canada with over $514 million spent on research and development.100 In 1997 the
Ministry o f Education and Training, came up with ‘Framework for a Research Policy for
Ontario.’ The framework laid down 12 key characteristics to form the course of
innovation and provide the Province with guidelines for its research.101 One of the major
key characteristics in the framework was to draw a distinction between theoretical and
applied research. The framework recognized the need to develop an infrastructure, which
could support the application of the research done by universities. The framework also
recognized greater need for industry and university cohesion to bring about practical
results for the economy. Three indicators were established for measuring the research
strengths o f each institution.102 These indicators were the input indicator which measures
the amount of research funding, capital equipment, number and stature of researchers in
each institution, the output indicator which measures the output of research done, by
estimating the number of publications, the impact indicator which checks how much
technology was transferred, what part of the technology was commercially viable and
made available, and what impact the research had on the economy and society.

99 See, Statistics Canada, Survey on Scientific and Technological Activities o f Provincial Governments and
Provincial Research Organizations, (August 2010 edition), 2004/2005 to 2008/2009, online :
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/88-001-x/88-001-x2009007-eng.pdf> (last accessed on June 12, 2011).
100 Ibid.
101 See, D. C. Smith, Framework o f Research Policy fo r Ontario (Canada : Ministry O f Education and
Training, 1997) online: <http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/discussi/research.html> (last accessed on
June 11,2011).
102 Ibid.
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The Ministry o f Research and Innovation (MRI) introduced the ‘Ontario Research
and Commercialization Program’ (ORCP) in June 2005 to help innovators take their
product to the market.103 A total of $31.4 million was committed to public research
institutions and non-profit organizations through this program to identify promising
research and shape ideas into innovative products or services.104 The Program assists with
linking research institutions to companies. For instance, the ORCP supports fifty-five
Ontario public research and not-for-profit organizations in their collaboration with
numerous technology based industries to identify research, develop and move them more
rapidly to the market.105 The ORCP aids linking companies to researchers, building
regional and province wide networks. For instance, Bio-Enterprise Corporation, a Guelph
based not-for-profit organization that helps promote agriculture based food, life sciences
and bio-products expanded its expertise under the ORCP and linked Ontario’s rural and
northern companies to develop new uses for agricultural products and waste. Moreover,
Ontario’s next generation o f innovative thinkers are developed by training personnel in
practical business skills required to shape future discoveries into products and services;
Ontario Centres o f Excellence conduct an Ontario Internship program to train graduates
in Ontario-based technology.106 The MRI has formed consortiums of Universities and
Institutes that mutually formulate sui generis policies to transfer technologies, define the

103 See, Canada, Ministry o f Research and Innovation Report (Ontario: MRI, 2005) online:
<http://www.mri.gov.on.ca/english/programs/ORC-Program.asp> (last accessed on February 12,2011).
104 Supra note 103.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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kind of agreements that need to be formulated, and identify procedures to be used to
commercialize technology.107
C4 is a technology transfer consortium in Southwest Ontario that encourages
innovation by promoting commercialization. Comprised o f ten universities and research
institutions, C4 members co-ordinate their resources, cooperate with governmental and
industrial bodies, collaborate in multi-disciplinary research to solve real world problems,
and commercialise the results of their research. The C4 members are, University of
Western Ontario, McMaster University, University o f Guelph, University o f Waterloo,
Wilfrid Laurier University, University of Windsor, Robarts Research Institute, Lawson
Health Research Institute, Hamilton Health Sciences and St. Joseph’s Healthcare. The
diverse group o f Universities and Research Institutes provide a broad and deep base of
expertise for world discoveries to draw on. Together the C4 Institutions achieve
economies o f scale with a more directed effort than could be accomplished individually.

An extensive agricultural program is propagated by the Ontario Ministry of
Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (OMAFRA). The Ministry o f Health administers
about $34 million in research funds most o f which are directed to commercializing
technologies developed in hospitals and research institutes.108

Quebec is another Province where business investment in research and innovation
has increased to around $ 511 million from $498 million dollars in one year according to

107 See, Appendix A: ORCP Consortia Projects in the Province o f Ontario at 160.
108

Supra note 107.
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the latest Statistics Canada Survey in 2010.10910The General and Vocational Colleges Act,
1997no is Quebec legislation which provides for establishment of college centres for
facilitating technology transfer so as to support researchers in the Province.

Section 17.2 o f the General and Vocational Colleges A ct111 states:
A college may, with the authorization of the Minister after the latter has
consulted the Minister of Economic Development, Innovation and Export
Trade, establish a college centre for technology transfer which may, in a
particular field, engage in applied research, furnish technical assistance
to enterprises and provide information [...].’12
Section 25 o f the General and Vocational Colleges A ct113 specifically provides for
budgetary rules pertaining to allocation of subsidies to colleges establishing and
maintaining research centres related to technology transfer. The section states:
[T]he budgetary rules may also provide, in particular, for the allocation
o f subsidies to a college to establish and maintain a college centre for
technology transfer, offer special programs established by the Minister
or carry out activities agreed upon with the Minister.114 [emphasis added]
The provincial regulation respecting the criteria o f eligibility applicable to
initiatives and the modalities o f financial participation of the Société Innovatech du sud
du Québec also encourages initiatives which shall lead to innovation and technology
transfer.

109 See supra note 99.
110 See, R.S.Q., 1997, Chapter C-29.
111 Ibid,s. 17.2.

n2Id.
113 Ibid, s. 25.
114 Id.
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Rule 1 sub-rule 3 o f the regulation"3 explicitly provides:
[A]n initiative submitted to the Société shall lie within the scope of its
mission. Such initiative shall primarily have as its ultimate objective the
realization in the southern Quebec territory, by direct or indirect means,
o f activities related to the process of technological innovation, including
research
and
development,
technology
transfer
and
the
commercialization o f innovations.11511617
Among other government actions, one o f the main encouragements for
technological development is the provision for tax incentives for the promotion of
research and development (R&D) in the developed market economy. For instance, section
37 of the Income Tea Act,u l provides for tax incentives for scientific research and
experimental

development

(SR&ED).11819 The

Canada

Revenue

Agency

(CRA)

administers the SR&ED program, which is a federal tax incentive program to encourage
Canadian businesses of all sizes and in all sectors, to conduct research and development
in Canada. The resulting advantage o f the Government initiative in the main is that it
generally allows the deduction o f R&D operating expenditure in computing income. The
current version o f the income tax Interpretation Bulletin, Scientific Research and
Experimental Development Expenditures (IT-151R5)"9 explains how to identify
qualifying expenditures. In essence, IT-151R5 discusses which expenditures qualify for

115 An Act respecting Société Innovatech du sud du Québec, R.S.Q., c. S -l 7.2.1, s. 25, r 1(3).

U6Id.
117 R.S.C. (1985) (5th supp.), c. 1, as amended, (Canada) [“Tax Act”].
118 See, Canada Revenue Agency, Income Tax Information Circular IC86-4R3 dated May 24, 1994, for
administrative policy for what constitutes SR&ED, online:http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic86-4r3/ic864r3-e.html (last accessed on March 12, 2011); See Appendix B for the definition o f SR&ED in the Tax Act
at 168 and see also [“Tax Act”] Section 127(5) for what constitutes ‘Investment tax credit’ at 169.
119 See, Canada Revenue Agency, Interpretation Bulletin IT-151R5, “Scientific Research and Experimental
Developmental Expenditures” (27 February 1995). online: http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tn/itl5 lr5consolid/itl 51 r5-consolid-e.pdf (last accessed on January 12, 2011).
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tax incentives and who is eligible to receive them as well as the mechanism by which
expenditures of a current and capital nature on SR&ED carried on in Canada may be
pooled and deducted in calculating the income from a business carried on by a taxpayer in
the year the expenditure is made or in any subsequent year. Being the largest single
source o f federal government support for industrial R&D,

the SR&ED program gives

claimants cash refunds and tax credits for their expenditures on eligible R&D work done
in Canada. In effect, parties interested in conducting R&D in Canada, can compute
income in current or capital expenditure. The prerequisites for recognition include that the
claimant’s activity must constitute SR&ED, then as per the IT-151R5 one can be certain
about what can be deducted for SR&ED.12’Another example o f government initiative
favouring technology transfer in developed countries is Canada’s combined Federal and
Provincial tax incentives to foreign owned as well as locally owned companies.1201122 In
addition to full tax deduction o f current SR&ED expenditures, a tax credit is also
available based on qualifying SR&ED expenditures carried out in Canada. The eligibility
of deducting the full cost o f R&D equipment, no limits on subcontracting and ability to
defray part of the R&D expenses incurred abroad on Canadian R&D projects aims at
benefitting the scientist researcher.

120 See, Canada Revenue Agency, “SR&ED Program” online: http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/txcrdt/sredrsde/menu-eng.html (last accessed on January 12, 2011).
121 A noteworthy grey area o f CRA's administrative policy is the issue o f ascertaining whether the activity
constitutes SR&ED. See for example, CRA publications discussing what is SR&ED and what is not
SR&ED, online: http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tg/rc4472/rc4472-e.pdf (last accessed on September 12,

2011).
122 See, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada,“D o Your Research in Canada, it pays off!” online:
http://investincanada.gc.ca/download/142.pdf (last accessed on January 16, 2011) [“FAITC - September
2010”]; See, Appendix C for federal SR&ED Program on $5million o f qualified SR&ED expenditures and
Appendix D for the Federal and Provincial SR&ED tax incentives in Canada at 171 and 172 respectively.
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Universities in Canada follow a pattern for sui generis policies.123 Common issues
addressed by the university intellectual property policies are disclosure, ownership,
commercialization and revenue sharing. Kevin LaRoche et al., define these four
parameters:
[Disclosure is the obligation of the inventor or inventors to disclose the
invention to the university. Ownership, in the simplest sense, is “title” to
the invention [...]. Commercialization is the process of extracting
revenue from the invention; Revenues are the monetary proceeds of
commercialization; while they normally accrue to the owner, most
intellectual property policies contemplate a sharing as between the
university and the inventor, regardless of who the owner is.124 [emphasis
added]
The recent progress report of the Canadian Science and Technology Strategy,125
which provides international comparisons for Canada’s performance in science,
technology, R&D, commercialization and output, places faith in commercialization
through intellectual property portfolios and licensing, similar to the Bayh Dole approach.
Analysis o f the recent survey data of “Intellectual Property Commercialization in the
Higher Education Sector” from Statistics Canada126 also suggests that the total intellectual

123 See for example, Industry Canada, University Research and the Commercialization o f Intellectual
Property in Canada (Occasional Paper No.21) (Ottawa: Research Publications Program, 1999); See also,
Statistics Canada, Appendix 2: Survey o f Intellectual Property Commercialization in the Higher Education
Sector (Ottawa: Science, Innovation and Electronic Information Division, 2003); See also, C.R Cates,
“Legal Issues within the Intellectual Property Policies o f Universities : Standing on the Shoulders o f
Giants” (XIII 2001) online: The Journal o f the Association o f University Technology Managers
www.autm.net (last accessed on January 12, 2011); See also, A. Ketis, J. Rudolph and M. Gravell,
“Ownership o f Intellectual Property Policies o f Canadian Universities : Standing on the Shoulders o f
Giants” (2002)13 J.AUTM 13.
124 See, K. LaRoche, C. Collard and J. Chemys, “Appropriating Innovation: The Enforceability o f
University Intellectual Property Policies,” (2006/07) 20 I.P.J at 139 [“Kevin LaRoche et a/”].
125 See, Govt, o f Canada, “Science and Technology Data 2009” (April 2011 edition) online:
http://www.science.gc.ca/937918F9-DFCD-42C4-992C-E4948CB883EF/2009-e.pdf (last accessed on July
23, 2011); See also, J. Atkinson-Grosjean, Public Science; Private Interests: Cultures and Commerce in
Canada's Networks o f Centres o f Excellence (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 2006).
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property (IP) income, generated from licensing at reporting Canadian Universities is
$53.2 million per year. Table 2 illustrates the survey data based on the questionnaires
received representing 125 responding Institutions for income received from intellectual
property:
Table 2: Income Received from Intellectual Property - 2008127
Total
Thousands of Dollars
Total

53,183

Running Royalties

35,374

Milestone Payments

4,681

From one time sales o f Intellectual Property

3,080

Reimbursement of Patent, Legal and related Costs

5,889

License Income received from another Canadian Institution

125

under a revenue-sharing agreement
Other

4034

The reporting institutions employed 321 full-time employees in intellectual property
management for a cost o f $51.1 million. Table 3 illustrates the data in terms of the
expenditure on intellectual property management based on response from 69 institutions
with intellectual property offices, engaged in intellectual property management and Table1267

126 See, Survey o f Intellectual Property Commercialization in the Higher Education Sector, Statistics
Canada (2008 edition), online: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/88-222-x/2010000/aftertoc-aprestdmleng.htm> (last accessed on June 12, 2011). [“Statscan Survey-2008”].
127 Adopted from Table 15-1 [“Statscan Survey-2008”] supra 126, online: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/88222-x/2010000/t096-eng.htm (last accessed on June 12, 2011).
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4 illustrates, after deduction o f the direct costs, the total surplus for all Canadian
Universities was $2.1 million only. The average income per university from the
intellectual property was only $425,500 representing a 9% decrease from the previous
year ($468,500 in 2007).12812930The patent applications and patents issued were also down in
the reporting institutions and there were less than two-dozen spin-off companies reported
by the universities.
Table 3: Expenditure on Intellectual Property Management - 2008129
Expenditure
Thousands of dollars
Total operational expenditure for IP management

51.124

Salaries and benefits corresponding to full-time equivalents

28,056

Patent and regular legal expenditure1JU

15,331

Litigation expenditure131

361

Other operational expenditures

7376

Full time equivalent employees engaged in IP management

321

128 See [“Statscan Survey-2008”] supra 126.
129 Adopted from Table 2-1 [“Statscan Survey-2008”] supra 126, online: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/88222-x/2010000/t080-eng.htm (last accessed on June 12, 2011).
130 See [“Statscan Survey-2008”] supra 126, Patent and regular legal expenditures include those for patent
filings, patent searches, registration o f copyright, etcetra.
131 See [“Statscan Survey-2008”] supra 126, Litigation expenditures are those related to disputes over
patents or other intellectual property and include settlements.
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Table 4: Income Cost & Surplus - 2008
Particular

Total Income
Received From
IP - 2008 (A)
Total operational
expenditure for IP
management 2008 (B)
Total Surplus
(A-B)

Income
(Thousands of
dollars)

Expenditure
(Thousands of
dollars)

Surplus
(Thousands of
dollars)

53,183

51, 124

2059

The revenue sharing policies in eight prominent universities in Canada based on
the analysis o f the intellectual property policies reveal a further division of the income
generated from commercialization. Table 5 illustrates the allocation o f the net income or
revenue splitting in prominent Canadian Universities:

49

Table 5: Allocation of Net Income in 8 Canadian Universities132

University of
Toronto

Queens
University

University o f
Western Ontario
University o f
British Columbia
University o f
Alberta
University o f
Saskatchewan
McMaster
University

University o f
Ottawa

Allocation of Net Income (Cumulative unless otherwise
indicated)
$500,000+
First
$1000-$200,000 $200,000-$500,000
25%
Inventor
25% Inventor
25%
$1000:
Inventor
50% Innovations 25%Innovations
100%
5%
Foundation
Foundation
Inventor
50%
University
Innovations
25% University
Foundations
70%
University
$500,000+ 75% to Inventor if self
First $500,OC0
100% to In ventor if Self - commercialized.
commercials red, or negotiated 25% to Queens.
Negotiated allocation if
by Queen's, otherwise
allocation
if commercialized by Queens
negotiated
commercialkred by Queens
Shared equally
Equity in any spin off companies is negotiated between university
and inventor
Shared equally
2/3 to the party which commercializes and 1/3 to the party which
does not
Shared equally
Re-Investment in Research Method:
25% Inventor, 25% University, 35.7% Research, 14.3% Indirect cost
recovery if there is investment in research
50% Inventor, 50% University where there is no reinvestment in
research
$100,000+ 50% Inventor,
First $100,000
50% University
80% Inventor,
20% University

132 See [“Kevin LaRoche et a/.,”] supra note 124 at 172; For University Intellectual Property Policies see,
McMaster (MILO) online : http://ip.mcmaster.ca/policies/joint_ip_policy (last accessed on June 12, 2011);
University o f Alberta : http://www.rso.ualberta.ca/intellectualproperty.cim (last accessed on June 12, 2011);
Queen's University : http://www.queensu.ca/secretariat/senate/policies/intelprp/index.html(last accessed on
June 12, 2011); University o f Toronto : http://www.utm.utoronto.ca/ipguide3.0.html (last accessed on June
12,
2011);
University
of
British
Columbia
(Simon
Fraser
University)
: http://www.sfu.ca/policies/gazette/research/r30-03.html(last accessed on June 12, 2011); University o f
Saskatchewan : http://www.usask.ca/research/ilo/uofs_ip.php(last accessed on June 12, 2011); University o f
Ottawa : http://www.ttbe.uottawa.ca/researchers/tech_transfer/faq.asp(last accessed on June 12, 2011).
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Commercialization particularly involves at least two steps -

making the

innovation proprietary and thereafter, working or licensing the resulting proprietary
rights. Three issues in respect of commercialization arise - who decides whether to
commercialize, who decides how to commercialize, and who pays for commercialization.
For example, at the University o f Western Ontario, London (UWO) the typical provision
with respect to third party sponsored research initiatives undertaken by a faculty member
provides for the contract to be entered into between the sponsor and UWO, and
accordingly, the faculty member assigns his or her right, title and interest in and to any
resulting intellectual property rights to UWO, in order for it to be able to perform the
obligations under the contract. The negotiation between the sponsor and UWO determines
the ultimate ownership o f intellectual property rights, with entitlement for compensation
to the faculty member as governed by the collective agreement. UWO subscribes to an
“inventor-owned” policy, in a case where intellectual property rights would arise from
research conducted independent of third party agreements but with requirement under the
collective agreement for a report of invention to be made by the faculty member to UWO
for discussion o f commercialization alternatives. Ownership is not automatically vested in
UWO in this instance, but only upon an elective assignment by the faculty member to
UWO, again in accordance with the provisions o f the collective agreement.133
As regards revenue sharing, allocation o f the net income earned as a result of
commercialization between the inventor and the university is provided in the university
intellectual property policy. Revenue sharing is dependent on the specific formula subject
to interpretation and accounting methods. For instance, certain intellectual property
133
See,
University
of
Western
Ontario
: http://www.uwo.ca/univsec/mapp/sectionl/mappll2 .p d f (last accessed on June 12,2011).
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policies such as those of the University o f Toronto and the University o f Alberta permit
the inventor to decide whether he or she wishes to commercialize or, alternatively offer
the invention for assignment to the university, which may or may not accept.134 Another
example is the intellectual property policy o f McMaster University, which allows the
university a period o f time, following the initial disclosure, during which to decide
whether it wishes to commercialize the invention. If it elects not to commercialize, then
the intellectual property may, at the request of the inventor, be transferred to him or her.
That being said, the same policy allows an inventor who is a member o f the teaching staff
to request that the university transfer ownership o f the intellectual property and provides,
further, that university “shall not unreasonably withhold approval of the intellectual
property creator’s request.”135 The intellectual property policy o f Queen’s University
simply provides that once a disclosure is made the university has an exclusive
opportunity, for a defined period o f time, to make a commercialisation proposal, which
the inventor is free to accept or reject. Many policies provide for a regime of shared
decision making in respect o f commercialisation issues. Where the university assumes
responsibility for commercialisation o f the invention, then, the costs o f commercialization
are borne by the university, subject to the revenue sharing requirement of the policy.
Where the inventor is entitled to commercialise and elects to do so, then the inventor
bears those costs, subject to the revenue sharing requirements. The manner in which an
invention is commercialised can have a significant impact on the revenue available to be
134 See, supra note 132, University o f Alberta Faculty Agreement, Appendix C: University o f Alberta Patent
Policy, Clause 7.1; See also, University o f Toronto Research-Related Policies: University o f Toronto
Inventions Policy, Clause 3.
135 Email correspondence dated April 03, 2011 with David William George Morrison, former Business
Development Analyst, Technology Transfer Office, McMaster University, Canada.
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shared between the inventor and the university. Most intellectual property policies
apportion the net profits produced from commercialization. The net profits generated by
working an invention can be very different from the net profits produced from a license or
sale of that same invention. The former requires that the costs o f production and sale be
appropriately allocated, while the second does not. In order to ascertain the specific
research question o f what are the implications o f excessive commercialisation o f science

and technology on the traditional enterprise o f “knowledge sharing’’? the following
section discusses expert viewpoints on the issue o f university-industry partnership.

3.3.3 Academic capitalism: An evil paradox
The laws and government policies discussed above support increased interaction
with industry sponsors with the view to enhance revenue as well as innovation and access
to research material. The practice o f deploying the human capital of universities that is
their faculty, for the purpose o f enhancing revenues is also a form o f technology transfer
termed as “academic capitalism” in the literature.136 Academic capitalism is defined as

136 The term “academic capitalism” was first used by E. J. Hackett in a paper, “Science as a Vocation in the
1990s. The Changing Organisational Culture o f Academic Science” (1990) 16 J.H.E at 273; See also, G.
Rhoades and S. Slaughter, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2009) [“Slaughter and Rhoades”] where the authors track changes in policy and practice
in American Universities which reveal new social networks and organisational structures linking higher
education institutions and markets. An academic-capitalist-knowledge-regime is depicted in faculty work,
departmental activity and administrative behaviour. See especially, S. Awbrey, “Making the Invisible Hand
Visible. The Case for Dialogue About Academic Capitalism” in Academic Capitalism and the New
Economy (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) at 46 where the author mentions, “[t]he
major financial advantages o f academic capitalism include the generation o f funds [...] Nevertheless, those
who believe in the ‘invisible hand o f the market’ [Smith, 1776/1976, p. 456] must also recognize the
difference between short-term and long-term gains. Even if higher education institutions become totally
successful at balancing budgets through academic capitalism, if the way in which this is done leads to a loss
o f quality in the best higher education system in the world just as w e enter the age o f knowledge and
information [...]th en w e will have surrendered long-term interests for short-term solutions. Academic
capitalism is not the inherent evil some believe nor is it the unmitigated blessing others imagine. It is a
strategy that has the potential both greatly to help and greatly to harm universities.”
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the “institutional and professorial market or market-like efforts to secure external
moneys.” 137 This practice gained momentum in the 1990s due to the changing role of
universities as entrepreneurs.138 Increased commercialization may not necessarily lead to
more revenue and better conditions for research, and may even stifle innovations for
which huge public funds are invested. This section further discusses this point.
Geiger and Sa state:
[I]n their zeal to patent, universities have engaged in practices that can
scarcely be regarded as compatible with the public interest. These
include claiming ownership over fundamental scientific knowledge or
research tools.139 [emphasis added]
An unavoidable aspect of commercialisation of academic and scientific research is
increased pressure on universities to patent and commercialize research results. A hasty
approach gives way to a decline in the quality o f patents,140 the substitution between basic
and applied research,141 substitution between patents and publications142 and decline of
publications’ quality143as well. Proliferation o f intellectual property rights on basic or

137 See, L. Leslie, R. Oaxaca and G. Rhoades, “Technology Transfer And Academic Capitalism” in
Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies and the Entrepreneurial University (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997) at 8. [“Slaughter and Leslie”].
138 See, [“Slaughter and Leslie”] supra note 137 at 261, noting that, “[a]cademic capitalism seems to
characterize higher education in virtually all o f the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries.”
139 See, [“Geiger and Sa”] supra note 50 at 144.
140 See, R. Henderson, et al., “Universities as a Source o f Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis o f
University Patenting, 1965-88” Working paper # 5068, (Cambridge, MA : National Bureau o f Economic
Research, 1995) for a reference to consequent decline in the quality o f patented products.
141 See, J. Thursby and M. Thursby, “Who is selling the Ivory Tower? Sources o f Growth in University
Licensing” (2002) 48 Management Science at 90 [“Thursby and Thursby”].
142 See, A. Agrawal and R. Henderson, “Putting patents in context: Exploring knowledge transfer from
MIT” (2002) 48 Management Science, 44-60.
143 See, F. Murray and S. Stern, “Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow o f Scientific
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early stage upstream research results may stifle downstream research and development.144
The reason is that the greater number of people whose agreement has to be obtained in
order to allow a project to proceed, the higher the risk that bargaining will fail or that
transaction costs will become too high. This will be even more likely if the property rights
belong to actors in both the public and the private sector, with different institutional
agendas. Increased private public partnership was basically aimed to ensure that more
industry funding may be directed towards areas such as health and consumer welfare
which require more attention. However, several issues emerge due to academic patenting
and increased interaction between the university and industry.
Scientist researchers are bound by contractual obligations in the nature of
restrictions to share knowledge or data,145 restrictions on disclosure o f research results,146
and restrictions on transfer of research tools. 147The Industry may also suffer from

Knowledge? An Empirical Test o f the Anti-commons Hypothesis” Working paper # 11465, (Cambridge,
MA : National Bureau o f Economic Research, 2005) where authors share concerns related to academic
patenting and dissemination o f scientific information.
144 See, M. Heller and R. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research” (1998) Science 698,701. [“Heller and Eisenberg”]; See also, R. Eisenberg, “Bargaining over the
transfer o f proprietory research tools: Is this market failing or emerging?” in R. Dreyfuss, D. Zimmerman
and H. First eds. Expanding the Boundaries o f Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy fo r the Knowledge
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 223; See also, A. Rai, “Regulating Scientific Research:
Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms o f Science” (1999) NW .U.L.Rev 94; See also, R. Nelson,
“Observations on the Post-Bayh-Dole Rise o f Patenting at American Universities” 2001 JTT 26.
145 See, D. Blumenthal et al., “Withholding research results in academic life science. Evidence from a
national survey o f faculty” (1997) 277 JAMA 1224, 1228.
146 See, W. Cohen et al., University-Industry Research Centres in the United States (Mimeo: Carnegie
Mellon University, 1994) at 52.
147 See, J. Walsh, A. Arora, W. Cohen, “Research tool patenting and licensing and biomedical innovation,”
in W. Cohen and S. Merril eds. Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Washington, D.C. : The
National Academies Press, 2003) at 285, 340.
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restrictions on university-industry communications,148 obstacle to new research fields and
unreasonable cost increase.149
Garret Hardin had advanced “the tragedy o f the commons” in 1968 to address the
problems o f over population and the management o f scarce resources.150 Accordingly, the
“tragedy o f the commons” occurs when multiple owners are each endowed with the
privilege to exploit a scarce resource, and no one can exclude the others from using such
resources. The resource is then prone to suffer from the problems of over use, waste, no
incentive to conserve and the eventual destruction o f common property. Privatization is
seen as a solution to this tragedy since it creates an incentive for the efficient use and
enjoyment of scarce resources and minimizes the cost and externalities associated with
common ownership. Nonetheless, one must bear in mind that intellectual property does
not have the characteristic of excludability like that o f tangible property. The possession
and use of intellectual property is primarily non-rivalrous. There is no danger of over use
or over distributing intellectual property, since everyone can use it without diminishing its
value. Therefore traditional economic justification for tangible property does not fit
intellectual property.151 Just as too few property rights can lead to overuse o f resources in
a “tragedy o f the commons”, too many property rights can cause underuse o f resources in
a “tragedy of the anti-commons” where too many owners can block each other’s
148 See, W. Cohen et a l, “Links and impacts: The influence o f public research on industrial R&D” (2002B)
48 Management Science, 1-23.
149 See, J. Colyvas et al., “How do university inventions get into practice?” (2002) 48 Management Science,
61-72.
150 See, G. Hardin, “The Tragedy o f the Commons” (1968)162 Science 1243, 1248 [“Hardin-1968”]; See
also, G. Hardin, “Extensions o f “The Tragedy o f the Commons” (1998) 280 Science 682, 683. [“Hardin1998”].
151 See, P. S. M enell, “ 1600: Intellectual Property: General Theories” in Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics (Cheltenham, UK : Edward Elgar and The University o f Ghent, 1999) at 129 online:
http://encvclo.findlaw.com/1600book.pdf (last accessed on August 0 2 ,2 0 1 1 )
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application o f knowledge.152 While the “tragedy o f the commons” underlines the costs of
overuse of a scarce resource, it ignores the possibility of underuse when too many owners
are given rights to exclude others from its use. Privatization may solve one tragedy while
creating another.
Michael Heller described this as the “tragedy o f the anti-commons.” Viewing it as
a mirror of “the tragedy o f the commons,” “the tragedy of the anti-commons” occurs
when multiple owners are endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce
resource and no one has an effective privilege o f use. When there are too many owners
holding rights o f exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse. The “tragedy o f the anti
commons” is an absurd consequence o f patents. Patents are a double edged sword, which
hold both promises and risks to technology advancement. Patents encourage inventors to
engage in the inventive activity because they result in equitable distribution of the profits
o f R&D. However, in the event that too many owners hold patents in previous inventions,
distortion o f the inventive activity and obstacles to future research are inevitable.
[CJomplex obstacles that arise when a user needs access to multiple
patented inputs to create a single useful product. Each upstream patent
allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product
development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of
downstream... innovation.153
The growth o f upstream patents leads to royalty stacking and a reduced number of
players in the research field, which hinder or limit the development o f new products onto

152 See, M. Heller and R. Eisenberg “Can patents deter innovation? The anticommons in bio-medical
research,” (1998) 280 Science 698,701; See also, R. Henderson et al., “Universities as a Source o f
Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis o f University Patenting, 1965-88” Working paper # 5068,
(Cambridge, MA : National Bureau o f Economic Research, 1995) at 22.
153 See, [“Heller and Eisenberg”] supra note 144 at 698.
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the market. Eisenberg and Heller point to the problematic situations arising from royalty
stacking or license stacking:
[A] Reach Through License Agreement (RTLA) used in upstream stages
o f research, gives the owner of a patented invention, rights in subsequent
downstream discoveries. Such rights may take the form o f a royalty on
sales that result from use of the upstream research tool, an exclusive or
nonexclusive license on future discoveries, or an option to acquire such a
license...RTLAs may lead to anti-commons as upstream owners stack
overlapping and inconsistent claims on potential downstream products.
In effect, the use of RTLAs gives each upstream patent owner a
continuing right to be present at the bargaining table as a research
project moves downstream toward product development.154
[emphasis added]
Royalty stacking leads to delays for the product’s arrival in the market due to
license negotiations or the product may be priced at an expensive level, wherein only a
few o f the possible users can afford it, or worse the product may not reach the market at
all. The number o f players in the research field will be reduced due to upstream patenting.
Unlike traditional patents for commercial end products, which are rarely infringed by
university researchers, research tool patents, which are patentable subject matter, being
novel, unobvious and useful but equally fundamental for developing new applications,
cover almost by definition the type o f research carried out by academics and scientist
researchers. Therefore unregulated use of patented research tools in the absence o f a
research exemption is discouraged.

3.3.3.1 The experimental use exception: A peculiar exemption
One area where patents can have significant negative effect is research. The
reason is that along with the final products, patenting o f research tools may impede future
research. Therefore, if a scientist requires research tools which are already patented, he or
154Ibid.
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she is forced to seek authorisation to use certain research tools in a project. If several
patented tools are required, the expense of the license rights can quickly become
prohibitive. Therefore, patents can restrict research by slowing the process and imposing
additional costs. In order to combat these barriers, research exceptions have been enacted
by some countries in their patent legislations. It is arguable that Articles 30 read with
Article 8 o f the World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Trade related aspects o f

Intellectual Property Rights, 1995 (TRIPS Agreement)155 allows for the introduction of
legislated research exceptions, also called research exemptions or experimental use
clauses. Article 8 permits member states to adopt measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors o f vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development. Article 30 holds that member states
are allowed to provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent.
Research exceptions grant researchers the right to innovate in a field where
patents have been granted and to undertake studies focussed upon a patented invention or
using a patented tool without having to pay royalties to the patentee. However, the exact
scope o f research exception being unclear at this time weakens the effectiveness of such
clauses.156157For instance, in Canada the prime source o f confusion is created by the fact
that it is undetermined whether research that could result in a commercial outcome
qualifies for a patent exemption. Two aspects of section 55.2 o f the Canadian Patent

Act151 which provides for research exemption are, first, it is not an infringement to make,

155 See, Annex 1 C o f The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 33 I.L.R. 1197
(1993).
156 See, E. R. Gold and A. Gallochat, “The European Directive: Past and Prologue” (September 2001) 7:3
Euro L.J 358 for an example o f research exception pertaining to genetic material.
157 The Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C 1985, c. P-4.
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construct, use or sell a patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission o f information required under any law o f Canada, second,
research upon the subject matter o f the patent that has a non-commercial purpose is
permitted. Lobby groups support a general research exception for studies investigating the
properties o f a patented material to improve upon an invention or creating a new product
or process.158 These suggestions have not been implemented and even the courts have
articulated some confusion about the nature o f the research exemption that does exist.159
Research tools are important to the progression o f scientific studies. Some
countries lack the research facilities and know how necessary to adapt generic tools to
their own needs. The end result is that freedom from infringement allegations is worthless
and that research tools remain unavailable to most developing countries. A dependence
remains either on the research carried out in the developed countries or upon
collaborative efforts with researchers belonging to the developed countries in order to
create products that respond to the population specific needs.160 Research tools should be
subject to broad exemption than other patented inventions for scientific progress.

158 Ontario, Ministry o f Health and Long-Term Care, Genetics, Testing and Gene Patenting : Charting New
Territory in Healthcare (Toronto: Ministry o f Health and Long-Term Care, 2002) at 40, online : Ontario
Ministry
of
Health
and
Long-Term
Care
www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_reports/geneticsrep02/report_e.pdf (last accessed on
January 12,2011).
159 See for example the brief discussion in Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner o f Patents), [2002] 4
S.C.R 45 at para 174 (S.C.C); See also, M. Perry and P. Krishna,“Making Sense o f Mouse Tales: Canada
Life Form Patents Topsy-Turvy” (2001) 23(4) E.I.P.R. 196 [“Perry and Krishna”]; See also, the Supreme
Court o f Canada decision in President and Fellows o f Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner o f
Patents), [2002] S.C.J. No. 77 (S.C.C.) [“Harvard Mouse”] wherein the Supreme Court o f Canada allowed
the appeal.
160 See, J. H. Barton, “Research-Tool Patents: Issues for Health in the Developing World” (2002) 80:2
Bulletin o f the World Health Organisation 121.
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For instance, in the case of India, section 47(3) o f the Patent Act o f 1970 excludes
from the exclusive patent right “any machine or other article in respect of which the
patent is granted may be made or used by any person, for the purpose merely of
experiment or research including the imparting o f instructions to pupils.”161
The absence o f a research exemption or exception for experimental use in the
patent law will require even academic researchers, who do not engage in commercializing
technology, to seek licenses for accessing technologies and materials vital for basic
research. As a result research may suffer undue delays or be rendered redundant. An
experimental use exception provides an opportunity for researchers to circumvent patent
infringement. Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for utilizing this exception,
without violating the agreement. The Article provides:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation o f the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of
the legitimate interests o f third parties.162163
The experimental use exception in Canada is in an uncertain state. Both common
law and the Patent Act provide for it. The Canadian position with respect to the
experimental use exception has been articulated by Justice Hall in the matter of Smith

Kline & French Inter-American Corp v Micro Chemicals Ltd.

Per Justice Hall:

161 See, The Patent Act o f 1970, section 47(3).
162 See, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 (being Annex 1C o f the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867
U.N.T.S. 3). [“TRIPS”].
163 Smith Kline & French Inter-American Corp v Micro Chemicals Ltd. (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 506. [“Micro
Chemicals cited to S.C.R”]
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[N]o doubt if a man makes things merely by way o f bona fide
experiment, and not with the intention of selling and making use of the
things so made for the purpose o f which a patent has been granted, but
with the view o f improving upon the invention the subject of the patent,
or with the view o f seeing whether an improvement can be made or not,
that is not an invasion o f the exclusive rights granted by the patent.
Patent rights were never granted to prevent persons of ingenuity
exercising their talents in a fair way. But if there be neither using nor
vending o f the invention for profit, the mere making for the purpose of
experiment, and not for a fraudulent purpose, ought not to be considered
within the meaning of the prohibition, and if it were, it is certainly not the
subject for an injunction.1 4 [emphasis added]
Furthermore, subsection 55.2(1) o f the Patent Act provides for the statutory
experimental use exception:
[T]o make, construct, use or sell the patented invention solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission o f information
required under any law o f Canada, a province or a country other than
Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any
product.164165

164 See [“Micro Chemicals”] supra note 163 at 519-520, quoting Jessel MR in Frearson v Loe, (1878), Ch.
D. 48 at 66-67; see also, B. Robinson, “Pin-Stripes, Test Tubes and Patents: Is the Commercialization o f
University Research Consistent with the Fundamental Tenets o f the Patent Act?” (2006) 3:2 UOLTJ 385,
wherein Robinson mentions, “[A]t issue in Micro Chemicals was whether the purpose o f examining the
manufacturing process o f a patented invention constituted patent infringement. A s Micro chemicals was not
manufacturing the patented substance for profit, but rather ensuring the successful manufacture o f the
patented product in generic form, the court held that Micro Chemicals fell within the ambit o f the
experimental use exception, and was therefore not liable for patent infringement. However, as Micro
Chemicals addressed the issue o f compulsory licensing, a provision since repealed from the Patent Act [...]
the nature and scope o f this exception is now uncertain.” [“Brent Robinson”]; See also, Apotex Inc v
Canada (AG) (1996) 71 C.P.R. (3d) 166, 123 F.T.R. 161 at paras. 6-7, 16 (FCTD) [“Apotex”], previously
the Patent Act provided for a system o f compulsory licensing allowing manufacturers o f generic versions o f
patented brand names to manufacture or import and use the generic version until expiry o f the patentee’s
patent on the similar product in exchange for royalties. Ss. 55.2(2) and (3) were repealed in 2001. Ss.
55.2(1) and (4) now provide for the development o f the generic brand and for application for regulatory
approval without infringement o f the patent.
165 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-4, s.55.2(l)
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The most common circumstances where this provision applies are where generic
drug manufacturers, prior to the expiration of a patent, are in the development and
approval stage o f a generic version o f a patented product.166
Further subsection 55.2 (6) which is more relevant for the purposes of the
experimental use exception generally, provides that subsection (1) does not abrogate any
exception afforded by the common law with respect to:
[A]cts done privately and on a non-commercial scale or for a non
commercial purpose or in respect of any use, manufacture, construction
or sale o f the patented invention solely for the purpose of experiments
that relate to the subject-matter o f the patent.167168
The above is the codification o f the common law experimental use exception.
However, very limited judicial interpretation of the statutory exception is available to
determine the scope o f the defense. Brent Robinson notes, “this is particularly so with
respect to research conducted on patented products in university laboratories that may,
although perhaps not initially intended to, result in a highly profitable research-product
from experimentation with the patented invention.”
The uncertain state o f the experimental use exception in Canada warrants that
some reliance be placed on the persuasive value o f the decisions o f the US courts for the
purpose o f determining the scope of the exception in Canada. The seminal decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the US in the matter of Madey v Duke169 and

166 See [“Apotex”] supra note 164 at para 16.
167 Patent Act, supra note 165, s. 55.2(6).
168 See [“Brent Robinson”] supra note 164 at 25.
169 Madey v Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed Cir 2002), certiorari denied 539 U.S. 958 (2003) [“Madey
cited to F.3d”].
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the decision o f the US Supreme Court in Merck KGAA v Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd170 are
described for that purpose.
The US provision in 35 U.S.C. s. 271(e)(1) o f the US Patent Act 1790 provides
that it is not an act of infringement to:
[M]ake, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into
the United States a patented invention...solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission o f information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.170171
It is noteworthy that the statutory language of the US provision and the Canadian
provision are similar. Justice Scalia o f the US Supreme Court has determined the scope of
the US provision in the matter of Merck KGAA v Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd 172 :
[W]here a drug maker has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented
compound may work, through a particular biological process, to produce
a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that,
if successful, would be appropriate to include in a submission to the
FDA, that use is “reasonably related” to the development and submission
o f information under.. .Federal Law.173
Despite o f the obvious extent accorded to research conducted with reasonable
understanding that results from experimentation with a patented compound would be
appropriate for submission to the Food and Drug Authority, the court noted the
applicability o f the statutory exception, or rather the lack thereof, to basic research:

170 Merck KGAA v Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 125 S.Ct. 2372 (2005) [“Merck cited to
S.Ct”].
171 See, 35 U.S.C. s. 271(e)(l)(1984).
172 Supra note 170.
173

Supra note 170 at 2383.
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[B]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without
the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the
compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher
intends to induce, is surely not “reasonably related to the development
and submission of information” to the FDA.174
While the statutory exception discussed in Merck affords researchers in the
pharmaceutical industry a wide use o f the exception, but university researchers,
particularly those conducting basic research o f the kind discussed in Merck, are unlikely
to be afforded any additional research liberties by virtue o f this provision. Further in
Madey v Duke University the scope o f the common law experimental use exception in the
US was significantly narrowed. Madey, a former research professor and sole patent
holder o f two patents related to laboratory equipment at Duke University, brought an
action against the university for patent infringement contending that the continued use of
three specific components o f the laboratory equipment without his consent constituted
infringement. Justice Gajarsa, in holding that the experimental use exception was not
available to the university, stated that, the exemption was restricted to those actions
conducted “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry” 175 and that the exemption is inapplicable where the “slightest commercial
implication is undertaken”176 or where research with the patented technology is conducted
under the “guise o f scientific inquiry” 177 but has “definite, cognizable and not

174 Ibid at 2382.
175 See [“Madey”] supra note 169 at 1362, quoting Embrex, Inc v Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343
(Fed Cir 2000).
176 See [“Madey”] supra note 169 at 1362.
177 See [“Madey”] supra note 169 at 1362, quoting Roche Products, Inc v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc.,
733 F. 2d 858 (Fed Cir 1984) at 863.
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insubstantial commercial purposes.” 178 Even more importantly and o f particular relevance
to the university sector, the Court found that a lack o f direct commercial applicability
from the use was not determinative of the exception’s applicability. Therefore, if the same
reasoning were applied, academic researchers in Canada may be held liable for
infringement o f research tool patents. From a policy perspective, the uncertain state of the
research exemption in Canada results in a situation where academic researchers may not
explore certain research possibilities at all. Therefore, fewer developments o f products are
expected to emerge if more field o f research remains unexplored. An amendment to the
experimental use provision in the Patent Act or a judicial pronouncement is needed to
save the interest o f the academic as well as the scientist researcher.
Full commercialization o f academic science also sidelines the importance of
educating students. Guena and Nesta mention:
[I]f patent output is to be used in the academic evaluation process, this
will create incentives for researchers to reduce their time and
commitment to some o f their activities - and, given the current weighting
scheme, teaching will be the activity likely to suffer the highest time
reduction.179 [emphasis added]
University licensing policies have a serious bearing on the public interest. For
instance, industries may approach the technology transfer office (TTO) for the purpose of
exclusive licensing o f the technology as further research and development needed to bring
a product to market involves major investment o f time and money. TTOs, being under
institutional pressure to increase royalties may issue exclusive licenses in favour of
industries.180 While exclusive licensing practices may be thought of as a beneficial move

178 Ibid.
179 See [“Guena and Nesta”] supra note 189 at 17.
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from the perspective o f the TTO, examples such as “the non-exclusive Cohen-Boyer
patent on the recombinant DNA technology” 18081 and the Canadian example of Banting and
Best,182183bear testimony to the anti-capitalistic view o f innovation. Faced with a choice
between collecting licensing revenue and transferring technology, TTOs may in all
probability prefer an exclusive arrangement. Lemley’s concurring view is expressed in
terms o f concerns respecting exclusive licensing and effective diffusion o f new
technologies:
[F]or certain basic building blocks - “enabling technologies” - opening
up licensing on many innovators who can develop different uses will
generate substantial improvement, while giving an exclusive license to
only one person will generate fewer improvements. And exclusive
licenses can block any development of a technology if the licensee
doesn’t deliver...Exclusive licenses aren’t necessarily bad...but they
1
raise concerns about the effective diffusion o f new technologies.
[emphasis added]
Academic patenting and licensing can generate significant social benefits, but
blindly promoting a pro-intellectual property culture may lead to several dangerous
ramifications. A restrictive intellectual property culture acts as a bar to the sharing of
research results among academics. Margo Bagley mentions:
[T]oday, academic researchers are being encouraged by technology
transfer offices and industry sponsors to delay publishing and presenting
their work until after filing a patent application and sometimes even
longer than that while not amenable to precise quantification, the stifling
of discourse and the attrition in the norms o f sharing and colloquy
180 See, C. Vest, Pursuing The Endless Frontier: Essays on MIT and the Role o f Research Universities
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005) 205 at 206.
181 See, S. Sterckx, “Patenting and Licensing o f University Research: Promoting Innovation or Undermining
Academic Values?” (2011) Sci Eng Ethics 51. [“Sigrid Sterckx”]
182 See [“Gary Matkin”] supra note 78.
183 M. Lemley, “Are Universities Patent Trolls?” (2007) Ford. IPME LJ 611. [“Lemley”]
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historically associated with the scholarly enterprise are costs that must be
balanced against the technology transfer gains.184
Bagley further emphasizes:
[E]ncroachment on traditional sharing norms now often comes from
university intellectual property policies codified in faculty hand-books
and in the instructions of TTO personnel to vet inventive work through
the office before publishing or presenting it to avoid the loss of potential
patent rights.185186
The study endorses the viewpoint also emphasized by Lemley:
[B]y even tacitly encouraging faculty to withhold key research results,
university technology transfer offices may be focusing on a red herring
of commercialization, while stomping on the real goose with the
golden egg - the universities’ core research enterprise. m [emphasis
added]
It seems that the obvious consequence o f academic patenting is the suppression of
research results. Some academics opine that, “universities have paid a price for industry
support through excessive secrecy and corporate efforts to manipulate or suppress
research results.” 187 Lemley mentions:
[Ujniversity technology transfer ought to have as its goal maximizing the
social impact o f technology, not merely maximizing the university’s
licensing revenue. A university...is a public regarding institution that
184 See, M. Bagley, “Academic discourse and proprietory rights: Putting patents in their proper place”
(2006) 47 BCL Rev at 2, 3.
185 Ibid at 12.
186 See [“Lemley”] supra note 183 at 6.
187 See, D. Bok, Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization o f Higher Education (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003) at 77; See also, [“Margo Bagley”] supra note 184 at 7, noting that,
“Derek Bok, former Harvard University President forewarns regarding the loss o f scientific integrity that
comes with increased commercial ties. Bok attributes the commercialization o f academia to a loss o f
academic values and direction, in addition to the loss o f state and federal appropriations and the shift to the
knowledge-based econom y”; See, S. Hansen et al, The Effects o f Patenting in the AAAS Scientific
Community (Washington, D.C: AAAS, 2005) online: American Association for the Advancement o f
Science < http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/AAAS_IP_Survey_Report.pdf> at 5 (last accessed on June 12, 2011)
[“The Effects”].
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should be advancing the development and spread o f knowledge and the
beneficial use o f that knowledge.188
University policies are also determiners o f the direction in which academic and
scientific research is directed. For instance, research grants may be re-directed from basic
to applied sciences.189 Special emphasis on commercial and entrepreneurial research
criteria may also influence the criteria for hiring academic staff.190 Another consequence
o f industry funding is the increased pressure to commercialize research results. In order to
increase the commercial value and appeal of research results, researchers are prone to
adopting a patent friendly format o f presentation. A patent friendly format refers to
disclosure o f the details o f the claimed invention only in the complete patent specification
and not prior disclosure by means o f academic publication or exchange of information
between peers.
A series o f studies on the practice of data withholding, especially in the field of
genetics and other life sciences have concluded:
[D]ata withholding is likely to remain prevalent in academic science.
One o f the main obstacles is the growing commercialization of US
universities [...] In 2002, more patents on genetic tests were held by
universities than by companies.191

188 See [“Lemley”] supra note 183 at 6.
189 See, A. Guena and L. Nesta, “University Patenting and its Effects on Academic Research” in SEWPS
Paper no. 99 Science and Technology Policy Research (UK: University o f Sussex, 2003) at 16 [“Guena and
Nesta”]; See also, W. Powell and J. Owen-Smith, “The N ew World o f Knowledge Production in the Life
Sciences” in S. Brint ed., The Future o f the City o f Intellect: The Changing American University (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2002) at 124 [“Powell and Owen-Smith”].
190 See [“Geiger and Sa”] supra note 50 at 178, 180.
191 See for example, D. Blumenthal et al., “Data Witholding in Genetics and the Other Life Sciences:
Prevalence and Predictors” (2006) 81:2 Academic Medicine 137 at 145.
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Adopting a proprietary attitude towards research is clearly a deviation from the
Mertonian norm o f disinterestedness and communalism.192 For fulfilling the aims of
commercialization, every invention generated from the research result ought to be a
consequence of fate and not a result o f knowledge sharing. McSherry emphasizes the
lawyer’s perspective on similar lines while quoting an interviewee from a TTO:
[Attorneys] prefer that you make every invention by accident...What the
patent attorney’s trying to do is establish that there’s no mechanism,
[that] you couldn’t have foreseen this. This is the exact opposite of the
faculty inventor who’s trying to establish that their understanding of the
mechanism and predictability led to this discovery [...] That scares
patent attorneys to death. People could say, wait a minute, you mean
anybody could have formed this hypothesis based on what Professor Joe
Schmoe said in this paper and that all you did was test [that idea]?193
Academic patenting and licensing also amounts to double taxation. The funding of
the initial research comes from the taxpayers, who again pay a second time as the cost of
royalty payments to universities is reflected in the prices o f patented products and
processes.194 Therefore, academic patenting leads to excessive taxation as well.
Commercialization o f academia can prove unfavourable to the researcher, the innovator
as well as the consumer.

3.4 Summary
Safeguarding the enterprise o f “knowledge sharing” is important for ensuring
scientific progress and technological development. Patents which grant the exclusive right

192 See [“Merton”] supra note 64 at 273.
193 See also, C. McSherry, Who Owns Academic Work? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001)
at 174 [“McSherry”]
194 See [“Sigrid Sterckx”] supra note 181 at 6; See also, [“Ritchie de Larena”] supra note at 1373; See also,
J. Washburn, University Inc. The Corporate Corruption o f Higher Education (New York: Basic Books,
2005).
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of use to the inventor are thought o f as tools which withhold knowledge and hinder
innovation. Both US and Canada have taken measures by framing policies and enacting
laws for allowing public research organisations such as universities and research institutes
to take title to resulting inventions. The rationale behind such measures is to shift the
responsibility o f commercialization on to the public research organisations. The problems
of bureaucracy prevent substantial interaction between the government and industry for
the purposes of commercialisation. The university ownership scheme will prove to be a
preferred option for increased industry interaction. The aim is to ensure that inventions
resulting from publicly funded research is eventually commercialised and brought from
the laboratory to the market for the benefit of the consumers. The faculty scientists
involved in developing inventions are provided with incentives o f shares in the revenue
generated from licensing the research results.
The US Bayh Dole Act 1980 and the Canadian measures for commercialisation of
public funded research indicate that the governments are in favour of universities
developing intellectual property portfolios and generating revenue through licensing. The
revenue generated is further shared between the university, the inventor and other
stakeholders in accordance with the terms and conditions of the university intellectual
property policy. Analysis of the statistical data and studies indicate that the
commercialisation strategy adopted by the Governments is not resulting in the desired
revenue or university income. The income-expenditure analysis o f the Statistics Canada
2008 data indicate that the cost of generating the revenue is too high for the universities
and that there may be no value in intellectual property commercialization strategy for
universities after all. The sample indicating the revenue sharing policies of eight
Canadian universities illustrated in Table 3 explain that only a small percentage of the
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income earned by the universities is reinvested in research and that too in only very few
universities. Consequently, the university mission to serve the public interest seems to be
blurring with the increased effort to patent even basic research tools. Patenting basic
resource material hinders access to such material as it creates the “tragedy of anti
commons” and stifles scientific progress. Furthermore, the lack of clarity in statutory
research exemptions in countries like Canada worsens the situation by disallowing
scientists to use basic scientific findings to build upon and innovate.
There are several drawbacks to adopting a proprietary attitude towards research.
The core enterprise o f a publicly funded non-profit organisation is research, adopting
ways to stifle innovation by suppressing access to basic research results or royalty
stacking is against the idea o f “knowledge sharing” and must be frowned upon.
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Chapter 4

4. Technology Transfer: An International Viewpoint
[M ultinational Corporations are profoundly troubled by the provisions
for technology transfer, which essentially mean surrendering the
heretofore exclusive patents and trade secrets o f advanced technology to
competitors in the Third World. Much of this apprehension derives from
a novel but intensely held perspective; the popular image o f the world is
no longer an infinitely expanding organism but rather a claustrophobic
spaceship with limited and increasingly overtaxed resources, distributed
hereafter to the winners o f zero-sum competitions (your win is my
loss).195
-

W. Michael Reisman

The cogent resonance of Michael Reisman’s words reflects the transformation by
a new perspective brought by technology transfer at the international context. It was as
early as the 1960s, which saw the advent o f the New International Economic Order
(NIEO), when issues pertaining to technology transfer emerged as a controversial yet
main aspect o f international relations. Sifting through the pages o f history, the various
efforts made by the developing countries to put an international legal framework for
governing technology transfer in place is noteworthy. The efforts imply that there are
various perspectives regarding the need for a legal framework for governing technology
transfer at the international level. This chapter seeks to analyse provisions relating to
technology transfer in two international framework treaties and identify the points of
tension between access and transfer of technology at the international level.

195 See, M. Reisman, “Trade Helps the Traders - The Third World’s Fading Dream,” The Nation, (1976) at
718, quoted from , P. Nanyenya-Takirambudde, Technology Transfer and International Law (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1980) at 76.
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Since the adoption of the resolution for the establishment o f NIEO,196 the
developing countries consolidated an agenda for the reform o f international law that had
been gaining momentum since the end of World War II. Three main changes to the
international order in the postwar era laid the foundation o f this momentum: first, the
“massive expansion o f international organization for cooperative purposes”; second, the
“growing importance o f states representing non-Westem civilizations” in the wake of
decolonization and independence movements; and third, “the growing gap between the
economically developed and the economically less developed countries.” 197 Post World
War II, rules for the international economy provided by the Bretton Woods institutions
prescribed the adoption o f a laissez-faire stance towards internal economic growth and
towards cooperation between the domestic and the international economies.198 The
developing countries resisted the substantive policies o f the Bretton Woods institutions
and looked to the United Nations (UN) as an alternative forum for international rule
making. Thus United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the
NIEO were formed in 1964.199 The Preamble to the Declaration o f the NIEO proclaimed:
A united determination to work urgently for the establishment of a new
international economic order based on equity, common interest and
cooperation among all States which shall correct inequalities and redress
existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap
between the developed and developing countries and ensure steadily
196 G.A. Res, 3202, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., 2229th mtg., Supp. No. 1 at 5, U.N. Doc. A9559 (1974).
197 W. G. Friedman, Cases and Materials on International Law (Columbia: West Publishing Co, 1969) at 9,

10.
198 See, C. Thomas, “Transfer o f Technology in the Contemporary International Order” (1998) 22 Fordham
Inti L. J. 2105.
199 See, T. Kabiraj, “Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPs and Technology Transfer” (1994) 29 Economic and
Political W eekly at 2990, noting that, “[t]he industrialized economies had for long been dominant in the
international scene. In the post-second world war period the developing economies organized themselves as
the Group o f 77 (G -77) and initiated in the UN and in UNCTAD a wide series o f negotiations with the West
and aimed at establishing a N ew International Economic Order.”
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accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for
present and future generations.200
The NIEO adopted the normative principle of “special and differential treatment
for developing countries” so as to aid the process o f industrialization. The NIEO further
adopted a substantive principle of economic redistribution along with the institutional
principle o f international cooperation.201 In the advancement o f the goal to regulate
foreign investment in developing countries, an “International Code o f Conduct for the
transfer o f technology corresponding to needs and conditions prevalent in developing
countries,” “access on improved terms to modem technology” and the adaptation of
“commercial practices governing transfer of technology” to the requirements of the
developing countries was formulated under Article 4 (p) o f the Programme of Action of
NIEO.202 The Draft International Code of Conduct for the transfer o f technology required
foreign investors to provide technical assistance by training host country personnel in the
technology and not gain total proprietary control over the technology-developed as a
result o f joint venture with the local owners.203 The 1980s saw the developing countries
suffer growing budgetary deficits, external debt and balance o f payment crises, which led
to excessive borrowings from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Eventually, the structural adjustment programme in the nature of negotiations for the

200 Supra note 196.
201 See, D. M. Trubek, “Protectionism and Development: Time for a N ew Dialogue” (1993) 25 Inti Law &
Policy 346.
202 Supra note 196.
203 See, Draft International Code o f Conduct on the Transfer o f Technology, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Developm ent U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/33 (1981) at 21, 23.
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Draft International Code suffered a stalemate204 and the NIEO also dissolved with the
onset o f the debt crisis in the 1980s.205 The developing countries adopted economic
liberalization as a measure for debt relief and removed restrictions on foreign investment,
including restrictions relating to technology transfer.
The Uruguay Round o f Negotiations 1986 to 1994 in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was launched by the North while developing countries in the
South were overcoming a debt crisis. GATT discussions had the objective of free and fair
trade among its member nations and primarily limited the discussions to tariffs and trade
in goods. Nonetheless, the industrialized North, especially the US, insisted on introducing
issues relating to intellectual property rights within the ambit o f GATT, the main
contention being that ineffective protection provided to intellectual properties in countries
gave rise to production and trade in counterfeit goods which led to unfair conduct and
trade practices. GATT was to set standards and norms for ensuring international
enforcement o f trade related intellectual property rights. Opposing opinions on the aspects
o f the issue o f intellectual property protection and patent protection in particular led the
then Director General o f GATT, Arthur Dunkel, to submit the draft proposal in 1991 on a
‘take it or leave it’ basis.206 The draft was finally signed by the member states in 1993.

204 See, R. M. Buxbaum, “The Politico-Legal Context o f the Purpose and Effect o f Codification: The
Example o f Technology Transfer Negotiations” in N. Horn ed. Legal Problems o f Codes o f Conduct for
Multinational Enterprises (London : Kluwer Law International, 1980) at 445; See also, T. H. Reynolds,
“Clouds o f Codes: The N ew International Economic Order Through Codes o f Conduct: A Survey” (1982)
75 L. Lib. J 315; See also, S. Patel et al., eds. International Technology Transfer : The Origins and
Aftermath o f the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code o f Conduct (Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 2001) noting that, “[d]ue to the dissension between developed countries and developing
countries and changes in the world economic and political situation, the ToT Code negotiations never
became an international legal document.”
205 See, R. Rothstein, “Epitaph for a Monument to a Failed Protest? A North-South Retrospective” (1988)
42 Inti Org at 725.
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GATT had the objective of promoting free international flow o f goods in trade, and with
the inclusion of trade related intellectual property issues within its ambit by means of the
Uruguay Round negotiations, the free international flow o f ideas. Meanwhile, supporters
of the TRIPS negotiations argued that protection of intellectual property was needed to
permit the owners o f that property to export the products that embody their innovations
and hence intellectual property protection is pro-trade.
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4.1 Technology Transfer: A Developmental Approach

UNCTAD regarded technological change as an important source o f growth in
living standards and essential for modernization in developing countries.

Technology

as a factor in international trade has time and again been emphasized as a tool for
international competitiveness. The developmental levels o f countries differ due to several
factors. The UNCTAD acknowledges that the volume and growth of trade is explained by
international technology gaps resulting in important inter-country variations in techniques
used and product characteristics. Developing countries are in a disadvantageous position
in terms o f their socio-economic conditions o f poverty, population growth and
international competition. Access to innovation is seen as the only way that Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) can overcome their developmental challenges. Eminent
scholars noted that while developed countries had taken centuries to modernize
technologically, the LDCs were expected to implement stronger intellectual property20678
206 See ‘The Dunkel Draft’ supra note 199 at 2990.
207 Ibid-, See also, A.V. Deardorff, “Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing Countries?”
(1990) 13 World Economy at 497, noting that, “[i]n an interdependent world economy with all countries
being exposed to foreign trade, it is hard to isolate the one which is not trade related.”
208 See, J. Markusen and L. Svenson, “Trade in Goods and Factors with International Differences in
Technology” (1985) 26 Inti Eco Rev at 175.
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rights in a matter of decades.209 Michael Blakeney210 mentions that since the middle-ages
in Europe the main objective for the grant of patent protection was to encourage industrial
development.211213During the 19th century, several instances were reported by the United
Kingdom stating that the US refused to provide adequate intellectual property protection,
as it would prevent their social and economic development. Companies in the US
continued to imitate and market British innovations during this time.
During the 1990s, the Uruguay Round negotiations led to the adoption of the
TRIPS agreement. TRIPS brought the perception that technology transfer was the way by
which LDCs could acquire foreign technology and scientific knowledge from developed
countries than innovating them on their own. Such transfer was intended to initiate a
process of economic development for the LDCs. Given that most of the advanced
knowledge and technologies were developed and located in the North, it is thought that
the LDCs would benefit from this advanced knowledge and experience and reduce the
•

development gap vis-à-vis the advanced nations.

i l l

209 See, K. E. Maskus, “U sing the International Trading System to Foster Technology Transfer for
Economic Development” 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev 219 [“Maskus”]; See also, J.T. Tsai, “Article: Not Tripping
Over the Pebbles: Focusing on Overlooked TRIPS Article 66 for Technology Transfer to Solve Africa’s
AIDS Crisis” (2007) 11 Mich. St. J. Med & Law 447.
210 S ee, M. Blakeney, Legal Aspects o f the Transfer o f Technology to Developing Countries (United
Kingdom : ESC Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 1989) at 49.
211 Ibid; See also, D. W. Kariodimedjo, “Legal Perspective o f Transfer o f Technology and Development in
Developing Countries,” Research Paper on the Government Regulation o f International Trade (Melbourne:
Monash University, 2003) at 60, noting that, “[s]ome developed countries which are home o f some o f the
most innovative companies such as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland resisted
providing patents until their industries had reached a certain degree o f development.”
212 See, W. Pretorious, “TRIPS and Developing Countries: How Level is the Playing Field?” in P. Drahos
and R. Mayne eds. Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development (Oxfam:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2002) at 183.
213 Ibid.
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Supposedly, the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights was
expected to contribute to the promotion o f technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination o f technology, to the mutual advantage o f producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and
to a balance o f rights and obligations. Parties, in formulating or amending their national
laws and regulations, were to adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and promote public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent
with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.214
The TRIPS Agreement aimed at benefitting the technologically poor countries in
the new international set up. Countries deficient in R&D have raised concerns regarding
international intellectual property protection in pharmaceuticals, food and agricultural
products that are likely to primarily affect the poor.215 Consider, for instance, the case
when the Brasilian government and American laboratories entered into negotiations for
reduction o f drug prices in 2005. Brasil had fore-warned that it would issue a compulsory
license over certain antiretrovirals (ARV). The spokesperson for the pharmaceutical
industry replied that such action would “ensure that companies whose patents are
destroyed will not be selling their next generation AIDS drugs, or any other medication

214 See [“Maskus”] supra note 209 at 220.
215 See, M. Kruger, “Harmonizing TRIPS and the CBD; A Proposal From India” (2001) 10 Minn J. Global
Trade 169, stating that, “ [b]y contrast, developing countries like India stand to lose the most from strong
intellectual property protection, because with strong IP protection they lose access to affordable medicines,
crop chemicals and educational materials.” [“Kruger”]; See also, F. Emmert, “Intellectual Property In the
Uruguay Round - Negotiating Strategies o f the Western Industrialised Countries” (1990) 11 Mich J Inti L
1317 at 1383, stating that, “ [fjarmers, students and the sick rely on cheap access to seeds, education and
drugs for their basic way o f life” and discussing the particular importance o f protecting access to advances
in education, agricultural materials and medicines to newly industrialised countries.

79

for that matter in Brazil.”216 Such instances lead one to question, whether TRIPS
endangers the transfer o f technologies required by developing countries for their
sustainable development. The following section discusses the provisions pertaining to
technology transfer in the TRIPS Agreement to establish conclusions regarding the effect
of monopolizing technology.

4.2 TRIPS and Technology Transfer
The key objective o f the WTO is to promote trade and economic development.217
The TRIPS Agreement has several provisions directly relating to the issue o f international
technology transfer. The most important among them are the Preamble, Articles 7, 8, 66.2
and 67. The first recital o f the Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement indicates that its
principal objective, which is to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade,
is international technology transfer promotion. The minimum standards provided by the
TRIPS Agreement are a means to achieve this principal objective. The fifth recital of the
Preamble recognizes the underlying public policy objectives o f national systems for the
protection o f intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives.
The sixth recital o f the Preamble to TRIPS makes explicit mention of the special needs of
least developed economies regarding implementation:
[RJecognizing also the needs of the least-developed country members in
respect o f maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation o f laws
and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable
technological base.
216 See also, B. Salama and D. Benoliel, “Pharmaceutical Patent Bargains: The Brazilian Experience”
(2010) 18 Cardozo J Inti & Comp L at 656.
217 See, Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO online : www.wto.org (last accessed
on January 12, 2011).
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Thus the Preamble indirectly encourages technology transfer. The objectives of
the Agreement in Article 7 o f TRIPS also confirm and recognize, in rather unspecific
terms, the importance of technology transfer as a benefit o f intellectual property rights:
[T]he protection and enforcement o f intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion o f technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users o f technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligation.218219[emphasis added]
Though Article 7 does not impose any specific obligation on developed countries,
it demonstrates the overall importance o f international technology transfer to TRIPS. The
TRIPS review processes in general require the development o f an intellectual property
policy capacity on the part o f LDCs as members o f the WTO. Furthermore, other
provisions could be read in light of their requiring developed countries to help ensure that
the adoption o f intellectual property rights does indeed contribute to innovation, transfer,
and dissemination o f technology in LDCs.
Additionally, Article

8 establishes principles in favour o f transfer and

dissemination o f technology. Article 8.1 indicates that WTO Members may, in
formulating or amending their law and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interests in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development provided that such
measures are consistent with the Agreement. Article 8.2 recognizes the need to take
appropriate measures to prevent resorting to practices which adversely affect the

218 “Preamble” Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1197 [“TRIPS”], Annex 1C o f Legal Instruments— Results o f the Uruguay Round o f Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, April 15,1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
219 Ibid at Art 7.
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international transfer of technology. Articles 66.2 and 67 impose more clear and direct
obligations on developed countries with regard to assistance and technology transfer to
LDCs.
Article 66.2 provides:
[Developed country members shall provide incentives to enterprises and
institutions in their territories for the purpose o f promoting and
encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country members in
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.22021
The negotiating history o f Article 66.2 suggests that it was a “last-minute attempt
by developing countries to rebalance the final [agreement],” and that industrialised
countries were not keen on it and “succeeded in limiting its scope to LDCs only.
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Article 67 explicitly addresses measures to promote technology transfer to LDCs by
establishing workable systems of intellectual property protection within LDCs.
The Article provides:
[I]n order to facilitate the implementation o f this Agreement, developed
country members shall provide on request and on mutually agreed terms
and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of
developing and least-developed country members. Such cooperation shall
include assistance in the preparation o f laws and regulations on the
protection and enforcement o f intellectual property rights as well as on
the prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the

220 Id. at Art 66.2.
221 See, D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
2003) at 3, 24; See, P. Roffe, “Comment: Technology Transfer on the International Agenda” in K. E.
Maskus & J. H. Reichman eds. International Public Goods and Transfer o f Technology Under a Globalized
Intellectual Property Regime (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 263; See also, A.
Michaels, “International Technology Transfer and TRIPS Article 66.2: Can Global Administrative Law
Help Least-Developed Countries Get What They Bargained For?” (2009) 41 GJIL 223; See also, S. K. Sell,
“Intellectual Property & Trade: The Quest for TRIPS and Post-TRIPS Strategies” (2002) 10 Cardozo J. Inti
& Comp. L at 79 [“Sell”]; See, C. M. Correa, “Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to
Developing Countries?” in K. E. Maskus and J. H. Reichman eds. International Public Goods and Transfer
o f Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
at 227.
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establishment or reinforcement o f domestic offices and agencies relevant
to these matters including the training of personnel.22223
Measures taken by developing countries to comply with Article 67, such as
holding classes to train government administrators in the intricacies of intellectual
property rights, could also be said to count towards implementation o f Article 66.2.
Intellectual property rights can be one factor leading to increased private international
technology transfer in countries with relatively good investment climates. The
interpretation of the provisions pertaining to technology transfer in the TRIPS agreement
provide for a developmental approach in contrast to total privatisation of technology.
Technology transfer is perceived as a tool for economies to strengthen a level playing
field by promoting technological innovation, transfer and dissemination of technology.
Accepting that the above provisions of the TRIPS Agreement encourage and promote
technology transfer, one essential concern is whether international technology transfer,
especially the technology transfer from the developed countries to the LDCs, actually
exists. Intellectual property protection merely provides a platform for technology transfer
but does not guarantee the transfer in practice. The developed countries prompted the
negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement based on the argument that an expanded and
strengthened protection o f intellectual property would bring about increased flows of
foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer to developing countries and that
change in intellectual property would also stimulate local innovation.

In spite of the

adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, the North-South technological gap has continued to

222 See [“TRIPS”] supra note 218, Art 67.
223 See, C. M. Correa, “Review o f the TRIPS Agreement: Fostering the Transfer o f Technology to
Developing Countries” (2000) TWN online httn://www. twnside.org.sg/title/foster.htm (last accessed on
June 12, 2011).
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grow.224 Several developing countries have raised concerns that the enhanced protection
given to intellectual property will impede the development process and restrict the access
to technology.225 Intellectual property rights, patents in particular, are a result o f the
corporate concentration and consolidation of the multinational companies (MNCs). The
life sciences industry which witnessed several mergers o f MNCs in the 1990s is an apt
example of the relatedness of intellectual property rights and the TRIPS Agreement.
Commercial sale o f seeds, pesticides, food and pharmaceuticals are controlled by small
number of MNCs. According to estimates indicated in the United Nation Development
Program's Human Development Report, 1999, in the year 1998, the top ten corporations
in the commercial seed industry controlled 32% o f the US$23 billion industry; in
pharmaceuticals, 35% o f the US$297 billion industry; in veterinary medicine, 60% o f the
US$17 billion industry; and in pesticides 85% o f the US$31 billion industry.
Corporate control over the supply of the products consequently leads to control
over the price o f the products. Monopolistic tendencies drive MNCs to increase the price
of essential goods. Aside from the pricing issue, control over essential resources such as
seeds, drugs and food translate into the MNCs having control over fundamental rights of
access to food, health and nutrition. The TRIPS Agreement imposes obligations on the
WTO members to make substantial changes to the national laws to afford protection for
224 See, L. Heifer, “Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and N ew Dynamics o f International
Intellectual Property Law-making” (2001) 29 Yale J Inti L at 23 [“Heifer- Regime Shifting”].
225 See, M. Kruger, “Harmonizing TRIPS and the CBD; A Proposal From India” (2001) 10 Minn J Global
Trade 169, stating that, “[b]y contrast, developing countries like India stand to lose the most from strong
intellectual property protection, because with strong IP protection they lose access to affordable medicines,
crop chemicals and educational materials.” [“Kruger”]; See also, F. Emmert, “Intellectual Property In the
Uruguay Round - Negotiating Strategies o f the Western Industrialised Countries” (1990) 11 Mich J Inti L
1317 at 1383, stating that, “[fjarmers, students and the sick rely on cheap access to seeds, education and
drugs for their basic way o f life” and discussing the particular importance o f protecting access to advances
in education, agricultural materials and medicines to newly industrialised countries; See also, Dru-BrennerBeck, “D o A s I Say, N ot As I Did” (1992) 11 UCLA Pac Basin LJ 84, stating that, “[ljesser developed
countries do not benefit from IPR systems until they have reached a threshold level o f development.”
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the inventions and technologies generated by the MNCs. There are elaborate enforcement
procedures in the Agreement, which are backed by a right for the complaining country to
apply for cross-retaliations against a non-complying country. The TRIPS agreement as
such does no more than emphasize the need for a developmental approach by means of
technology transfer in favour of the LDCs so as to uplift their socio-economic status.

4.3 Challenges to the Developmental Approach: Barriers to Access and Transfer

The LDCs were promised technology transfer as a tool for their socio-economic
emancipation and development. The development o f socio-economic status is closely
associated to the nature of problems faced by countries in need of technological aid. The
common concerns o f the developing countries in the nature o f increasing population,
poverty, food insecurity and health bring to the fore issues relating to inadequate access to
bio-based technology and generic resources. Access to innovation and technology
become a crucial aspect closely connected to survival than merely trade.
Under the United Nation’s Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 (CBD),
relevant technologies are identified as means o f achieving the objectives o f conservation
and sustainable use. Scholars have emphasized that “technology transfer is the means of
providing broad access in an interdependent world.”2
26227 There are many relevant

226 See generally, L. Imade, “The Two Faces o f Globalization: Impoverishment or Prosperity” (2003) Inti
Studies Center, online http://globalization.icaap.Org/content/v3.l/01_imade.html (last accessed on January
12, 2011 ); See also, W. Lesser, “Role o f Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology Transfer under the
Convention on Biological Diversity” in The International Service fo r the Acquisition o f Agri-biotech
Applications Briefs No. 3 (Ithaca, N Y : ISAAA Briefs, 1997) at 22 [“Lesser”]; For a detailed discussion on
access to development goals, see generally, L. Sebastian and J. Payumo, “Implications o f the Treaties TRIPS,
CBD and ITPGRFA on Public Agricultural R&D in the Philippines” (2008) 91 The Philippine Agricultural
Scientist at 228, noting that, “[t]he know ledge and products from agbiotech research could largely
contribute towards the attainment o f the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals o f eradicating
hunger and poverty.”
227 See [“Lesser”] supra note 226 at 25.
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technologies which are likely to be protected by intellectual property rights, such that the
recognition o f those rights become an aspect of technology transfer which can draw
specific connection to the objectives of the Convention. Intellectual property rights bear
specific importance in this light.
From the previous instances discussed, this study finds that international policy
in the area o f technology transfer is driven by the developed North. It is suggested
that in order to safeguard the interests o f the South, a global economic and
sustainable development model for technology transfer needs to be implemented.
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Figure 5: Model for Economic & Sustainable Development

Figure 5 illustrates the interdependent link between the holders and receivers
o f technology. For the purpose o f economic development, traditional technologybased products are sent to the global market by a technology-based economy, while
for the purpose o f sustainable development, the traditional resource based products
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are sent to new global markets. The two parties i.e., the resource donor providing the
material and the resource recipient are to achieve the goal o f sustainable and
economic development. The two international treaties negotiated during the 1990s,
which set standards and rules involving intellectual property rights and access and
transfer o f resources essential for innovation and research are the TRIPS Agreement,
1995 and the Convention on Biodiversity, 1992 (CBD).

The application o f intellectual property rights especially to bio-based
technology, have particularly important implications to access, availability and transfer
of such technologies. Thus, technology transfer as such in relation to the developing
countries is more than just a trade relationship. It is a question about meeting basic needs
of survival and development. Issues relating to access to biological and genetic resources,
agriculture systems, food security and increased poverty levels around the world have
been reiterated in the context of the developing countries by several proponents.228 For
instance, biomedical drugs which are created using biological material and genetic
resources are essential for health and survival in the LDCs.229 The proprietary nature of
basic public goods such as biological materials and genetic resources (GR) leads to the
creation of tension between the intellectual property protection standards and the
228 See, C. L. Diaz, Intellectual Property and Biological Resources - An Overview o f Key Issues and
Current Debates (W uppertal: Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, 2005) at 120; See
also, U. Schuklenk and A. Kleinsmidt, “North-South Benefit Sharing Arrangements in Bioprospecting and
Genetic Research : A Critical Legal and Ethical Analysis” (2006) 6:3 Developing World Bioethics 122 at
133; See generally, W. Reid et al., “A N ew Lease on Life”, in Biodiversity Prospecting: Using Genetic
Resources fo r Sustainable Development (Baltimore, MD : WRI, 1993) at 6.
229
See,
UN
Study,
“Overcoming
Barriers
to
Access”
online:
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/TF5-medicines-Chapter2.pdf (last accessed on January 12,
2011); See also, T. Ensor and S. Cooper, “Overcoming Barriers to Health Service Access and Influencing the
Demand
Side
through
Purchasing”
(2004)
HNP
online:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/2816271095698140167/EnsorOvercomingBarriersFinaI.pdf (last accessed on January 12, 2011).
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principles and rules o f other international regimes which are directly devoted towards the
concerns o f the developing economies.230

The following section explores the synergies and conflicts pertaining to
technology transfer in TRIPS and CBD to highlight the divergent approaches to the
enterprise o f “knowledge sharing” discussed in Chapter 3.

4.4 CBD and TRIPS: Identifying the relationship

The primary objectives of the TRIPS Agreement involve the reduction of
hindrances to international trade by promoting effective and adequate intellectual property
right protection, promotion o f technological innovation, the transfer and dissemination of
technology under a relationship o f mutual advantage to producers and users of such
technology, conducive to social and economic welfare, balanced rights and obligations.
Global minimum standards for the protection o f intellectual property rights including plant
genetic resources established due to the TRIPS regime fundamentally changed
international intellectual property law.231

An examination o f the negotiating history o f TRIPS shows that it was “drawn up
with the encouragement and active support o f large corporations to promote their
technological dominance and gain additional margins o f profit through obtaining private

230 See [“Heifer - Regim e Shifting”] supra note 224 at 23.
231 See, K. Nnadozie and R. Lettington, International Treaties o f Relevance to Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture (Washington, D.C: Méridien Institute, 2003) at 24, online: Méridien Institute
http://www2.merid.org/bellagio/Intl_Treaties_Paper_FINAL.pdf (last accessed on March 12, 2011) for a
discussion o f International instruments and issues o f access to PGRs.
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monopolies.”232 Countries such as the US have favoured the intellectual property right
model within the TRIPS framework. The intellectual property right model is synonymous
with the “corporate” model and favours the rights and benefits of intellectual property
right holders. Being a commercial treaty, TRIPS incorporates commercial objectives to
largely benefit private firms. Social causes such as human development, conservation of
resources and environmental protection feature only in terms o f references to or
exemptions made on behalf of the environment, human and animal health and public
order.233 On the other hand, establishment of international treaties such as the CBD were
a result o f the growing concern about the rapid worldwide loss of biodiversity and
essential resources. Rights o f local communities and indigenous people who are
recognised as holding the key to biodiversity conservation and use also form an important
aspect o f the Treaty.234 Unlike TRIPS, the promotion of commercial interests is not
central to the objectives of the CBD. One o f CBD’s central aspects is the recognition of
the need to regulate the behaviour and effects o f private corporations and researchers. It
aims to constrain their rights o f access and benefits within a larger framework that
stresses the goals of environmental protection and the rights o f sovereign states to their

232 See, K. Maskus and M. Penubarti, “How Trade Related Are Intellectual Property Rights?” (1995) 39
J.Intl. Eco. 227-248 (online) http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552 (last accessed on March 12,

2011).
233 See for instance, Art 27.2 o f the TRIPS Agreement which deals with ‘Patentable Subject Matter’
provides, “Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory o f the
commercial exploitation o f which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such
exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.” See also, G. Dinwoodie
and R. Dreyfuss, “International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain o f Science” (2004) 7 J Inti
Econ L. 431, 435, noting that, “[tjhere are no WTO decisions addressing Article 27 subject matter
exclusions directly, but relying on the WTO's tendency to hew closely to the text when resolving disputes.”
[“Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss”].
234 See, M. Khor, Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Sustainable Development: Resolving The Difficult
Issues (Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 2002) at 55. [“Khor”]
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resources and the rights o f local communities within them.

Supporters that argue in

favour of TRIPS Agreement hold that strong protection o f intellectual property rights
encourages creation and innovation.235236 The essential contention being that the
justification for intellectual property rights was to encourage artistic creation and
innovation.237 Effective administration of intellectual property rights will maximise the
contributions o f inventors.238 There are other proponents that contend that weak
protection o f intellectual property rights protects life itself by ensuring access to essential
goods for medical treatment, sustenance and development.239 Graham Dutfield identifies
three realms o f incompatibility between the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement. They are
“pro-patent,” “anti-patent” and the “pragmatic” viewpoints.240 Essentially, the pro-patent
view is that a strong patent regime is supportive o f the objectives o f CBD. Corporations
would be willing to invest in natural product research and more likely to participate in
benefit sharing and technology transfer agreements, that is, strong intellectual property
rights will provide incentive to the careful preservation o f these valuable resources. The
anti-patent view asserts that by creating patents over living organisms, the destruction of
biodiversity is encouraged, and monopolies that are unfair and immoral are created. The

235 Ibid.
236 See, M. W. Smith, “Bringing Developing Countries Intellectual Property Laws to TRIPS Standards:
Hurdles and Pitfalls Facing Vietnam Efforts to Normalize an Intellectual Regime” (1999) 31 Case W Res J
Inti L 211 at 215 [“Smith”]; See also, R. M. Sherwood, et a l, “Promotion o f Inventiveness in Developing
Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration” (1999) 39 IDEA, 473, suggesting that, “
[effectiv e administration o f intellectual property rights will maximise the contributions o f inventors.”
[“Sherwood”].
’
237 See [“Smith”] supra note 236 at 215.
238 See [“Sherwood”] supra note 236 at 473.
239 See [“Kruger”] supra note 215 at 169.
240 See, G. Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and Biodiversity: Seeds and Plant Varieties (UK:
Earthscan Publications, 2000) at 41.
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anti-patent view holds that such patents support biopiracy, which is the unauthorised use
of biological resources or the knowledge held by indigenous communities of developing
countries. The pragmatic view is that while there are difficulties in reconciling the
incompatibilities between TRIPS and CBD, the best way to achieve reconciliation is
through amendments and additions to the existing systems of intellectual property right
protection. The following sections explain the conflicts between TRIPS and the CBD in
terms of implementation o f technology transfer.
The Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) was drafted at the Rio Earth Summit in
1992 and came into effect in 1993. CBD is dedicated to promoting sustainable
development and addressing problems associated with the exchange and use of plant
genetic resources. The TRIPS Agreement and the Biodiversity Convention were developed
at the same time, by different delegations with different objectives, and with almost no
consultation or even communication between the two negotiations.241
The effects of a strong intellectual property right regime on technology transfer,
particularly biotechnology, can be assessed in light o f the objectives o f the CBD. Article
1 of CBD provides for an important legal objective. The Article states:
[T]he conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its
components and the fair and equitable sharing o f the benefits arising out
o f the utilization of GR, including by appropriate access to GR and by
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies taking into account all
rights over those resources and to technologies and by appropriate
funding.242 [emphasis added]

241 See, A. B oyle and P. Birnie, International Law and The Environment, 2ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002) at 732.
242 See, Art 1 “Objectives” Convention on Biodiversity CBD (1992): International Legal Materials, Vol 31,
No. 4, July 1992 online http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp?lff=Q (last accessed on January 12,

2011.)
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The Convention has mainly three objectives: conservation o f biological diversity,
which could be the activity o f technology transfer itself; sustainable use o f its components,
which are its indirect effects such as implications for labour requirements; and fair and
equitable sharing o f the benefits arising out o f the utilization of GR, which are the equity
considerations for the providers or innovators.
Taking a practical view o f technology, CBD views it as one possible means of
achieving stated objectives. In other words, technology transfer features as a method for
achieving one o f the three principal objectives of CBD, and intellectual property rights
are identified as the significant aspect o f technology transfer. Technology transfer is also
presented as a means o f achieving the rights o f traditional and indigenous peoples.
Benefit sharing from the use o f genetic resources is defined to include inter alia, “the
appropriate transfer o f relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those
resources and to technologies.”243 In essence, CBD recognizes that the conservation of
biological diversity is a common concern of humankind and promotes national sovereignty
o f genetic resources and sharing o f benefits.244 The term biodiversity as put forward in the
CBD means the “variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia,
terrestrial, marine and other marine ecosystems and the ecological challenges of which
they are part of, which includes diversity within species and o f ecosystems.”245

243 Ibid
244 See, Convention on Biodiversity, online: http://www.biodiv.org/default.shtml (last accessed on January
12, 2011) [“CBD”]; See also, Convention on Biodiversity, online: http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-un-enpdf (last accessed on January 12, 2011); See also, Editorial, “Genetic Benefit Sharing” (2000) 290:5489
Science 49, online : Science http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/summarv/290/5489/49 (last accessed
on January 21, 2011), “[B]enefit sharing as an objective is designed to provide an incentive for fulfilling the
other two core objectives, which are the conservation and sustainable use o f genetic resources. Benefit
sharing has been established as a principle o f international law in the area o f genetic resources in food and
agriculture.”
245 See [“CBD”] supra note 244 Art 2 o f CBD.
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The CBD achieves these objectives in part by recognising a states’ sovereign right
to control genetic resources within its borders and to determine conditions of access.
Therefore there are two identifiable sets o f rights in respect o f genetic resources in CBD.
The first set o f rights can be exercised over the genetic resources per se and the second
set relates to the technologies that are based on those genetic resources. Access to these
technologies may be granted only upon mutually agreed terms and subject to the prior
informed consent o f the state providing the resources. The sovereignty and access rules of
CBD allow the biodiversity rich South to act as “gatekeepers, conditioning access by
private parties seeking the genetic raw materials needed for future innovations upon a
promise to provide compensation, technology transfers or other benefits should those
innovations prove commercially profitable.”246 The CBD does not define what constitutes
‘a benefit’ nor does it lay down the criteria to determine when a benefit-sharing
arrangement is “fair and equitable.”247 The conditions for access and benefit sharing are
set forth in MTAs between the biological material or genetic resource providers and the
commercial entities seeking access to the resources as recipients. Some authors refer to
these MTAs as biodiversity prospecting contracts that create specific rights and
obligations for each party.248 While the CBD does not mention the types o f benefits to be
shared, it does consider access to technology and participation in research to be important

246 Supra note 224 at 31.
247 See, K. Nnadozie, “Evolving Norms O f Ownership and Access: Benefit-Sharing In A Global Context” in
R. Gold and B.M Knoppers eds. Biotechnology IP and Ethics (Canada: LexisNexis, 2009) at 244.
[“Nnadozie”].
248 See, L. Heifer, “Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties : An Overview with Options for National
Governments” (FAO Legal Papers Online No. 31, 2002), online www.fao.org/Legal/pub-e.htm (last
accessed on January 12,2011).
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benefits. Article 19 of the Convention, which deals with the handling o f biotechnology
and distribution o f its benefits, specifically provides:
[E]ach Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative and policy
measures, as appropriate, to provide for the effective participation in
biotechnological research activities by those Contracting Parties,
especially developing countries, which provide the genetic resources for
such research, and where feasible in such Contracting Parties.249250
[E]ach Contracting Party shall take all practicable measures to promote
and advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting
Parties, especially developing countries, to the results and benefits
arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by
those Contracting Parties. Such access shall be on mutually agreed
terms.
Article 19 reiterates that developing countries, being providers of genetic
resources, promote and advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by parties,
especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising from biotechnologies
based upon genetic resources provided by those Contracting parties. The CBD is binding
on over 190 member states.251

249 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 19.1 o f CBD.
250 See [“CBD”] supra note 244 Art 19.2 CBD; See also [“Nnadozie”] supra note 247 at 246, “[T]he
benefits shared between a provider and a user o f genetic resources could be the results o f research and
development or o f other related activities, as well as the monetary benefits derived from the utilization o f
the genetic resources. The CBD also points to other possible benefits that should be shared with the
providing country, such as “full” and “effective” participation in scientific research and biotechnology
research activities based on the genetic resources provided, especially by developing countries (Articles
15(6) and 19(1); access to and transfer o f technology that uses their genetic resources to developing
countries, including those protected by patents and other intellectual property rights (Article 16(3)); and
priority access o f providing countries, in particular developing countries, to the results and benefits derived
from biotechnologies based on the genetic resources they provided (Article 19(2))).”
251 The CBD list o f parties is annexed as Appendix E at 174.
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4.5 TRIPS and the CBD : Is there a conflict?
The objectives o f the CBD and TRIPS are seemingly unrelated but there are
several contentious issues. The statement by the G-77252 and China noting their “deep
concern that intellectual property rights deny developing countries access to affordable
technology and equitable benefits that accrue from the conservation and sustainable use
o f biodiversity”253 reiterate the imbalance between TRIPS and CBD. The developing
countries’ emphasised, “...if the Convention on Biodiversity is to have any meaning
beyond superficialities, then the removal of these distortions is crucial.”254 India and
Tanzania also stressed that “intellectual property rights regime and the TRIPS agreement
of the WTO are detrimental to achieving the objectives o f the CBD.”255
The following section analyses the provisions pertaining to technology transfer in
CBD to ascertain the tensions between the two Agreements. In terms of transfer of
technology, the provisions contained in Article 16 are noteworthy. In fact, the reference to
the negotiating history o f CBD as explained by one o f the negotiators, B.E Tewolde of

252 G-77 was established on June 15, 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries signatories o f the Joint
Declaration o f the Seventy-Seven Countries issued at the end o f the first session o f the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. G-77 is the largest intergovernmental
organization o f developing countries in the United Nations, which provides the means for the countries o f
the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating
capacity on all major international econom ic issues within the United Nations system, and promote SouthSouth cooperation for development; See, online http://www.g77.org/doc/index.html (last accessed on June
12, 201 l).T he list o f G-77 Countries is annexed as Appendix F at 176.
253 See for example, Report o f the First Meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, U N Environmental Programme, Conference o f Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, para 98, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/1/17 (February 28, 1995).
254 Ibid.
255 See, Summary o f the Fourth Meeting o f the Conference o f the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity: 4-15 May 1998, Earth Negotiations Bill. (Winnipeg, Canada: Inti Inst. For Sustainable
D ev,1998) May 18,1998 at 6.
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Ethopia, expresses the tensions and balancing acts in relation to the provisions pertaining
to technology transfer. Tewolde explains:
[A]rticle 16 is a complex Article because it resulted from the conflicting
interests o f the North, which wanted to hang on to its advantages in
biotechnology, particularly genetic engineering and the biodiversity rich
South, which wanted technology transfer in exchange. The North insisted
that technology transfer should be linked to the Northern form of IPRs in
order to protect the interests of their private sectors, particularly their
transnational corporations. Conversely the South wanted to make sure
that IPRs do not damage the prospects for the conservation and
sustainable use of its biodiversity and insisted on the inclusion of
paragraph 5. This upset the USA so much that it became one o f the
reasons why it never ratified the Convention.256257
Para 5 of Article 16 provides:
[T]he Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual
property rights may have an influence on the implementation of this
Convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject to national legislation
and international law in order to ensure that
such rights are supportive of
cn
and do not run counter to its objectives.
Article 16.5 implies that intellectual property rights can have negative effects on
implementing the CBD and that contracting parties have to cooperate to ensure that
intellectual property rights are supportive o f and do not run counter to the CBD’s
objectives. The provision also includes a caveat that the cooperation be subject to national
and international law.
Furthermore, Articles 16.1 and 16.2 may be read in the same light. Article 16.1
states:
[Ejach Contracting Party, recognizing that technology includes
biotechnology, and that both access to and transfer o f technology among
Contracting Parties are essential elements for the attainment o f the
objectives of this Convention, undertakes subject to the provisions o f this
Article to provide and or facilitate access for and transfer to other
256 For historical reference, see [“Khor”] supra note 234 at 142.
257 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 16.5.
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Contracting Parties o f technologies that are relevant to the conservation
and sustainable use o f biological diversity or make use of genetic
resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment.258
Article 16.2 provides that transfer o f technology to developing countries shall be
provided and facilitated under “fair and most favourable terms,259 including on
concessional and preferential terms where mutually agreed.” Where technology is subject
to patents and other intellectual property rights “such access and transfer shall be
provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and effective
protection o f intellectual property rights. The application o f the paragraph shall be
consistent with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 below.”260
Article 16.3 states that each contracting party shall take measures with the aim
that parties, especially developing countries that provide genetic resources, are provided
access to and transfer of technology which makes use of those resources, on mutually
agreed terms, including technology protected by patents and other intellectual property
rights, in accordance with international law and consistent with paragraphs 4 and 5.
Article 16.3 o f CBD addresses the issue o f access and transfer o f technology which
makes use of genetic resources to economies, particularly developing countries which are
providers of the genetic resources. The Article provides for parties to take measures to
provide access to and transfer o f technology on mutually agreed terms. Article 15 of CBD
supports Article 16.3 by providing that sharing of results o f R&D and the benefits arising
from the commercial and other utilization o f genetic resources should take place in a fair

258 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 16.1.
259 See, C. McManis, “Interface between International Intellectual Property And Environmental Protection:
Biodiversity and Biotechnology” (1998) 76 W.U.L.Qly at 263, noting that, the terms “fair and most
favourable terms” refers to “commercially reasonable and non-discriminatory.”
260 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 16.2.
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and equitable way and upon mutually agreed terms, with the party providing such
resources. To facilitate the transfer o f technology to developing countries, Articles 16.5
and 16.3 place emphasis on the obligations of developed countries with technology.
The articles are limited by the need to be consistent with international law, and
through the provision in Article 16.2 that technology access and transfer shall be on terms
consistent with adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights. The
provision aims at providing developing countries with access to technology on favourable
and concessional terms, but the need for consistency with intellectual property rights’
protection and international law counteract the obligations on technology transfer. These
implications lead the aims o f technology transfer on favourable terms difficult to be
implemented.
Inherent in Article 16, is a basic conflict between the aims and obligations of
technology transfer on preferential terms to the developing countries, and the need to
recognise and be consistent with the adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property rights. Furthermore, a basic conflict between Articles 16.5 and 16.2 is
noteworthy. Article 16.5 recognises that patents and other intellectual property rights can
influence the implementation o f CBD and therefore, parties are obliged to cooperate to
ensure that intellectual property rights support and not counter CBD’s objectives. The
obligation imposed upon the member states are subject to international law as well as the
proviso to Article 16.2, which states that this obligation has to be subject to international
law. The WTO TRIPS Agreement, which came into force subsequent to the CBD
represents the main international law treaty regulating the effective protection of
intellectual property rights. Therefore, a conflict does exist between TRIPS and the CBD
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obligations on technology transfer and on cooperation to ensure that intellectual property
rights do not frustrate CBD objectives.
Martin Khor in Intellectual Property, Biodiversity and Sustainable Development:
Resolving The Difficult Issues emphasizes, that there is “an inherent tension in spirit
between the aspirations o f a majority o f CBD parties” (i.e., developing countries) that
recognise the potential adverse effect of a strict intellectual property rights regime and
that are demanding effective technology transfer and access, and the insistence of
developed countries that the rights o f intellectual property rights holders be fully
respected, irrespective o f the effects on the CBD.261
As discussed above, the issue of access and technology transfers in CBD is closely
associated with intellectual property rights. The drafters o f the CBD envisioned that
technology would function as a quid pro quo for access. Economies rich in biodiversity
but poor in the skills agreed to facilitate access to genetic resources in exchange for a
commitment by technology rich economies to provide and/or facilitate access for and
transfer to other contracting parties of technologies in relevance to conservation and
sustainable use. The CBD allows developing countries which are biodiversity rich to
regulate access to their genetic resources and to share in the benefits arising from their
use. Therefore, as per the CBD, the San tribe ought to be compensated by SACSIR with
share in the benefits arising from the use o f hoodia.
Providers of genetic resources have not been compensated or acknowledged, or
otherwise have not been positioned to share in the benefits arising from the use of such
resources, because genetic resources were considered to be the “common heritage of

261

See [“Khor”] supra note 234 at 77.
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mankind”262and therefore free for all. The 1990s witnessed a shift in the notion from
common heritage to affirming state sovereignty over the genetic resources and the right to
determine the access and benefit sharing conditions.263 Therefore within the CBD the
typical notion o f technology transfer dons the function o f an instrument o f exchange or
compensation.
One may question that in case of conflict between TRIPS and CBD, which Treaty
would prevail? For instance, if patents hinder the access to a particular resource or
technology, will patents be seen as opposing the objectives o f CBD? Some authors
believe TRIPS supersedes CBD.264 It is noteworthy that Article 22 of CBD adopts a rule
o f priority stating:
[T]he provisions o f this Convention shall not affect the rights and
obligations o f any Contracting Party deriving from any existing
international agreement, except where the exercise o f those rights and
obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological
diversity.265
Therefore the interpretation of Article 22 would require developing countries to
demonstrate that patents are working against the conservation o f biodiversity. However,
Article 30 o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties (VCLT) dictates that TRIPS

262 See, B. De Jonge and M. Korthals, “Vicissitudes o f Benefit Sharing o f Crop Genetic Resources :
Downstream and Upstream” (2006) 6:3 Developing World Bioethics 144, [“Jonge and Korthals”]; See also,
J. Kloppenburg, First The Seed: The Political Economy o f Plant Biotechnology (Cambridge, UK :
Cambridge University Press, 1988), noting that, “[t]he principles o f common heritage and free exchange
had sent the developing world an ironic message: although the genetic material located within their borders
is o f great potential value, these resources, until transformed by technological invention or intervention, are
a public good that can be freely appropriated.” [“Kloppenburg”].
263 See [“Kloppenburg”] supra note 262 at 249.
264 See generally, C. M cDougall, Intellectual Property Rights and the Biodiversity Convention: the Impact
o f GATT (United Kingdom: Friends o f the Earth, 1995), noting that, “CBD cannot require technology
transfer over and above that which is allowed by TRIPS Agreement.”
265 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 22.
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would prevail because TRIPS is the latter Agreement and the more detailed one for
intellectual property protection.

Figure 6: The conflicting relationship between CBD and TRIPS
Figure 6 illustrates the conflicting points between the TRIPS and the CBD. The
conflicting points are discussed in detail in the following sections.
CBD was the first international treaty to assert the principle that countries have
“the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies.”266 This assertion is provided in Article 3 o f the Convention. Furthermore,
Article 15.1 states:

266 See, G. K. Rosendal, “Regulating the Use o f Genetic Resources - Between International Authorities”
(2006) 16, Eur. Env. 265 at 267, online <www.interscience.wilev.com> (last accessed on June 12, 2011);
The CBD negotiations originally focused on conservation alone. Soon, however, the negotiators included
the contested issue o f national sovereignty, access and property rights to genetic resources.
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[RJecognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources,
the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the
967
national governments and is subject to national legislation.
The principle o f national sovereignty over genetic resources was provided to
defend national interests against intrusiveness o f external elements mainly in respect of
bio-prospecting.267268 Based on this principle, countries have the right to regulate access of
foreigners to biological resources and knowledge and to determine benefit-sharing
arrangements. On the other hand, TRIPS enables research institutions to patent a
country’s biological resources or knowledge relating to the resources in countries outside
the country o f origin o f the resources or knowledge. Furthermore, Article 3 of TRIPS,
states:
[Ejach Member shall accord to the nationals o f other Members
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals
with regard to the protection [...] of intellectual property, subject to the
exceptions [...]269[emphasis added]

The Article contains the national-treatment principle, which makes it mandatory
for foreigners to have the same rights as citizens to apply for or obtain patents and other
intellectual property rights.270 According to TRIPS, a WTO member must allow
foreigners to apply to patent in its country certain categories o f living organisms (micro

267 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 15.1.
268 See, S. A Laird and K. ten Kate, “Biodiversity Prospecting :The Commercial U se o f Genetic Resources
and Best Practice in Benefit Sharing” in Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge : Equitible Partnerships in
Practice (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2002b) online: http://books.google.ca/books?id=17DLShPmX0C&pg=PA310& lpg=PA 310&dq=Biodiversity+Prospecting:+The+Commercial+laird&source=bl&ots=t
FulS7LbRB&sig=U4YM0CTrC7sWJjcZ9CVEJnbdug8&hl=en&ei=JNjTb3ZB8yJ0QG_y7mDCQ&sa=X&oi=book_resuIt&ct=result&resnum=l&ved=0CBsQ6AEwAA#v=onep
age&q=Biodiversity%20Prospecting%3A%20The%20Commercial%201aird&f=false (last accessed on June
12, 2011) wherein Bioprospecting refers to “exploration o f biodiversity for commercially valuable
biological and genetic resources.”
269 See, TRIPS, Art 3.
270 Supra note 221.
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organisms) including those from developing countries and even those originating in the
Member State. TRIPS facilitate the conditions for the appropriation or misappropriation
of ownership or rights over living organisms, knowledge and processes on the use of
biodiversity. Even if a WTO member believes it should exclude patenting of genes and
micro-organisms, it will be unable to do so, because of the TRIPS provision. Thus, the
sovereignty o f developing countries over their resources, as well as to determine access
and benefit sharing arrangements, is compromised, which is undesirable.

4.5.1 Private rights versus community rights
The preamble to TRIPS recognises that “intellectual property rights are private
rights.”Article 28 states:
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third
parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter o f a patent is a process, to prevent third
parties not having the owner’s consent from the act o f using the process,
and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for
these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process.
2. Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer by
succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.271
Under Article 28 o f TRIPS, a patent confers exclusive rights on its owner to
prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these
purposes the patented product; and to prevent third parties from using the patented
process and from using, selling or importing the product obtained from the patented
process. Intellectual property right owners are taken to be natural or legal persons such as

271 See, TRIPS, Art 28.
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corporations and research institutions. The rights conferred are therefore to private
individuals or private legal entities. Thus, in TRIPS, the award o f intellectual property
rights over products or processes confers private ownership over the rights to make, sell
or use the product or to use the process or sell the products o f that process. This makes it
an offence for others to do so, except with the owner’s permission, which is usually given
only on license or payment o f royalty. For instance, plao noi which is a herbal plant, has
been used by a Thai tribe for stomach ache for generations. The medicinal properties of
the herb were recorded on palm leaf parchment called ‘samutkhoi.’ Japanese researchers
learned about the medicinal qualities from the antique recorded medical texts on palm
leaf parchments and utilised them for the identification o f a drug. Subsequently upon
extraction and monopolization o f a derivative from the plant, a patent on the resultant
drug called Kelnac-Plaunotol was obtained. The inventors indicated that they had for
many years engaged in studies for finding novel pharmaceuticals by isolating
physiologically active ingredients from plants. As a result o f the studies, they isolated a
diterpenediol

compound,

(E,Z,E)-7-hydroxymethyl-3,l l,15-trimethyl-2,6,10,14-

hexadecatetraen-l-ol, from plants belonging to the genus Croton, particularly Plau-noi
(Croton oblongifolius Roxb.) growing in Thailand and also succeeded in chemical
synthesis of this diterpenediol compound as well as its homologs and derivatives.272
Robinson in Confronting Biopiracy mentions that one botanist o f the Forest Herbarium,
National Park Wildlife and Plant Conservation Department, led the Japanese team to
explore plao noi following the information from specimens recorded in the herbarium.

272 See, D. Robinson and J. Kuanpoth, “The Traditional Medicines Predicament: A Case Study o f Thailand”
(2009) J.W.I.P 375,403; See also, Y. Yuthavong, “Future Vision for Science and Technology in Thailand”
in S. Lorlowhakam and S. Teth-uthapak eds. Science and Technology in Thailand (Bangkok: National
Science and Technology Development Agency, 2003) at 24.
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Several trips were taken for obtaining quality extracts, while no benefits were shared with
the Thai authorities, tribals or local traditional knowledge holders conserving the plant,
with the exception that the botanist was offered employment as company consultant to the
Japanese researchers.273 Dhillon and Amorpan maintain:
If the company wanted to employ best practice according to the current
principles under the Bonn Guidelines, retrospective benefit sharing could
include the transfer o f technologies and manufacturing to Thailand.274
Thus, intellectual property rights often constitute obstacles to the exchange or
flow of knowledge, of products of the knowledge, and their use or production. This
system of exclusive and private rights clashes with the traditional social and economic
system in which local communities make use o f and develop biodiversity. Article 8(j) of
CBD recognises the contribution and nature o f traditional knowledge (TK) and of the
indigenous and local communities that own it. The provision states that each contracting
party shall:
[RJespect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices
of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity
and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement
of the holders o f such knowledge, innovations and practices.275
Article 15 spells out conditions for access to genetic resources, requiring that
access shall be subject to prior informed consent (PIC) o f the contracting party providing

273 See [“Robinson”] supra note 2 at 64.
274 See, S. Dhillion and L.A. Ampompan, “Bioprospecting and Phytomedicines in Thailand: Conservation,
Benefit-sharing and Regulations” in H. Svarstad and S. Dhillion eds. Responding to Bioprospecting: From
Biodiversity in the South to Medicines in the North (Oslo: Spartacus Forlag AS, 2000) at 57, 76; The Bonn
Guidelines on access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable sharing o f the benefits arising from
their utilization was adopted in C BD ’s Sixth COP. The guidelines were meant to assist Parties,
Governments and other stakeholders in developing an overall ABS strategy and in identifying the steps
involved in the process o f obtaining access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing; See, online
http://www.cbd.int/abs/bonn/ (last accessed on January 12,2011).
275 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 8(j).
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such resources.276 This means that the communities which are providers of the resources
shall be approached for their consent so as to use their resources. The users namely the
multinational companies shall ensure that the communities exercise their rights to
participate in benefit-sharing arrangements. However the TRIPS Agreement does not
recognise the contribution o f community knowledge and community rights.277 Instead, the
TRIPS Agreement favours private individuals and institutions, enabling them to acquire
“rights”, including rights over the products or knowledge whose development was mainly
carried out by the indigenous communities.
TRIPS allows patenting of biological resources, thereby facilitating the
misappropriation o f the knowledge and resources of indigenous and local communities.
Thus the activity o f bioprospecting takes the form o f biopiracy.278279As Vandana Shiva
maintains:
[T]he US accused the Third World of piracy [However], if the
contributions of Third World people are taken into account, the roles are
dramatically* reversed: the US would owe Third World countries
$302
•
97Q
million in agriculture royalties and $5.1 billion for pharmaceuticals.
The unauthorised access and misappropriation o f resource is one of the effects of
the “corporate” model within TRIPS which conflicts with the principles and provisions of

276 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 15.5.
277 See, “The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity and
the Protection o f Traditional Knowledge” Country Reports, WTO, D oc IP/C/W/356 and A dd.l, June 24,
2002 by Brazil, China, Cuba, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand,
Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe, noting that, “[a]mendments to the TRIPS Agreement to include an
obligation that patent applicants are required to disclose the origin o f generic resources and associated
traditional knowledge and to provide evidence o f PIC and fair and equitable benefit-sharing.”
278 See, M. Blakeney, “Bioprospecting and Biopiracy” in B. Ong ed. Intellectual Property and Biological
Resources (Singapore: Marshall-Cavendish, 2004) at 393 for a critique on how the two terms may have
been used interchangeably.
279 See also, V. Shiva, Biopiracy, The Plunder o f Nature and Knowledge (Cambridge: South End Press,
1997) at 56.
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the CBD that oblige member countries to recognise local community rights and fair
benefit-sharing. One o f the main objectives o f establishing the CBD is to counter the
possibility of misappropriation or biopiracy,280 while one o f the effects of TRIPS has been
to support this practice.

4.5.2 Modern technology and traditional knowledge
Traditional knowledge (TK) refers to the knowledge, beliefs, practices, cultural
expressions and innovation that belong to indigenous communities worldwide. These
indigenous traditional knowledge systems include valuable understanding o f plant, crop
and tree species, medicines, animal breeds, biological resources and also encompasses
useful technologies.

Unlike

Western

science

disseminated

through widespread

publication, traditional knowledge systems often exist in the form o f folklore, community
laws, common or collective property and inventions, which are disseminated over
generations through elders of the community. The knowledge therefore is o f a collective
nature, not private to one individual or group.281
While CBD recognises the nature and crucial role o f traditional knowledge and
practices in biodiversity conservation and use as discussed in relation to Article 8(j),

280 The term “biopiracy” was originally coined by the Canadian NGO Action Group on Erosion,
Technology and Concentration (“ETC Group”) - formerly known as Rural Advancement Foundation
International (“RAFI”) - to refer to the uncompensated commercial use o f biological resources or
associated traditional knowledge from developing countries, as w ell as the patenting by corporations o f
claimed inventions base on such resources or knowledge; See also, P. R Mooney, “Why We Call it
Biopiracy” in H. Svarstad and S. Dhillon eds. Bioprospecting: From Biodiversity in the South to Medicines
in the North (Oslo: Spartacus Forlag A S,2000) at 37 for the coinage o f the term ‘biopiracy’; See, C Juma,
The Gene Hunters: Biotechnology and the Scramble fo r Seeds (Princeton N J: Princeton University
Press, 1989) at 169, noting that, “industrialized nations collect and improve Third World resources before
selling such resources at higher prices.”
281 See for example, the case o f hoodia plant discussed in Ch 1 at 1; See also, R. A Mashelkar, “Intellectual
Property Rights and the Third World” (2002) 7 J.W.I.P 317, wherein the author discusses about the
knowledge relating to the therapeutic properties o f turmeric held by Indian communities since generations.
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TRIPS is constructed in ways that effectively denies this and instead rewards additions to
knowledge even if very slight and minor made through modem technology. This different
treatment for modem technology and traditional knowledge is also associated with
discrimination against local community rights.
According to Gurdial Singh Nijar282 the “definitional constructs in TRIPS are
selectively in favour o f the developed economies and marginalised developing
economies.”283 The criteria for a patent claim for an invention under Article 27.1 of
TRIPS are that it must be new, involve an inventive step and be capable o f industrial
application. Therefore, according to these requirements there must be an identifiable
inventor. This definition almost immediately dismisses the knowledge systems and the
innovations of indigenous people and farmers because they innovate communally.
The prior informed consent requirement is thus a measure to prevent
misappropriation o f resources and knowledge, and to facilitate fair benefit-sharing. In
TRIPS, there is no provision that applicants for patents over biological resources have to
obtain prior informed consent. There is no recognition in TRIPS o f the rights of the
country in which the biological resource or knowledge o f its use is located. Patent
applicants can submit claims on biological resources to patent offices in any country that
recognises such patentability and the patent office can approve the claims without going
through a process o f checking with the authorities of the country or countries of origin.
Thus, while the CBD has established the principle and obligation of PIC as a check
against misappropriation or biopiracy, TRIPS on the other hand facilitates the possibility

282 See, G. S. Nijar, TRIPS and Biodiversity: The Threat and Responses: A Third World View (Penang
Malaysia: Third World Network, 1996) at 41.
283

Ibid.
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o f such misappropriation by not recognising the need for and thus omitting a mechanism
of prior informed consent.

4.5.3 Access and Benefit-Sharing Arrangements
One o f the key aspects o f CBD is that it recognises the sovereign rights of States
over their biodiversity and knowledge, and thus gives the State rights to regulate access,
and this in turn enables the State to enforce its rights on arrangements for sharing
benefits. Grant o f access shall be on mutually agreed terms284 and shall be subject to prior
informed consent.285 Providers o f the resources should fully participate in the scientific
research286 and most importantly, each country shall take legislative, administrative or
policy measures with the aim o f sharing in a fair and equitable way the results o f research
and development, and the benefits arising from the commercial and other utilisation of
genetic resources with the contracting party providing such resources. Such sharing shall
be upon mutually agreed terms.
TRIPS does not have a provision for benefit-sharing with the State or
communities in countries of origin. If a person or corporation obtains a patent based on
the biological resource or related knowledge in another country, little can be done by the
country o f origin to enforce its benefit-sharing rights. It is true that a legal challenge can
be launched by the state or citizens of the country of origin. However, such legal cases are
expensive to take up. Even if a state has the resources to legally challenge a particular
patent in another country, it may not have the resources to track down and challenge

284 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 15.4.
285 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 15.5.
286 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 15.6.

109

every patent that it believes to embody biopiracy. Moreover, there is no certainty that
such challenges will be successful, since the matter has to be referred to the dispute
resolution mechanism o f the WTO. It is disheartening to note that if the patent laws, the
administration o f approvals or the Courts of a particular country operate in a context that
is favourable to the granting o f such patents, there is little that can be done by a country
of origin to ensure that biopiracy does not take place or that, if it takes place, it can be
resolved.
One prominent example o f biopiracy is the patenting o f the therapeutic properties
o f Neem. Local communities in India have regarded Neem as a free pharmacy or the cure
for almost all ailments for over 2000 years. Reportedly, in total, 23 parts of the Neem tree
are used in traditional medicinal remedies and practices.287 These include “medicine for
wounds, protection o f teeth and gums, the accumulation o f anti-bodies, detoxification, a
cure for smallpox, hysteria, leprosy, AIDS, malaria and snake bites as well as numerous
disinfectant and cosmetic uses.”288 Between 1994 and 1999 around 70 patents were
granted to Western universities, drug and cosmetic companies, and genetic researchers
regarding different properties and genes of the tree. In 1994 the European Patent Office
(EPO) granted W.R. Grace EP 0436257 for a “method for controlling fungi on plants by
the aid o f hydrophobic extracted Neem oil”.289 A group of international Non
Governmental Organisations (NGO) and representatives o f Indian farmers filed legal
opposition submitting evidence that the fungicidal effect o f Neem seed extracts had been
287 See,
A.
Purvis,
“Nature’s
Pharmacy”
The
Guardian
(30
May
2002)
online:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2002/mav/30/medicalscience.aids?INTCMP=SRCH. (last accessed on
September 15, 2011).
288 Ibid.
289 Id.
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known and used for centuries thereby negating the novelty requirement for patentability.
The debate reached a conclusion in 1999 when the EPO, revoking the patent, found that
according to the evidence “all features o f the present claim have been disclosed to the
public prior to the patent application ... and [the patent] was considered not to involve an
inventive step.”290 It is important to note that the patent was only subsequently revoked
and that W.R. Grace was able to exploit its monopoly until 2000. Equally important is the
fact that the patent was granted in Europe and was not subject to the lax perception of
prior art applicable in the US.
Similarly, the bark o f Banisteriopsis caapi has traditionally been used by
indigenous shamans to diagnose and treat illnesses. A specimen was granted US Plant
Patent 5,751 in 1986. The Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon
Basin learnt o f the patent in 1994 and a re-examination was requested on behalf o f them
by the Centre for International Environmental Law on grounds o f prior art and also by
suggesting that such a patent would be contrary to the public morality aspects of the US
Patent Act due to the sacred nature of the plant throughout the Amazon Region. Despite
such persuasive arguments, the USPTO ordered that the patent should stand.291 This
example represents an “as is” form o f biopiracy where the raw material has not undergone
any further improvement and is therefore even more lamentable.
Protection o f the environment is at the heart o f the rationale and provisions of the
CBD. The objectives o f the Convention as provided in Article 1 include:

290 See, Section 102 o f the US Patent Act.
291 See, J. Barton et al., Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (London:
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002) at 24.
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[T]he conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its
components and the fair and equitable sharing o f the benefits arising out
o f the utilisation o f genetic resources.292
Countries are obliged to develop strategies and plans to conserve and sustainably
use biodiversity, and integrate conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in
sectorial and cross sectorial plans and policies;293 to carry out in situ and ex situ
conservation;294 to minimise adverse impacts on biodiversity whilst also carrying out
remedial action in degraded areas ;295and to conduct environmental impact assessments on
and minimise adverse impacts o f projects.296297 TRIPS does not have environmental
protection as part o f its objectives. Unlike the CBD, the promotion of environmental
goals is not part o f its rationale. It does however have provisions that enable members to
exclude patents on environmental grounds. Article 27.2 states:
[Mjembers may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory o f the commercial exploitation of which is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality.
The differences between the two agreements demonstrate the conflict between
“western big business [...] couched in international trade and the pre-existing economic
and cultural values o f developing countries.”298 The two agreements emphasize the

292 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 1.
293 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 6.
294 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Arts. 8 and 9.
295 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 10.
296 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 14; See also, [“Khor”] at 55,“Article 19 requires parties to consider the
need for an international biosafety protocol (which has now been established) to deal with the safety aspects
o f biotechnology and international transfer o f genetically-modified organisms.”
297 See, TRIPS Art 27.2.
298 See, D. M. Strauss, “The Application o f TRIPS to GMOs: Intellectual Property Rights and
Biotechnology” (2009) 45 Stan J Inti Law, 287.
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differences in the objectives and values rather than the implicit functions of the
agreements. The implicit value of nature is embraced by the CBD which is considered as
the cornerstone for international environmental interests.299
Biological diversity is considered to be about more than plants, animals and
micro-organisms and their ecosystems. It is about people and their need for food security,
medicines, fresh air and water, shelter and a clean and healthy environment in which to
live. TRIPS takes a proprietary approach to the biotechnology industry, in that genetic
material and life forms represent commodities, whose ownership becomes exclusive and
remunerative. Therefore, TRIPS allows for intellectual property protection that can be
implemented in a manner that undermines the CBD’s objectives.300 TRIPS neither require
“sharing the benefits o f biotech products with the countries that supply the genetic
resources nor gives recognition for the traditional knowledge o f original communities as a
form to be patented.”301302Additionally TRIPS does not require the disclosure of the origin
of the resources for applicants to exercise their rights.

4.6 Can CBD and TRIPS be reconciled?
The US in its country report before the TRIPS Council meeting in March 2006,303
argued that the CBD’s objectives on access to genetic resources, and on benefit sharing
could best be achieved through national legislation and contractual arrangements based
on the legislation, which could include commitments on disclosing o f any commercial
299 Ibid at 305.
300 Id at 309.
301 Id
302 Id.
303 See, United States, WTO, D oc IP/C/W/469, March 13, 2006 WTO, Doc IP/C/W/254, WTO, Doc
IP/C/M/35 [“US Country Report”].
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application o f genetic resources or traditional knowledge.304According to the US, there is
no conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD. The two agreements can be
implemented in a mutually supportive manner.305 The absence o f provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement to protect genetic resources from misappropriation and theft does not indicate
conflicts between its implementation and the CBD. The lack o f clearly defined national
systems directly regulating the use o f genetic resources, particularly in the context of
access and benefit-sharing (ABS) systems creates an “erroneous” treatment of the
relevant resources, not the “lack o f safeguards” in the TRIPS context, as accused by
India, Brasil and others.306 The US proposed, “national contract-based systems to meet
the demands o f achieving appropriate access and equitable benefit sharing.”307 Therefore,
the developed world views TRIPS and CBD to be in harmony rather than conflict even
when there are obvious instances o f conflicting implementations.

304 Ibid at 83, “[t]he position o f the USA was that a contract-based system provided many advantages for
protecting access to and use o f genetic resources or traditional knowledge o f indigenous populations, many
o f which would not be available in a patent system. For example, contracts provided a mechanism to
properly obtain genetic resources or traditional knowledge from the provider for research and permit benefit
sharing arrangements between the provider o f the resource and the user o f that resource. Contracts could
also include research reporting requirements, rules on how to transfer, store or use the genetic resources or
traditional knowledge, and set out clear ways to resolve any future disputes that may arise between the
provider and user. By contrast, the patent system could not ensure authorized access to genetic resources
and equitable sharing o f their benefits. Contracts could be precisely tailored to accomplish these goals.”
305 See [“US Country Report”] supra note 303, Document IP/CAV/469; see also, [“Gervais”] supra note 221
at 83.
306 See, Technical Observations on the US Submission IP/C/W/449 by Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Cuba,
India and Pakistan, “The Relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and the Protection o f Traditional Knowledge,” WTO, D oc IP/C/W/459, (2005) online :
http://commerce.nic.in/ip-c-w-459.pdf (last accessed on July 01, 2011); see also, [“Gervais”] supra note
221 at 83.
307 Ibid [“Gervais”] at 83; See also, Access and Benefit-Sharing, Draft decision submitted by the Co-Chairs,
UNEP/CBD/COP/9/ICG-ABS/CRP. 1/Rev. 1, May 28, 2008, UNEP, 2008, “the Ninth Session o f the
Conference o f the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,” 101 at 120, wherein it was decided
that an international regime on equitable access and benefit sharing (ABS) in the context o f the CBD would
be established. This was a parallel development in the context o f CBD.
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4.7 Summary
This chapter identifies the tension between TRIPS under the auspices of the World
Trade Organisation and the United Nation’s Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
with technology transfer as its focal point. The negotiating history o f the two Treaties
reveals that technology transfer has been a bargaining tool for the developed countries.
Technology transfer is an issue that divides the world into two realms, namely
affordability and availability. The MNCs driving the discussions o f the TRIPS Agreement
have required stronger intellectual property rights for the purposes o f transferring their
technologies. By the mid-1990s, a minimum global standard for intellectual property
rights had been enshrined in the WTO Charter through the incorporation of the TRIPS
Agreement. The shift in international policy making from its traditional postwar focus on
the lowering o f tariff and nontariff trade barriers to the embrace of strong intellectual
property rights has been controversial. Stronger intellectual property rights in developing
countries may work against national economic interests, transferring rents to
multinational corporate patent holders headquartered in the world’s most advanced
countries, especially the US. Intellectual property rights advocates counter that
strengthening intellectual property rights will induce more innovation in the global
economy, thereby fostering more rapid economic growth. Throughout the 1980s and
1990s, a number o f countries undertook substantial reforms o f their patent systems. The
interpretation that intellectual property rights’ reform results in an increase in technology
transfer among US multinationals is strengthened by the fact that R&D spending by
affiliates - usually viewed as a complement to technology imports from the parent increases after intellectual property rights reform. The CBD on the other hand conflicts on
significant points with that of TRIPS. Issues o f access and transfer o f technology ought to
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adhere to a bilateral arrangement between the provider o f technology and the recipient of
technology as per CBD. The principles enshrined within the CBD are prior informed
consent (PIC) and mutually agreed terms (MAT). The CBD provision on technology
transfer conflicts with the non-discrimination provision o f the TRIPS Agreement.
The examination o f the provisions pertaining to technology transfer in the TRIPS
Agreement indicates that technology transfer was used as a major bargaining tool for
encouraging the developing and least developed countries to approve the TRIPS
Agreement. The enterprises which were technology holders and developers could abuse
their monopoly rights in the patented technology and charge increased cost to the
consumers in the developing countries. Therefore the issue of facilitating technology
transfer and access to technology remain as mere words in the text.
The basic concerns o f the developing countries in terms o f survival, preservation
o f resources for future use, accessibility to food and health can be found in the provisions
of multilateral treaties such as the CBD. Both the treaties contain provisions pertaining to
access and transfer o f technology and benefit sharing in favour o f LDCs. However, when
it comes to implementation, transferring (bio-based) technology is found to be in direct
opposition to the TRIPS Agreement. Provisions pertaining to technology transfer in CBD
are found to be potentially conflicting with the non-discrimination provision in the TRIPS
Agreement. This study finds the TRIPS Agreement and CBD to have conflicting policies.
Articles 15.7, 16.2 and 16.3, 19.1 and 19.2 o f CBD provide for priority access,
preferential terms and requirements of joint research projects respectively which are not
contained in the TRIPS Agreement. The proponents of the South, such as Brazil, India
and Malaysia believe that TRIPS and CBD are incompatible and the TRIPS Agreement
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encourages biopiracy by means of non-disclosure o f the source o f the genetic resources.
On the other hand, the proponents of the North, the US and EU expressly deny such
claims. The international viewpoint on technology transfer is both complex and
controversial. The perspective on technology transfer at the international realm depends
on who is the holder o f the technology and who is the user o f the technology. The MNCs
have introduced a “corporate” model within the “developmental” model in the
international policy making environment which gives way to barriers in conducting
research for innovation. It is submitted that it is essential to preserve the developmental
and participatory approach for safeguarding the interests o f the resource providers who
are also the primary consumers of the technology. In the following chapter, an alternative
approach in international policy-making that may achieve the middle-ground of satisfying
the demands for profit as well as sustainable development is identified.
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Chapter 5
5. Conclusion
[T]he most important and urgent problems of the technology o f today are
no longer the satisfactions of the primary needs or o f archetypal wishes,
but the reparation of the evils and damages by the technology of
yesterday.308
-

Dennis Gabor

Gabor emphasizes the new role of modem day technology. The “corporate” model
of increased interaction with multinational companies for better access to resource,
products and technology is prevalent in the domestic as well as the international level of
policy making. This “corporate” model has transformed the age-old enterprise of
“knowledge sharing” which led to scientific progress and technological development
from a “developmental” model to an exploitative one. This study examines the enterprise
o f “knowledge sharing” through the perspectives o f technology transfer.
The theoretical as well as the domestic and international perspectives of
technology transfer were analysed to identify a shift in the rationale for public interest and
public policy. It is found that universities and research institutes advocate “knowledge
sharing” in their mission statements and are generally committed to generating,
disseminating and preserving knowledge and to working with others in disseminating this
knowledge. Academe’s principle regarding technology transfer is also grounded on the
perspective that it propels new research collaborations, exchanges o f materials,
information and personnel with industry, which adds new dimensions to university
research programs and, at the same time, presents unique research opportunities for
308 D. Gabor, Innovations: Scientific, Technological and Social (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970) at
26.
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faculty and students. The different models of scientific research and technology transfer
that were analyzed in Chapter 3 o f this study further directs one to the conclusion that
academic universities principally share similar aims of promoting integrity in scientific
research and fostering an open method for achieving accuracy in scientific research and
innovation, which is significantly beneficial to mankind. However, while academia is
motivated by the quest for knowledge and to accomplish its duty to human kind, private
industry, in contrast, has a responsibility to satisfy its investors and shareholders whose
motivation is financial gain. Partnership between the university and industry has resulted
in the attrition o f the values o f progress by means of “knowledge sharing”. Industry
contributes to university research because of the potential o f reaping exclusive benefits
through licensing and commercialization agreements. Both university and industry play
unique roles in society and their interaction may lead to compromising the virtue of
communalism which leads to better research and innovation.
The role reversal o f a non-profit organisation into an entrepreneur has led to the
patenting o f basic science and research tools considered as building blocks for further
innovation. Public research organisations have drifted into a capitalistic mode, while the
traditional norms o f optimal scientific production advocated by the likes o f Merton call
for the need for a participatory approach. “Knowledge sharing” as an ethos has
somewhere blurred into the sidelines at the domestic realm.
Analysis o f various technology transfer policies implemented by the US and
Canadian governments as well as the provisions o f TRIPS and CBD in support of
technology transfer provides answers to this study’s research questions including:
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•

Whether laws and policies pertaining to technology transfer at the domestic and
international level support a “developmental” perspective towards scientific research
and technology transfer?

•

What are the implications o f excessive commercialisation o f science and technology
on the traditional enterprise of “knowledge sharing”?

•

Does the “corporate” model transform the traditional enterprise of “knowledge
sharing” and technology transfer into an exploitative one both at the domestic and
international level?
While the government supported policies on R&D initially generated successful

research results; more patents, non-disclosure clauses and material transfer agreements
into academe as an outcome o f commercialization have demonstrated interference with
access to research results and materials. Increased commercialization has not directed
better conditions for research and innovation in areas for which huge public funds are
invested. In order to benefit from royalty payments, universities have engaged in practices
that can scarcely be regarded as compatible with the public interest. These practices
include exclusive licensing and claiming ownership over fundamental research tools.
As a response to this study’s main question and from the examination of various
instances o f commercialization of technologies and resources (especially bio-based), there
are conflicting provisions at the international level which are supportive of the
“corporate” model o f scientific research and consequentially hinder access to technology
for further innovation. As discussed in Chapter 4, the TRIPS Agreement brought the
perception that technology transfer was the way by which developing countries could
acquire foreign technology and scientific knowledge from developed countries rather than
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developing them on their own. An examination of the negotiating history o f TRIPS shows
that it was drawn up with the encouragement and active support o f large corporations to
promote their technological dominance and gain additional margins of profit through
obtaining private monopolies. Being a commercial treaty, TRIPS

incorporates

commercial objectives to largely benefit private firms. Furthermore, TRIPS and the
enactment o f patent laws relating to biological materials in some countries have
facilitated the misappropriation of knowledge and resources of indigenous and local
communities, resulting in an increase in the number o f biopiracy cases. TRIPS, is
established in ways that effectively denies traditional knowledge and instead rewards
additions to knowledge, even if very slight and minor additions are made through modem
technology. This different treatment for modem technology and traditional knowledge is
also associated with discrimination against local community rights.
On the other hand, the CBD, which recognizes the need to regulate the behaviour
and effects of private corporations and researchers was established during the same period
as TRIPS, but has not been ratified by developed countries such as the US. The CBD is
dedicated to promoting sustainable development and addressing problems associated with
the exchange and use o f plant genetic resources. CBD allows developing countries which
are biodiversity rich to regulate access to their genetic resources and to share in the
benefits arising from their use.
There are conflicting implementations, policies, and points of view on
commercialising and transferring scientific research and technology at the domestic and
international level. The perspective on technology transfer ultimately depends on who is
the holder o f the technology and who is the user o f the technology. The developmental
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and participatory approach, safeguards the interests of the resource providers, academic
and scientist researchers, entrepreneurs as well as consumers of the technology.

5.1 Recommendations and Alternative Approaches
Taking a pragmatic view that while there are difficulties in reconciling the
incompatibilities between the “corporate” and “developmental” approaches to technology
transfer, the best way to achieve reconciliation is through amendments and additions to
the existing systems of intellectual property rights, their protection and policies.
In order, to save the interest of the academic as well as the scientist researcher, it
is submitted that research tools should be given broad exemption compared to other
patentable inventions. An amendment to clarify the experimental use provision in the
Canadian Patent Act or a clear judicial pronouncement is desired.
Adoption o f an open developmental model for accessing resources should find a
place both in letter as well as in the spirit o f laws and policies. One recommendation that
can be made is that exclusive or narrow licensing by a university should require an
explicit rationale. Open licensing may be resisted by university administrators and
researchers on the grounds that it would diminish their ability to maximise financial
returns from their portfolio. The principal support for university patenting with freedom
to license arises from their perception that it increases their ability to generate revenue.
The recent 2008 Statscan data on the “Intellectual Property Commercialisation in Higher
Education Sector”309 as well as studies by Mowery et a/.,310 reveal that patenting research
results as such does not lead to increase in revenue or profit by universities. Only a small
309 See [“Statscan Survey-2008”] supra note 126.
310 See [“Mowery et a/.”] supra note 91; See also [“Nelson et a/.”] supra note 86.
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fraction o f universities bring in more money from their patenting and licensing operations
than they spend on them.
The traditional approach inherent in communalism seeks to align the interests of
scientists and organisations with the overarching institutional goals of scientific progress,
defined as “the extension o f knowledge certified as true.”311 Scientific findings are a
product of collaboration, “a common heritage that should be dedicated to the scientific
community.”31231 Open source licensing seeks to maximize the amount of improved
technology available by ensuring that advances remain openly accessible.

Kenneth Neil

Cukier notes:
[T]here is currently no legal equivalent that can act alongside the patent
system for protecting inventions to ensure that they are opened up indeed, it is tricky to see how it might be put into practice. An offshoot of
Creative Commons called the Science Commons has formed to try to
devise just such a mechanism.314
Moreover, “ [solidarity is [also] a core value o f modem healthcare (and the
welfare state) and has been described as essential for redressing the growing global
healthcare deficit.”315 A general policy of open licensing of university research results can
set the stage for downstream applied R&D. A novel example o f preserving the communal
approach to research is found in the Stanford University policy regarding material transfer

311 See, J. E Hope, Open Source Biotechnology (PhD thesis, Australian National University, 2004), cited in
B. M. Knoppers and Y. Joly, “Our Social Genome?” (2007) 25:7 Trends in Biotechnology 284.
312 See, B. M. Knoppers and Y. Joly, “Our Social Genome?” (2007) 25:7 Trends in Biotechnology 284.
313 See also, R. Feldman, “The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?” (2004) 6
Minn.J. L Sci & Tech. 117 at 120.
314 See, K. N. Cukier, “Navigating the Future(s) o f Biotech Intellectual Property” (2006) 24 Nature
Biotechnology 249 at 251.
315 S. H. E. Harmon, “From Engagement to Re-Engagement: The Expression o f Moral Values in European
Patent Proceedings, Past and Future” (2006) 5 Eur.L.Rev. 642.
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agreements (MTAs). Stanford University has an extremely simple procedure for MTAs,
i.e., if the recipient is in academia or a not-for-profit institution, no MTA is required. If
the recipient is in industry, three options are there for the donor: where the donor is
certain that the material will be used for research purposes only, then again no MTA is
required, and where the donor is uncertain he may either insist on an MTA where the
recipient confirms use will be only for research purposes, or he may refer the matter to
the TTO for licensing.316 The Stanford model MTA gives way to a form of
standardization which removes a barrier to academic cooperation and is one step towards
reversing the current erosion of the key academic values o f collaboration and openness.317
An open source MTA may serve the ends o f preserving the ethos of science as
well as facilitate access to research materials.318 A similar principle is found in the
international treaty framework as well.
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGRFA), which came into force on June 29, 2004319adopts an open approach to
facilitate the international transfer of genetic resources. The Treaty is administered by the
316 See [“Sigrid Sterckx”] supra note 181 at 59; For more information, see also, J. Sandelin, “The Stanford
University
Knowledge
Transfer
Model”
online
‘http://www.auril.org.uk/media/AURIL%20Conference%202007/Sandelin%20Jon.pdf. (last accessed on
June 28, 2011).
3,7 Ibid.
318 See also, T. Margoni, “The Roles o f Material Transfer Agreements in Genetic Databases and Biobanks”
in U. Izzo, G. Pascuzzi and M. Macilotti eds. Comparative Issues in the Governance o f Research Biobanks.
Property, Privacy, Intellectual Property and the Role o f Technology (SpringerLink, 2011) forthcoming on
file with author, wherein a metadata driven approach is proposed as a methodology that can be
implemented by many different players and projects in different ways. R ecalling] that access to knowledge
and participation to scientific and technological growth are a public policy goal, hardly can they be
achieved through a private ordering tool.
319 See, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources fo r Food and Agriculture (November 3, 2001)
online: ftp: //ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf (last accessed on June 12, 2011) [“ITPGRFA”].
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United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization’s Commission on Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture.320 The ITPGRFA is relevant to agricultural plant-based
biopiracy as it seeks to globally administer the exchange of crop germplasm.
The objective o f the Treaty is stated in Article 1:
[T]he objectives o f this Treaty are the conservation and sustainable use of
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable
sharing o f the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with the
Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and food
security.321 [emphasis added]
The principal aim of ITPGRFA is to utilize the multilateral system for facilitating
the exchange o f seeds and other plant materials for research, breeding and crop
development purposes through which member states will be granted facilitated access.322
Article 12.1 of the ITPGRFA provides for facilitated access to plant genetic resources
under the multilateral system created by the Treaty, and is restricted only to the specific
list of genetic resources for food and agricultural purposes contained in Annex 1 o f the
Treaty. The Treaty provides that the recipients shall not claim any intellectual
property rights that may limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture, or their genetic components in the form received from the

320 CBD did not provide for access or the sharing o f benefits related to certain categories o f genetic
resources. In particular, it did not cover ex situ material collected before it sentry into force, including gene
bank collections o f the International Agricultural Research Centres o f the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (“CGIAR”) as well as many national collections. However the Nairobi
Conference, where the CBD was adopted, recognised the need to specifically address these categories o f
PGR, especially those within the Global System for the Conservation and Sustainable U se o f Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture established by the FAO; See, “Nairobi Final Act o f the Conference for
the Adoption o f the Agreed Text o f the Convention on Biological Diversity” (May 22, 1992), online:
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/handbook/cbd-hb-09-n.pdf> (last accessed on June 12, 2011).
321 See [“ITPGRFA”] supra note 319, Art 1.
322 See for instance, M. Blackeney “Agricultural Research: Intellectual Property and the CGIAR System” in
P. Drahos and R. Mayne eds. Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and Development
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) at 108.
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multilateral system.323 The multilateral system also covers ex situ collections in biobanks
o f the International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) o f the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). In essence, the treaty attempts to formalize
the transfer o f agricultural plant genetic resources, thus potentially inhibiting biopiracy
incidents and ensuring more transparent administration o f the IARC biobanks.
Parties that ratify the International Treaty effectively open up their agricultural
plant genetic resources to access via a Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA) in
accordance with Article 12.4 o f the Treaty. The SMTA adopted under the treaty
establishes a contract between the provider and recipient o f plant genetic resource products
for food and agriculture incorporating materials or any o f its genetic parts or components
that are ready for commercialization.324 This excludes products used for food, feed and
processing. Furthermore, Article 5 o f the SMTA requires that the provider should submit
all available data and descriptive information about the materials. Access to these
materials protected by intellectual property rights must be consistent with international and
national laws. During the period of plant genetic resource development including material
being developed by farmers, access is at the discretion o f its developer. Article 6 of the
SMTA provides that the recipient must use the materials only for the purposes of research,
breeding and training for food and agriculture, and must not claim intellectual property

323 Supra note 319 at 230, “[T]he multilateral system is a communal seed treasury composed o f 35 food and
29 feed crops held both by states and Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
gene-banks. In exchange for access to this common seed pool, private parties that create commercial
products which incorporate PGRs received from the multilateral system must pay a percentage o f profits
into a fund to be administered by the treaty's governing body. The fund will be used to promote
conservation and sustainable use o f PGRs.”
324 See [“ITPGRFA”] supra note 319 Art 2, Standard MTA “...understood to mean: materials o f plant
origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating materials, containing functional units o f
heredity.”
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rights that may limit facilitated access to the materials or their components. This Article is
an attempt to limit biopiracy involving the exclusion o f plant usage by others. In cases
where a recipient commercializes a product, a payment of 1.1 % of the sales of the
product, or products less 30%, must be paid to the Trust Account o f the governing body.3253267
That is to say that in practice, the payment must be 1.1 % o f 70 % of gross sales o f the
product. In other words, 0.77 % of total sales.
Article 13 o f ITPGRFA provides that, the multilateral system co-ordinates benefit
sharing through a range of mechanisms, including exchange of information, access to and
transfer o f technology, capacity building and the sharing o f monetary and other benefits
arising from commercialization. The multilateral system is administered by governing
body, composed of all the contracting parties,

and has a rolling Global Plan of Action.

Article 13 of ITPGRFA lists possible benefits and sharing mechanisms declaring that
“facilitated access” to PGR for food and agriculture is itself a “major benefit.”328 A major
problem in negotiating arrangements for benefit-sharing in regard to plant germplasm
used for food and agriculture is that, while it is unethical to disregard the contributions
made by many farmers over many generations, the economics of tracking these
contributions and adding value to it is not practicable. A SMTA under the ITPGRFA may
incorporate open source-style terms that would make access to the evolving technology

325 See [“ITPGRFA”] supra note 319, Annex 2, SMTA.
326 See [“ITPGRFA”] supra note 319, Art 19; See also, supra note at 241, Art 14 also explains about a
rolling Global Plan o f Action. Furthermore Art 17 o f ITPGRFA calls upon Parties to collaborate with each
other to develop a Global Information System on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in order to
complement those already existing in the IARCs.
327 See [“ITPGRFA”] supra note 319, Art 14.
328 See [“ITPGRFA”] supra note 319, Art 13.2(d).
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the usual reward for contributions rather than direct remuneration through royalties or
similar payments.
Article 1 o f ITPGRFA declares that the Treaty is in harmony with the CBD in
terms of access to resources. However their approaches in terms of sharing benefits
between the provider and recipients largely differ. While the CBD deals with biological
diversity and sets the framework for conservation and sustainable use of genetic resources,
including access and benefit-sharing; its objectives are basically related to the environment
and trade in genetic resources. The ITPGRFA deals with issues raised by the conservation
and sustainable use of plant genetic resources and the objectives are more focused on food
and agriculture. The ITPGRFA is essentially based on the premise that the private sector
and market forces approaches do not really function well for agriculture and since
agriculture has always been based on easy access and free exchange, a more “communal
access” approach in regard to the relevant genetic resources is needed.

The treaty

provides conservation and continued flow across national boundaries o f the plant genetic
resources most important to sustaining food security. Article 16 o f the CBD

and Article

13.2 o f the ITPGRFA concern access to and transfer of technology. Article 13.2 of
ITPGRFA provides:
[T]he Contracting Parties agree that benefits arising from the use,
including commercial, o f plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
under the multilateral system shall be shared fairly and equitably through
the following mechanisms: the exchange o f information, access to and
transfer o f technology, capacity building and sharing of the benefits
arising from commercialization taking into account the priority activity3290

329 Ibid
330 See [“CBD”] supra note 244, Art 16.
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areas in the rolling Global Plan o f Action, under the Guidance of the
Governing Body.
1

Both these provisions, namely Article 16 of CBD and Article 13.2 of ITPGRFA
explicitly refer to developing countries in the area o f technology transfers, emphasizing
their need for concessional access. The open source style MTA o f the ITPGRFA may
assist in allaying the concerns o f the developing economies and facilitate access to
technology essential for the purposes o f subsistence and survival. Thus the emerging
exploitative perspective o f technology transfer may be reversed to it traditional enterprise
o f “knowledge sharing.”
Figure 7 is a flowchart o f the arguments and submissions canvassed in the study.
The thesis statement along with two main supporting arguments are presented. This thesis
recommends that an open access approach to scientific research and innovation be
adopted to achieve the policy objectives as well as the goal o f “knowledge sharing.”31

331 See also [“ITPGRFA”] supra note 319, Art 13 - Benefit-sharing in the Multilateral System 13.1 The Contracting Parties recognize that facilitated access to plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture which are included in the Multilateral System constitutes itself a major benefit o f the
Multilateral System and agree that benefits accruing there from shall be shared fairly and equitably in
accordance with the provisions o f this Article.
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Figure 7: Flowchart of Arguments
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5.2 Future Research
This thesis identifies the presence of a “corporate” model making room for
exploitation within the “developmental” model in connection with technology transfer at
two levels. One at the public-private partnership supported by domestic policies of
developed countries and the other at the international policy making angle. For future
work, a compilation o f case studies of the commercialisation o f university inventions in
Canada, examining whether an exclusive license facilitates the transfer of a given
technology or whether technology transfer proceeded just as fast and widely when the
results were in the open literature, should be undertaken. The findings may be forwarded
to the concerned Ministries as an effort to demonstrate the importance and co-relation of
non-proprietary research and innovation and the consequent need for policy change.
A similar study may be undertaken to assess the use o f the open science MTAs or
the SMTA formulated under the ITPGRFA by government sponsored biobanks. There is
only one informed study, which is based on a survey o f 31 biobanks across North
America, Japan, Europe and Asia, concluding the lack o f use o f open science MTAs.332
More studies are desired to provide definitive examples discussing the impact of the
Treaty on the national regulation o f plant genetic resources and to ascertain the benefits
and costs associated with such adoption.

332 M. Perry., “A ccessing Accessions: Access to Biobanks” in U. Izzo, G. Pascuzzi and M. Macilotti eds.

Comparative Issues in the Governance o f Research Biobanks. Property, Privacy, Intellectual Property and
the Role o f Technology (SpringerLink, 2011) forthcoming on file with author.
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Appendix A
A. Ontario Research Commercialization Program Projects333
Project Name

BioDiscovery
Toronto &
Technology
Transfer Toronto

Project Description

Project Lead/Location & ORCP
Partner Organizations
Funding

BioDiscovery Toronto
and Technology
Transfer Toronto will
build the Toronto
network for
technology transfer —
for life sciences,
physical sciences and
information
technology.
They will provide a
focal point for
industry to access one
of North America's
leading biomedical
research centres,
including a single
window into the eight
academic health
science centres in
Toronto.

Lead: University of
$5,600,000
Toronto [Toronto]
Partners:
Centre for Addiction and
Mental Health, Hospital
l
for Sick Children, Mount
i
Sinai Hospital, Ryerson
!
University, St. Michael's
Hospital, Sunnybrook
!
Health Sciences Centre,
Toronto Rehabilitation
Institute, University Health
Network.

Ottawa Technology An Eastern Ontario
Transfer Network
technology transfer
network will be
established in
collaboration with
PARTEQ Innovations
in Kingston. This
investment will help
integrate six
institutions and three
industry-focused

■

:
Lead: University o f Ottawa $2,908,508
[Ottawa]
Partners: University of
Ottawa, Ottawa Health
Research Institute (OHRI),
Children's Hospital of
Eastern Ontario (CHEO),
University o f Ottawa Heart
Institute, Algonquin
College, National Capital
Institute of

333 See, Government o f Ontario, “Ministry o f Research and Innovation Report (July 21, 2006) (Ontario:
MRI, 2006 ) online:
httv://www. mri. gov, on. ca/enslish/news/MarketReadinessO 72 106 bd2. asv (last
accessed on July 20, 2011)
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Project Name

Project Description

Project Lead/Location & ORCP
Funding
Partner Organizations
j

:

organizations into one
network that will
transition
technologies to the
private sector, and
leverage research
expertise in the
Ottawa/Kingston
regions to help get
new technologies to
market.

T elecommunications
(NCIT), Ottawa Centre for
Research and Innovation
(OCRI).

Expanding
Commercialization
Capacity in the
Kingston Region

The PARTEQ
Innovations
technology transfer
model will be
expanded to all
research institutions
and two private sector
research facilities in
the Kingston area.
The main focus will
be on better
connecting the
research base at
Queen's University
and other institutions
to industries in
Eastern Ontario.

Lead: PARTEQ
$2,200,000
Innovations at Queen's
j
University [Kingston]
Partners: Kingston General
Hospital, Royal Military
College o f Canada, St.
Lawrence College, DuPont
Canada, Novelist Global
Technology Centre

C4 Technology
Transfer Offices

A Southwestern
Ontario network for
technology transfer
will be expanded to
leverage the expertise
of associated regional
innovation networks
and other
organizations to build
strong linkages with
the private sector.

Lead: McMaster
$3,899,531
University [Hamilton]
Partners: University of
Guelph, University of
Waterloo, University o f
Western Ontario,
University o f Windsor,
Wilfred Laurier
University, Lawson Health
Research Institute, Robarts
Research Institute

i

!
|

]
|

;
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Project Name

Project Description

Project Lead/Location & ORCP
Partner Organizations
Funding

The network will also
include a process to
link business and
engineering students
to companies to help
bring products and
services to market.
Ontario Partnership A provincial network
for Innovation and for technology
Commercialization transfer — comprised
(OPIC)
o f seven universities
— will be developed
and linked to
technology transfer
expertise in Toronto
(through Technology
Transfer Toronto).
These universities will
leverage their local
regional innovation
network to help
transition
technologies to the
private sector.
Colleges Ontario
Network for
Industry Innovation
(formerly known as
College Network
for Industry
Innovation)

Lead: Ryerson University
[Toronto]
Partners : Brock
University, Lakehead
University, Laurentian
University, Nipissing
University, Trent
University, University of
Ontario Institute of
Technology

$1,600,000

A provincial network Lead: Seneca College
will be established
[Toronto]
with 10 Ontario
Partners: Algonquin
colleges to help small College, Centennial
companies solve
College, Conestoga
technical problems,
College, Fanshawe
adapt new
College, George Brown
technologies, and
College, Humber Institute
develop or improve
of Technical and
new products and
Advanced Learning,
processes.
Niagara College, St. Clair
College, Seneca College,
Sheridan Institute of
Technical and Advanced
Learning

$3,500,275
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Project Name

Project Description

Project Lead/Location & ORCP
Partner Organizations
Funding

Ontario Society for
Excellence in
Technology
Transfer (OnSETT)

A provincial training
and internship
program will be
established and
delivered across 31
member institutions.
In addition, these
members will have
access to industry
expertise to help them
transition
technologies to the
private sector. The
program will facilitate
sharing of expertise
and resources across
the province.

Lead: Parteq Innovations
$2,205,000
at Queen's University
[Kingston]
Partners: McMaster
University, Mount Sinai
Hospital, Ottawa Health
Research Institute, Queen's
University, The Hospital
for Sick Children,
:
University o f Western
Ontario, University Health
Network, University of
Guelph, University of
Ottawa, University of
Toronto, University of
Waterloo

Talent First
Network

This network will
provide talented
students and
companies with the
training, tools and
methods required to
help move
technologies to
private sector
companies who can
get them to the
marketplace.

Carleton University
[Ottawa]

Strengthening
Ontario's Industry
Capacity in
Photonics

The Ontario Photonics Ontario Photonics
Innovation Network
Innovation Network
(OPIN) will: engage
[Midland]
and promote the
photonics industry
sector, act as a
gateway for industry
to Ontario's research
institutions, and act as
an advisor for

$1,116,500

$300,000
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Project Name

Project Description

Project Lead/Location & ORCP
Partner Organizations
Funding
i

I
r --------

innovative companies
that wish to bring
innovative ideas
before investors. The
photonics industry
includes areas such as
fiber optics, laser
technology and
imaging.
Regional Innovation The Regional
Development
Innovation
Program (RIDP)
Development
Program (RIDP) will
build business
development capacity
in Ontario's key
technology clusters
including Waterloo,
Ottawa, and Toronto.
Led by the Ottawa
Centre for Research
and Innovation
(OCRI), this initiative
will work to integrate
technology transfer
and
commercialization,
and also build
collaborations
between the
information and
communications
technology sector and
research institutions.
Promoting
Economic
Development in the
Medical and
Assistive

:

Led by the Ottawa Centre
for Research and
Innovation (OCRI)
[Ottawa] with help from
Communitech [Waterloo]
and the Innovation
Synergy Centre
[Markham]

Health Technologies Health Technologies
Exchange (HTX) will Exchange (HTX)
implement
[Markham]
developmental
research projects that

n

$3,400,000
!

}

!

i

$600,000
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Project Name

Technologies
(MAT) and
Information and
Communication
Technologies (ICT)
Sectors

Project Description

Project Lead/Location & ORCP
Partner Organizations
Funding

can further the
commercial
application o f new
discoveries in the
Medical and Assistive
Technologies, and
Information and
Communication
Technologies sectors.
This will involve
engaging teams of
Ontario researchers to
work with small and
medium-sized
businesses to solve
product development
issues.

t
jI
Ì

Building
Commercialization
and Investment
Capacity in
Ontario's Agri
Food, Life Sciences,
and Bio-Products
Sectors

BioEnterprise Corporation $900,000
BioEnterprise will
[Guelph]
undertake
commercialization
activities that focus on
the Agri-Food, Life
Sciences, and Bio
products sectors. Key
features o f the
program will include:
working with
entrepreneurs to assist
with business
planning and financial
strategies, and
building stronger
sector linkages
between small and
medium-sized
businesses and
research institutions.

Ontario Internship
Program

The Ontario Centres
o f Excellence, in

Ontario Centres of
Excellence with Vitesse

f

$1,200,000
!
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Project Name

Project Description

Project Lead/Location & ORCP
Partner Organizations
Funding
|

|

i
i

;

partnership with
Re-Skilling [Ottawa]
Vitesse Re-Skilling,
will develop the
Ontario Internship
Program. This
program will place
students and new
graduates in Ontario
technology companies
over the next three
years. Students will
have the opportunity
to develop
commercialization
skills, ideas and
knowledge in an
industry setting.
Southwestern
Ontario Industry
Engagement

C3 Network

TechAlliance will
TechAlliance [London]
develop programs that
will connect
entrepreneurs to
researchers to: help
start new ventures;
conduct market
research to determine
the potential saleable
1
value of technologies;
and assist small and
medium-sized
companies with
business plan
development.

$700,000

This program will
establish a student
mentorship program
and engage industry
in the new media
sector (e.g. electronic
gaming, etc.) A key

$300,000

j

New Media Business
Alliance [Toronto]

■

]
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Project Name

Project Description

Project Lead/Location & ORCP
Partner Organizations
Funding

'
goal o f the program is
to help retain
Ontario's young,
talented innovators by
creating an
entrepreneurial culture
within the new media
sector.
Industry Receptor
Capacity

The Ontario Centre
for Environmental
Technologies
Advancement
(OCETA) will bring
together research
institutions and
industry to collaborate
on research and
development to help
address technical
issues in the
development of a
technology. The
parties will develop
strategies to
commercialize
products that address
Canadian
environmental
priorities. OCETA
will also help Ontario
company’s access
markets, and will
expand its business
support services for
companies with
environment.

j
Ontario Centre for
Environmental
Technologies
Advancement (OCETA)
[Mississauga]

$1,000,000

1

[
j
1I

j

.
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Appendix B
B. Revenue Canada Provisions334
Pursuant to section 37 of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. (1985) (5th supp.), c. 1, as
amended, the Canada Revenue Agency provides incentives, in the form of income tax
credits and income tax deductions for taxpayers to undertake SR&ED. SR&ED is defined
in subsection 248(1) as follows:
...scientific research and experimental development means systematic investigation or
search that is carried out in a field o f science or technology by means o f experiment or
analysis and that is basic research, namely, work undertaken for the advancement of
scientific knowledge without a specific practical application in view, applied research,
namely, work undertaken for the advancement of scientific knowledge with a specific
practical application in view, or experimental development, namely, work undertaken for
the purpose o f achieving technological advancement for the purpose o f creating new, or
improving existing, materials, devices, products or processes, including incremental
improvements thereto, and, in applying this definition in respect o f a taxpayer, includes
work undertaken by or on behalf of the taxpayer with respect to engineering, design,
operations research, mathematical analysis, computer programming, data collection,
testing or psychological research where the work is commensurate with the needs, and
directly in support, of the work described in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) that is undertaken in
Canada by or on behalf o f the taxpayer, but does not include work with respect to market
research or sales promotion, quality control or routine testing o f materials, devices,
products or processes, research in the social sciences or the humanities, prospecting,

334 See, Industry Canada, online http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf7eng/sf01638.html (last accessed on
January 12, 2011).
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exploring or drilling for, or producing, minerals, petroleum or natural gas, the commercial
production o f a new or improved material, device or product or the commercial use of a
new or improved process, style changes, or routine data collection.

Section 127 (5) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. (1985) (5th supp.), c. 1, as amended,
provides for Investment Tax Credit335
(5) There may be deducted from the tax otherwise payable by a taxpayer under this Part
for a taxation year an amount not exceeding the lesser of
(a) the total of
(i) the taxpayer’s investment tax credit at the end o f the year in respect of property
acquired before the end o f the year, of the taxpayer’s apprenticeship expenditure for the
year or a preceding taxation year, o f the taxpayer’s child care space amount for the year
or a preceding taxation year, o f the taxpayer’s flow-through mining expenditure for the
year or a preceding taxation year, o f the taxpayer’s pre-production mining expenditure for
the year or a preceding taxation year or of the taxpayer’s SR&ED qualified expenditure
pool at the end o f the year or at the end o f a preceding taxation year, and
(ii) the lesser of
(A) the taxpayer’s investment tax credit at the end o f the year in respect of property
acquired in a subsequent taxation year, of the taxpayer’s apprenticeship expenditure for a
subsequent taxation year, o f the taxpayer’s child care space amount for a subsequent
taxation year, of the taxpayer’s flow-through mining expenditure for a subsequent
taxation year, o f the taxpayer’s pre-production mining expenditure for a subsequent

335 See, [“Tax Act”], online : http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-l -5th-supp/latest/rsc-1985-cl-5th-supp.html (last accessed on October 30, 2011)
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taxation year or o f the taxpayer’s SR&ED qualified expenditure pool at the end of the
subsequent taxation year to the extent that an investment tax credit was not deductible
under this subsection for the subsequent taxation year, and
(B) the amount, if any, by which the taxpayer’s tax otherwise payable under this Part for
the year exceeds the amount, if any, determined under subparagraph 127(5)(a)(i), and
(b) where Division E.l applies to the taxpayer for the year, the amount, if any, by which
(i) the taxpayer’s tax otherwise payable under this Part for the year
exceeds
(ii) the taxpayer’s minimum amount for the year determined under section 127.51.
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Appendix C
C. Federai SR&ED program on $5 million of qualified SR&ED expenditures
(all figures in SCAD)336
SR&ED
Expenditures

Small
Canadian
Controlled
Private
Corporations

Credit
Rate

First $3
million

35%

Remaining
$2 million

20%

% Refund

Refundable
Tax Credit
(Cash Back)

100%

$1,050,000

40%

$160,000

$1210,000

Total
SR&ED
Expenditures

Large Public
or
Foreign
Controlled
Corporations

Credit
Rate

First $3
million

20%

Remaining
$2 million

20%

% Refund

Refundable
Tax Credit
(Cash Back)

Total
$1000,000

336 The table is an adaptation from [“FAITC - September 2010”] supra note 122 at 2.

Non
Refundable
Tax Credit
(Reduce Taxes)

$240,000

$240,000
Non
Refundable
Tax Credit
(Reduce Taxes)

$600,000

$400,000
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Appendix D
D.

Federal and Provincial SR&ED Tax Incentives337

Federal and Provincial SR&ED Tax Incentives for Small Canadian Private
Corporations

Province

Provincial Credit

Combined

Federal Credit

Credit
Rate
Rate

Refund?

Rate

Refund?

Alberta

10%

Yes

35%

Yes

41.50%

British Columbia

10%

Yes

35%

Yes

41.50%

Manitoba

20%

Partial

35%

Yes

48.00%

New Brunswick

15%

Yes

35%

Yes

44.75%

Newfoundland

15%

Yes

35%

Yes

44.75%

Nova Scotia

15%

Yes

35%

Yes

44.75%

Ontario

10%+4.5%

Yes/No

35%

Yes

44.43%

35%

Yes

35.00%

Yes

35%

Yes

60.94%

and Labrador

Prince Edward
Island
Quebec

37.50%

Saskatchewan

15%

Yes

35%

Yes

44.75%

Nunavut

-

-

35%

Yes

35.00%

NWT

-

“

35%

Yes

35.00%

Yukon

15%

Yes

35%

Yes

44.75%

337 The tables are an adaptation from [“FAITC - September 2010”] supra note 122 at 2.
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Federal and Provincial SR&ED Tax Incentives for Large Public or ForeignControlled Corporations

Provincial Credit

Province

Federal Credit

Combined
Credit
Rate

Rate

Refund?

Rate

Refund?

Alberta

10%

Yes

20%

No

28%

British Columbia

10%

No

20%

No

28%

Manitoba

20%

Partial

20%

No

36%

New Brunswick

15%

Yes

20%

No

32%

Newfoundland

15%

Yes

20%

No

32%

Nova Scotia

15%

Yes

20%

No

32%

Ontario

4.50%

No

20%

No

23.60%

20%

No

20%

and Labrador

Prince Edward
Island
Quebec

17.50%

Yes

20%

No

34%

Saskatchewan

15%

Yes

20%

No

32%

Nunavut

20%

No

20%

NWT

-

Yukon

15%

-

20%

No

20%

Yes

20%

No

32%
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Appendix E
E. 192 Member States of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
(as of August 2011)
Afghanistan

Djibouti

Lebanon

Saint Kitts
and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent
and the
Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tomé
and Príncipe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal

Albania
Algeria

Dominica
Dominican
Republic

Lesotho
Liberia

Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina

Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador

Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania

Armenia
Australia

Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea

Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus

Estonia
Ethiopia
European Union
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon

Luxembourg
Republic of
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands

Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan

The Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana

Bolivia

Greece

Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Federated States
o f Micronesia
Moldova

Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso

Grenada

Monaco

Suriname

Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti

Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia

Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tajikistan

Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon
Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
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Burma
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde

Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran

Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger

Central African
Republic
Chad
Chile
People's Republic of
China
Colombia
Comoros
Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Republic o f the Congo

Iraq

Nigeria

Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and
Tobago
Tunisia

Ireland
Israel
Italy

Niue
Norway
Oman

Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu

Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan

Pakistan
Palau
Papua New
Guinea
Paraguay

Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark

Kenya
Kiribati
Kuwait
North Korea
South Korea
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia

Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda

Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab
Emirates
United
Kingdom
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Appendix F
F. Member States of the Group of 77
(As of August 2011)
Afghanistan

Singapore

Haiti

Mozambique

Algeria

Solomon

Honduras

Myanmar

Islands
Angola

Somalia

India

Namibia

Antigua and

South Africa

Indonesia

Nepal

Argentina

Sri Lanka

Iran

Nicaragua

Bahamas

Sudan

Iraq

Niger

Bahrain

Suriname

Jamaica

Nigeria

Bangladesh

Democratic

Jordan

Oman

Barbuda

Republic o f the
Congo
Barbados

Djibouti

Kenya

Pakistan

Belize

Dominica

Kuwait

Palestine

Benin

Dominican

Lao People's

Panama

Republic

Democratic
Republic

Bhutan

Ecuador

Lebanon

Papua New
Guinea

Bolivia

Egypt

Lesotho

Paraguay

Bosnia and

El Salvador

Liberia

Peru

Equatorial

Libyan Arab

Philippines

Guinea

Jamahiriya

Brazil

Eritrea

Madagascar

Qatar

Brunei Darussalam

Ethiopia

Malawi

Rwanda

Herzegovina
Botswana
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Burkina Faso

Fiji

Malaysia

Saint Kitts and
Nevis

Burundi

Gabon

Maldives

Saint Lucia

Cambodia

Gambia

Mali

Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines

Cameroon

Ghana

Marshall

Samoa

Islands
Cape Verde

Grenada

Mauritania

Sao Tome and
Principe

Guatemala

Mauritius

Saudi Arabia

Chad

Guinea

Micronesia

Senegal

Chile

Guinea-Bissau

Mongolia

Seychelles

China

Guyana

Morocco

Sierra Leone

Colombia

Swaziland

Tunisia

Venezuela

Central African
Republic

(Bolivarian
Republic of)
Comoros

Syrian Arab

Turkmenistan

Viet Nam

Republic
Congo

Thailand

Uganda

Yemen

. Costa Rica

Timor-Leste

United Arab

Zambia

Emirates
Cote d'Ivoire

Togo

United
Republic of
Tanzania

Cuba

Tonga

Uruguay

Democratic People's

Trinidad and

Vanuatu

Republic o f Korea

Tobago

Zimbabwe

